The Republic of Rwanda is part of the African Great Lakes Region. The region straddles the east-central part of Africa. A chain of lakes is found in the region, ranging from Lakes Victoria, Albert, Edward, Kivu and Tanganyika; hence the name African Great Lakes Region. It covers the countries of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The region's relief is moderate and influenced by tectonic and volcanic activity. Parts of the region are heavily forested, as is the case with the Congo-basin, while the others in the east are grassland savannahs. The volcanic soil in parts of the region makes it ideal for agriculture and therefore conducive to human habitation. Indeed parts of the region, particularly Burundi and Rwanda, have high population densities and a concomitant problem of land shortage. Besides the rich arable soil the countries of this region are also well endowed with a variety of precious mineral resources, such as gold, diamonds, uranium, copper, emeralds and cobalt.

Both the relationship between international and municipal law and fundamental rights are important themes of contemporary public law, and have been frequently discussed, among others by Professor Tammes, to whom these lines are devoted in gratitude. This is no reason, however, to consider these matters as closed. Both are still of current interest since they affect the very foundations of law. New developments give rise to new reflections. In law, man's freedom is constantly at stake. Breaches of fundamental rights are the order of the day. But also, and this may justify cautious optimism, these rights are no longer a merely national responsibility. Fundamental human rights, if anything, manifest the relationship between international and municipal law. They are no longer the basis of municipal law only, but also of international law. Fundamental rights occur in both spheres and therefore play a part in the problems of the relationship between them.

The article deals with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), of 28 April 2004. In it the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists, imposed obligations on states. Brief observations on the concept of legislation are followed by comments on instances of near legislation by the Council and on Resolution 1373 (2001), of 28 September 2001, in which the Council, reacting under Chapter VII, and unanimously to the dreadful terrorist attacks of the 11th of that month, took measures fully comparable to legislation. Resolution 1373 (2001) imposed on states rules and principles already sanctioned by the General Assembly, which ties in with the lack of any trace of the preparatory work on the resolution, adopted so to speak instantaneously. In contrast, Resolution 1540 (2004), which imposed on states entirely new rules, arose from a protracted and officially mentioned process of private consultations leading to two open Security Council meetings, at which many states commented on the draft resolution under consideration, questioning its constitutionality and pointing to problems of interpretation and application it raised. Those issues, which did not prevent the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1540 (2004), are the main topic of the article.

The object of this article is to consider whether the ownership of expropriated property of aliens also passes to the expropriating state if the expropriation purporting to be nationalisation is not accompanied by compensation. It deals only with property (including enterprises) located within the territory of the nationalising state and belonging to aliens. The appropriation by governmental agencies of (enemy) property during or in connection with a war will not be discussed.

Modern communications and transportation have brought about not only interdependency between all regions of the world but also an increase in offences committed by or against foreigners or their States. Different States handle this problem in different ways. Among other means, one might mention in this context the enactment of rules of municipal and international law which regulate substantive as well as procedural relationships between authorities of a given State and the perpetrator of an offence with a foreign element'. Such an element exists, for example, if an offence has been committed by a foreigner; if an offence has been committed against a foreigner; if a particular State is to pass judgment on an offence committed abroad; if an offence has been committed in a place where no legal system claims jurisdiction; if a judgment is to be rendered on an offence which has already been the subject of a foreign judgment; if a person is sought for extradition; or if judicial authorities have to take measures in the course of criminal proceedings in the territory of a foreign State, and so on.

The movement for development of private international law in the Americas through multilateral conventions (which is referred to below as the Inter-American Conventional Movement) began in 1878; and the great influence which the European school of legal thought has exerted on it can be perceived throughout its history. It was in the Americas that one of the decisive steps in the world-wide trend towards the development of private international law through conventions took place, and it is there that the considerable influence of the Hague Conference on this subject can be traced to its origin. Legal thought on a global scale is becoming universal and thus the ideas of the Dutch scholar Jitta, expressed at the end of the last century, that the State must respect the individuals forming part of a universal society and that to achieve this end, the State itself must find homogeneous solutions through treaties, are now a reality. In order to try to give an overall view of this movement in private international law in the Americas, section 2 will deal briefly with the development of the three historical stages, which, in my opinion, are the most significant, after which section 3 will deal with the fourth or current stage, following which section 4 will end with some brief concluding remarks.

28. The government has made it clear that both in general and in particular situations the provisions of the Convention are binding on the administrative authorities when exercising their functions. The direct influence of the Convention on the administration therefore arises mainly through the continuous interpretation of the provisions of the Convention by the public authorities when carrying out their duties. The influence of the Convention becomes apparent whenever there is a difference of opinion as to such interpretation between the administrative authorities and political bodies, such as the States-General, or between the administrative authorities and the private citizen. This may occasion discussion in the States-General or a decision by the courts.

During the life of the League of Nations the Mandates, created in conformity with Article 22 of its Covenant, have only once given rise to proceedings before the Permanent Court of International Justice. The case was that between Greece, as plaintiff, and Great Britain, in her capacity of Mandatory Power, as respondent, over the concessions for certain public works to be constructed by a Greek subject Mavrommatis in Palestine under contracts and agreements which he had concluded with the Ottoman authorities in January 1914. The respondent party immediately raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. How specious such questions of jurisdiction often are, was proved by the fact that the Court, in a Judgment of 30 August 1924 (Publications P.C.I.J., series A, No. 2), by 7 votes to 5 upheld its jurisdiction in respect of the works at Jerusalem—comprising an electric tramway system, the supply of electric light and power and of drinking water to the city—, while, obviously unanimously, denying it in respect of similar works—including in addition a system of irrigation of the city gardens—at Jaffa. This decision was based on an adjudication clause, obtaining in Article 26 of the Mandate for Palestine of 24 July 1922. On the strength of that Judgment the merits of the controversy over the Jernsalem concessions were dealt with in subsequent proceedings, terminated by a second Judgment of 26 March 1925 (ibid., series A, No. 5), by which (this time with only one dissenting vote), inter alia, the concessions concerned were found to be valid and Article 4 of Protocol XII, annexed to the Peace Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, concerning certain concessions granted in the Ottoman Empire— providing for the obligatory adaptation thereof to the new economic conditions—was held to be applicable to them.—When the ensuing lengthy negotiations between Great Britain and Greece for such adaptation reached deadlock in 1927, Greece again applied under the said Article 26 of the Mandate to the Permanent Court, with the object of achieving the award of damages for the asserted failure of Great Britain, in carrying-out the second Judgment, to comply with another provision (Article 11) of the Mandate, dealing with the methods of developing the country. Once more the British Government raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, maintaining that it was not competent to deal with this element of the dispute, and this time, by 7 votes to 4, the Court, by a third Judgment of 10 October 1927 (ibid., series A, No. 11), upheld the objection for reasons too technical to be summarized here.

Sedert het arrest van de Hoge Raad in de zaak Solbandera is het niet meer twijfelachtig dat de Hoge Raad het recht van partijen erkent om bij internationale overeenkomsten zelf het toepasselijke recht aan te wijzen. Naar mijn mening had de Hoge Raad de autonomie van partijen ook reeds erkend bij zijn arrest inzake de treuer Nicolaas, maar Hijmans, van Brakel, Schölten en A. van Oven hebben dit betwist. Geheel onbegrijpelijk was deze mening niet, daar de overwegingen van de Hoge Raad in dit arrest wel ruimte laten voor enige twijfel.

In the modern law of obligations the protection of consumers is a phenomenon that is gaining ever increasing importance. It has also penetrated the realm of private international law (p.i.l.). Rules on the subject primarily deal with obligations arising out of contract; in this field specific p.i.l. rules envisage contracts concluded by consumers. In the field of non-contractual obligations no such specific rules have been framed as yet. However p.i.1. rules relating to products liability, although as a rule not limited to consumers but also including non-consumers, largely affect the first-mentioned class of persons and cannot be neglected in a paper dealing with consumer protection. In the present paper, therefore, attention will be focussed on p.i.l. rules relating to consumer contracts, and this will be followed by a brief account of p.i.l. rules on products liability as far as these are of importance for the protection of consumers.

It was understood from the outset that the trials would be limited, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration, to a number of the highest-ranking Nazi leaders and their principal accomplices. It was proposed by the United States in the draft of April 30, 1945, presented to the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, that the trial comprise also “the principal Nazi organizations and their members, through whom the most bestial of the Nazi cruelties have been put into effect”. According to this draft, the defense of superior orders shall not absolve the accused from responsibility but may be considered, if justice so requires, in mitigation of punishment. Nor shall an accused be able to escape the trial on the ground that he was the head or principal officer of a state. Offenses against the armies of the United Nations would be punished by the appropriate national tribunals. Perpetrators of atrocities in territories occupied by Germany during the war as well as traitors such as Quisling, Laval, “Lord Haw-Haw”, would be dealt with in a similar manner.

The doctrine of immunity of States has always had the interest of Bert Voskuil. The question whether a foreign State may be summoned before a national court has been raised and answered by him in numerous essays. Therefore, a study of the question how to summon a foreign State before the national judiciary is not out of place in a collection of essays on international procedural law, dedicated to Bert Voskuil.

On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 also known by the names of its principal sponsors, Senator Helms (R-NC) and Representative Burton (R-IN), as the Helms-Burton Act. The United States thereby enacted a Bill that ‘internationalizes’ an essentially bilateral conflict with Cuba, which can be traced back to the Cuban Revolution, 37 years ago. The Act strengthens economic sanctions against Cuba, intending to protect property rights of Americans, eventually improve the human rights situation, cause the removal of the Castro regime3 and lead to the establishment of a democratically elected government.