1. Lagarde, P., Rev. Crit. 1974, 426.Google Scholar

2. This article discusses the concept of domicile as a connecting factor. Domicile as a basis for jurisdiction is not taken into consideration: see Kollewijn, , American-Dutch Private International Law, 1961, 29Google Scholar; Hoge Raad 6-12-1968, NJ 1970, 99; de Winter, WPNR 1971, 5, NILR 1971, 356; Hoge Raad 1-11-1974, RvdW 1974, no. 97; Verheul, WPNR 5247; Lemaire, WPNR 5188 (in respect of the concept of domicile in the EEC Convention of 1968 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments). Nor are we concerned with specific aspects arising in non-international but interregional cases; see Lemaire, , De betekenis van woonplaats volgens ons (Nederlands) interregionaal privaatrecht, NILR 1962 (De Conflictu Legum), 305Google Scholar; Henriquez, , Het domiciliebeginsel in het Antiliaans interregionaal en internationaal privaatrecht, WPNR 4873.Google Scholar

3. “The laws relating to the rights, the status and the capacity of persons are binding upon Netherlands subjects even when residing abroad” (translation derived from Kollewijn, , American-Dutch PIL, 98).Google Scholar

4. See Lemaire, , Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 1968, 213–217Google Scholar; Joppe, I. S., De Ned. Rechtspraak inzake huwelijksvermogensrecht en erfrecht in het IPR 1963–1973, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1974, 96.Google Scholar

5. de Winter, L.I., Le principe de la nationalité s'-effrite-t-il peu à peu?, NILR 1962 (De Conflictu Legum), 514Google Scholar; De maatschappelijke woonplaats als aanknopingsfactor in het ipr, Inaugural Adress Amsterdam, 1962; Nationality or domicile? The present state of affairs, Rec. Cours, 1969, III, 347.Google Scholar

6. See the abovementioned writings of de Winter; also: Deelen, , Nationalité et milieu, NILR 1962 (De Conflictu Legum), 103Google Scholar; d'Oliveira, Jessurun, Meded. Ned. Ver. v. Int. Recht 1971, 49Google Scholar: the growing importance of domicile is in accordance with the growth of the body of rules of “public law” to be obeyed in the country where one abides; Voskuil, , Enkele overblijfselen van internationaal huwelifks- en voogdijrecht uit het begin van dele eeuw, in Jeugdrecht op een Keerpunt, 1974, 113.Google Scholar

7. This labour has been elaborately accomplished by de Winter, , Rec. Cours, 1969 III, 455.Google Scholar

8. See de Winter, , Rec. Cours, 1969 III, 581Google Scholar. As to persons with dual nationality the Hoge Raad, 9-12-1965, NI 1966, 378 (Norwegian divorce case) has adopted the “effective nationality test”, propounded by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case, see ICJ Yearbook 1954–55, 76–80. The Hoge Raad decision has been followed by a series of (chiefly unpublished) decisions of lower courts, to be found in the Card Index of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut [AK]. According to Lemaire, 1968, 81, the effective nationality test gives rise to fundamental objections: establishing a person's effective nationality is equivalent to finding the country where he is domiciled. Hence effective nationality produces no solution when a person with dual nationality is domiciled in neither of the countries concerned, having no substantial links with either of them. Lemaire's criticism is correct: sticking to the effective nationality test may lead the court to unsatisfactory decision-making; see e.g. District Court Haarlem 12-3-1968, NJ 1968,424; a woman of German nationality marries an Italian; accordingly she obtains Italian nationality without losing her German citizenship; after the marriage she has factual connections with neither Italy nor Germany; the fact that she married an Italian is sufficient reason for the Court to apply Italian law as the law of her effective nationality, an effective link being deemed established merely by marriage.

9. See Court of Appeal The Hague 6-2-1931, NJ 1931, 747; 23-2-1942, NJ 1942, 327; 28-4-1947, NJ 1947, 743.

10. See Kollewijn, , 101–102Google Scholar, for an English translation.

11. District Court Utrecht 14-5-1969; Verheul, , De Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake echtscheiding in het IPR, 1963–1971, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1971, no. 105.Google Scholar

12. See Deelen, , NILR 1968, 316Google Scholar; Verheul, NILR 1971, 103Google Scholar: “The applicability of the law of the child's habitual residence is now generally endorsed, also outside the scope of the Hague Conventions … Even in matters of maintenance between adults the law of the habitual residence of the person entitled to maintenance is coming to the fore”; as to child protection see Verheul, , NILR 1974, 198.Google Scholar

13. See infra.

14. See e.g. District Court Rotterdam 28-8-1972, AK 7591; 5-3-1973, AK 8004.

15. Kollewijn, , 29.Google Scholar

16. N.B. woonstede has been derived from the Code Napoléon!

17. Kosters, , Het internationaal burgerlijk recht, 1917, 298Google Scholar; van Brakel, , Grondslagen en beginselen van Nederlands IPR, 1946, 132Google Scholar. Sauveplanne, , Elementair IPR, 1971, 22–23Google Scholar, does not reveal which role he attributes to the Civil Code notion of domicile. See also, District Court Leeuwarden 23-4-1964, NJ 1964, 377, NILR 1965, 408: the parties' last domicile is “Leeuwarden”; consequently, Dutch law is applied.

18. Morris, , The Conflict of Laws, 1971, 8.Google Scholar

19. Wolff, , Private International Law, 1962, 99.Google Scholar

20. In the English conflict of laws much stress is laid on this prerequisite; see Dicey, & Morris, , The Conflict of Laws, 1973, 88–89.Google Scholar

21. See Morris, , 1971, 497.Google Scholar

22. Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht, Deel, Eerste, eerste stuk, Natuurlijke Personen en Familierecht, 1957, 28 (translation by the present author).Google Scholar

23. Here woonplaats indicates the house where a person has his home, cf. Asser-Wiarda, , 30.Google Scholar

24. See Kollewijn, , 29.Google Scholar

25. A small village in the south of the Netherlands.

26. N.B. E.M. Meijers, who conceived art. 10, explains the use of woonstede in his Explanatory Report by the argument that woonstede marks the continuity of the dwelling-place better than does hoofdverblijf. Meijers seeks the criterion for this continuity in the habitual sleeping-place of a person (see also art. 17 Besluit Bevolkingsboekhouding). The sleeping-place seems to me to be rather arbitrary: sleeping – the usual nightly “activity” of the average Dutchman – is not an “act” relevant for the fulfillment of one's rights and duties.

27. See as to art 74 Civil Code: Hoge Raad 4-5-1917, NJ 1917, 706; Kosters-Dubbink, , IPR, 1962, 679Google Scholar; District Court The Hague 23-3-1933, N.J. 1934, 586; Court of Appeal The Hague 9-11-1934, NJ 1935, 241: a person may have his principal residence in a foreign country if he lives there regularly during a sequence of months in his own apartment, his assets being located there, and an intention to establish a principal residence elsewhere not being evident, even if he abides temporarily in the Netherlands; Court of Appeal Amsterdam 23-3-1939, NJ 1939, 462. See as to art. 75 Civil Code: Hoge Raad 4-7-1916, NJ 1916, 1168; District Court Rotterdam 4-11-1918, NJ 1918, 951; District Court Amsterdam 25-2-1941, NJ 1941, 235: a man, whose wife and children have already settled in Amsterdam, leaves his residence at Surabaya (Dutch Indies) for Holland and dies in the Gulf of Aden during the voyage to Holland; the District Court rejects the argument that a change of domicile has been effected, sheer intention being insufficient to that effect; only factual establishment in Holland may extinguish a domicile in a foreign country.

28. See Asser-Wiarda, , 30.Google Scholar

29. In other words: domicile as a connecting factor is not influenced by domicile as a concept of internal law. One may ask oneself whether the reverse may be feasible, i.e. is domicile in internal law subordinate to domicile in private international law? In writings dating from the beginning of this century one finds the conception that domicile itself is a matter of status, governed by the law of a person's nationality (this view has been rejected by Kosters, 1917, 296 and Hoge Raad 5-1-1917, NJ 1917, 143). The supposition that, in accordance with modern views on private international law, status is governed by the law of a person's domicile – in the sense of private international law – would lead to the following result: the substantive law of the country of a person's international domicile determines the place of internal domicile within that country. This construction, to be found in a decision of the Rotterdam District Court, 5-10-1970, AK 6656, is reprehensible: for reasons of, for instance, jurisdiction of a Dutch Court ex art. 126 Code of Civil Procedure no legal system but the lex fori can provide an adequate answer to the question whether the person is “domiciled” within the District of the Court. See also Schneider, B., Le domicile international, 1973, 160–164.Google Scholar

30. The Hague Conventions, in order to stress the non-legal character of domicile, avoid the use of “domicile” and prefer “habitual residence”. See as to the historical background and meaning of résidence habituelle: van Hoogstraten, M.H., La codification par traités en droit international privé dans le cadre de la Conférence de La Haye, Rec. Cours, 1967 III, 354Google Scholar: “Le rattachement ‘centre-vie”’; see as to “habitual residence” in the English conflict of laws: Hall, C., Cruse v. Chittum:Google Scholar Habitual Residence Judicially Explored, ICLQ 1975, 1.

31. See his inaugural adress, passim, and Mededelingen Ned. Ver. Int. Recht 1971, 31. See for a distinction between “domicile” as a “legal” concept and “résidence” as a “factual” one: Council of Europe, Resolution 18-1-1972, NILR 1973, 213.

32. See Wade, J.A., The English Concept of Domicile – A Re-Evaluation, NILR 1974, 265Google Scholar; District Court Utrecht 30-12-1970, AK 6671, Verheul, WPNR 5247.

33. See Winans v. A. G. [1904] AC 287, H.L.Google Scholar; Bowie (or Ramsay) v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] AC 588Google Scholar, H.L.; Wade, , 275Google Scholar: “… a person may be domiciled in a country which to all intents and purposes he has abandoned…”.

34. See supra note 30.

35. See e.g. District Court Haarlem 5-3-1968, AK 3842; District Court Assen 9-12-1968, AK 5579. District Court Utrecht 7-5-1969, AK 4980, de Winter, WPNR 1971, 28; 14-4-1969, AK 498, Lemaire, WPNR 1971, 79; District Court Amsterdam 29-1-1970, NJ 1970, 188; District Court Den Haag 29-6-1970, AK 6164; District Court Utrecht 4-8-1971, AK 7602; District Court Rotterdam 28-8-1972, AK 7591; District Court Amsterdam 9-5-1973, AK 8013; 28-6-1973, AK 8040.

35a. See Kokkini-Haandrikman, , De Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake gezag over minderjarigen in het IPR 1963–1971, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1973, 7.Google Scholar

36. District Court Amsterdam 1967, mentioned above, attached weight to the two and a half year's duration of the residence.

37. See supra, note 29.

38. District Court The Hague 7-11-1973, AK 7707 considers official registration sufficient to establish a private international law domicile.

39. District Court Utrecht 14-5-1969, AK 4981.

40. See District Court Arnhem 29-9-1969, AK 6572, CAR 6793: ingroeiing in de Nederlandse samenleving.

41. See District Court Haarlem 5-12-1969, AK 6577, CAR 6973: maatschappelijke banden.

42. District Court Utrecht 4-8-1971, AK 7602.

43. See Verheul, , NILR 1974, 91.Google Scholar

44. See e.g. District Court Amsterdam 29-1-1970, NJ 1970,187; District Court The Hague 29-6-1970, ak 6146; District Court Utrecht 9-12-1970, AK 6951; District Court Arnhem 22-2-1971, AK 7581; District Court Utrecht 19-5-1971, AK 7601; 4-8-1971, AK 7602; 9-2-1972, AK 7593; District Court Roermond 26-10-1972, AK 7728; 2-11-1972, AK 7859; District Court Utrecht 13-12-1972, AK 7612; District Court The Hague 8-1-1973, AK 7614; 22-1-1973, AK 7625; District Court Roermond 25-1-1973, AK 7615; 8-3-1973, AK 7820; 5-4-1973, AK 7829.

45. Sauveplanne, J.G., Internationaal privaatrechtelijke vraagstukken m.b.t. de echtscheidingGoogle Scholar, Hand. NJV 1971, deel I, eerste stuk, 18.

46. See Lemaire, WPNR 5275, 589, note 2; Kotting, WPNR 5283.

47. As will be shown below, domicile itself may lead to complications with regard to divorce matters. These complications, however, can not be solved by the “legal atmosphere” concept, as the same complications may arise when one adheres to it.

48. The rather arbitrary character of the present enumeration is caused by the casuistry inherent in the subject under discussion.

49. District Court Amsterdam 10-1-1974, NJ 1974, 460 attaches weight to the intentional element by using the terminology “choosing a domicile” in the sense of p.i.1.

50. Wade, , 279–280.Google Scholar

51. Morris, , 1971, 32.Google Scholar

52. See Lemaire, , IPR, 1968, 85.Google Scholar

53. See District Court The Hague 7-11-1972, AK 7707; Trib.Civ.Bruxelles 15-9-1967, Pas. Beige 1968 III 45.

54. See art. 1(2) of the Benelux Draft: “For the purpose of the following articles a person's domicile shall be ascertained without taking into account the conditions laid down by a State for the acquisition of domicile by aliens within its territory”. (Transl. Kollewijn, 99); Lemaire, , IPR, 1968, 84.Google Scholar

55. See Morris, , 1971, 22Google Scholar: naturalisation is one of the factors to be taken into account; Dicey, & Morris, , 99–100Google Scholar: “it is now settled that this consideration is not decisive as a matter of law”; Wahl v. A.-G. (1932) 147Google Scholar L.T. 382, H.L.; see also District Court Leeuwarden 23-1-1969, AK 4782, Lemaire, WPNR 1971, 79, de Winter, Meded. NVIR 1971, 35.

56. See ICJ Yearbook 1954–1955, 76–80.Google Scholar

57. See e.g. the Dutch Nationality Act, Wet op het Nederlanderschap, (art. 3(5).

58. The latter example may also demonstrate the role of the animus manendi: soccer players often voice their intentions for the future in interviews with the press. These may be taken into account with respect to the determination of domicile.

59. See as to these demands supra.

60. See Lemaire, , IPR, 1968, 84.Google Scholar

61. The following enquiry does not apply to, e.g., mesures d'urgence, see Convention of 10 5, 1961Google Scholar, on the Protection of Minors, Art. 9.

62. See for the role of domicile as regards custody: Kokkini-Haandrikman, , De Nederlandse recht-spraak inzake gezag over minderjarigen in het IPR 1963–1971, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1973, 33–34.Google Scholar

63. See Hoge Raad 14-5-1971, NJ 1971, 369, Ring v. Gould, NILR 1974, 195 (Verheul).Google Scholar

64. See Art. 2(1) of the 1955 Hague Convention concerning the Law Applicable to the International Sale of Goods; van Rooij, R., De Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake contracten in het IPR 1963–1971, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1972, XII–XIII.Google Scholar

65. See Lemaire, , IPR, 1968, 256.Google Scholar

66. As far as I know this ‘legal trick’ has never been used in Netherlands case law.

67. See supra note 63.

68. See Kokkini-Haandrikman, , 34–35.Google Scholar

69. See Lemaire, , IPR, 1968, 84.Google Scholar See, however, Kantongerecht (lowest court) The Hague 6-10-1972, NJ 1973, 255, incorrectly basing a child's domicile in the sense of p.i.l. on the child's domicile of dependence ex art. 12 Civil Code; Hoge Raad 24-5-1968, NJ 1968, 300 (Mexican divorce case). See, in accordance with the view expressed here, Hall, C., Cruse v. ChittumGoogle Scholar: Habitual Residence Judicially Explored, ICLQ 1975, 23–24: “In the case of children, though during their minority there may be an element of compulsory residence in their relationship with their parents, that same relationship also provides the ties which establishes the habit of so residing irrespective of their intentions, likes and dislikes. This is different from saying that minors have an habitual residence of dependency. There is no reason why minors should not acquire a separate habitual residence altogether”.

70. Convention of 24-10-1956 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children, art. 1(2); Convention of 2-10-1973 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, art. 4(2).

71. Both Germany and Switzerland have adhered to the 1956 Convention.

72. See Joppe, I.S., De Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake huwelijksvermogensrecht en erfrecht in net IPR 1963–1973, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut 1974, 20–23Google Scholar; Lemaire, WPNR 5117. See as to the concept of domicile in regard to matrimonial property law: Voskuil, 1974, 115, and the decision there discussed: District Court Amsterdam 20-2-1973, NJ 1973, 172, a decision which illustrates the difficulties one encounters when determining a married couple's (first) joint domicile.

73. See as to attempts to attenuate this strict rule Joppe, 22–23; Lemaire, WPNR 5117.

74. See Verheul, NILR 1971, 94, with references.

75. Art. 3 Benelux Draft, where the law of the husband's nationality is held applicable if the parties' nationalities differ.

76. See, e.g., art. 87–89 Netherlands Civil Code.

77. An aspect not to be neglected with respect to the application of the law of domicile to matrimonial property either; see Joppe, 23.

78. See art. 87(1) Netherlands Civil Code.

79. See Verheul, , De Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake echtscheiding in het IPR, 1963–1971, Ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1971, 7Google Scholar; Verheul, NILR 1971, 89–91; Sauveplanne, Hand. NJV 1971 I.1., 13.

80. See Verheul, Hand. NJV 1971, deel 2, 34; Kotting, ibid. 37 and WPNR 5283.

81. See Sauveplanne, 1971, 14Google Scholar: “The law of the last joint domicile then applies”.

82. See Trib. de Grande Instance de Paris 16-10-1970, Rev. Crit 1971, 532: “Que la notion de domicile commun, en cette matière, distincte du concept juridique du domicile légal, s'analyse en un établissement effectif commun dans le même pays, entrainant intégration réelle à un même milieu, et à la vie locale du même pays”. See as to the difficulties raised by “joint domicile” in divorce cases: District Court Utrecht 21-12-1966, NJ 1967, 392, Kollewijn, WPNR 1968, 437; District Court Leeuwarden 2-3-1967, NJ 1967,401; District Court The Hague 5-3-1973, NJ 1974, 430.

83. See Lemaire, WPNR 5188: “Zijn zin is immers die van een hulp-formule ter bepaling van de norm-inhoud van de verschillende soorten voorschriften en daarom afhankelijk van de strekking en ratio van de betrokken bepalingen”; Schneider, 227: “Les fonctionsdu domicile, en droit international privé comme en droit interne, sont fort diverses. Le terme de “domicile” n'a en lui-même aucun contenu concret; sa notion varie en fonction de ses conséquences”.

84. Codification of the concept of domicile in the sense of private international law seems hardly advisable, domicile being as flexible a concept as it is.