The officially atheist Soviet Union did not tolerate any open manifestations of faith except for the rare ones it overtly allowed and covertly controlled. Since all religions were almost entirely suppressed from above, there were no visible manifestations of inter-religious intolerance “from below,” i.e. among the adherents of different faiths. Yet our paper shows that in less than two decades after the demise of the Soviet state and its official atheism, there emerged in Russia an entirely new landscape of widespread and strong interfaith intolerance from below. We describe that landscape using the data from our representative national survey conducted in Russia in 2005.

The relationship between Orthodox Christianity and national identity has been one of the most contended issues in modern nationalism. The dominant religion in the Balkans, Orthodoxy has transported the identity of ethnic groups into the modern era and political leaders have employed religious institutions according to their own political agendas in the construction of “imagined communities.” Orthodoxy has a particular perception of the political field. Based on the concept of symphonia, which dates back to the Byzantine Empire, the Church claims that religious and political offices are equal and have similar responsibilities. Religious and political rulers have the mission to guide the people and the Church and state should collaborate harmoniously in fostering identity. Political leaders refer to the nationalist discourse of the Church in order to induce national cohesion. From this perspective, the relationship between religion and the construction of the nation in the Orthodox space differs from that in the Catholic or Protestant world where Churches are supranational or sub-national institutions.

Would you like to travel to outer space? Explore like real astronauts the slow, gentle movements characteristic of a weightless environment? The Houston Space Center offers its visitors such a trip through the ISS, the International Space Station. It presents America's space programme by using a simulator to create a compelling environment, complete with 3,000 accurately placed stars that mimic what the real astronauts experience in the ISS.1 You can feel the glory of current-day American scientific progress, the power of the US, the world's number one power.

In April 1994, the Croatian government of the late Franjo Tudjman demanded that all “non white” UN troops be removed from Croatia, claiming that only “first-world troops” were sufficiently sensitized to Croatia's problems. In Western circles, however, it was Tudjman's Serbian counterpart, Slobodan Milosevic, who was often portrayed as a racist. Ramet, for example, argues that “Milosevic built his power on a foundation of hatred and xenophobia …”; Zimmermann refers to “the ethnic hatred sown by Milosevic and his ilk …”; and Duncan and Holman compare Milosevic to Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky, claiming that the latter's “blatant appeals to racism bear a striking resemblance to those of Milosevic's Serbia.” For her part, Madeleine Albright, speaking on national television as US Secretary of State in February 2000, described Milosevic as a man “who decides that if you are not of his ethnic group, you don't have a right to exist.”

On 27 June 2004, Serbian voters went to the polls for the third time in a year to choose a president. The winner of the first two rounds of voting, Tomislav Nikolić, Deputy to the President of the extreme right Serbian Radical Party (SRS), lost the third round of voting to the more liberal Borisav Tadić by just under 8 percentage points (53.2 to 45.4), and the Radicals failed to form a ruling coalition in government. Nevertheless, more than five years after the last war in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, the largest political party in the largest of the successor states has been characterized as the most extreme right party in the Balkans today. Indeed, the Radicals have been an enduring force in Serbian politics for the past decade and a half, sometimes ruling in coalition with Slobodan Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). SRS founder Vojislav Šešelj, a flamboyant, obstreperous, highly influential figure, and his fellow Radicals have sought and in many ways succeeded in shaping the post-communist transformation of Yugoslav politics and society, calling for a return to the true spirit of Serbia, when the nation was strong because its men defended its honor as well as its borders.

The Republic of Tatarstan is located between Europe and Asia. It is important to emphasize geographical location, which is a key element in the processes of identities formation and transformation. Tatarstan is located in the core of the Russian Federation, situated in the European part of Russia and 800 kilometres from Moscow, at the confluence of the Volga and the Kama Rivers. The capital of Tatarstan is Kazan. The economic potential of the republic is based mainly on raw materials (including oil and gas), industry and agriculture. According to the constitution of the republic (approved on 6 November 1992) Tatarstan (previously known as Tataria) is defined as a multiethnic republic, with two official languages, Russian and Tatar. The largest ethnic groups are Tatars and Russians; as a consequence it makes sense to talk in terms of a bicultural society with two main confessional groups, namely Muslim and Orthodox Christians.

The role of Greece in the Balkans has been a rather ambiguous but extremely interesting issue for both Greek and European diplomacy for more than 15 years, since the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As with every phenomenon associated with that “dangerous” and “explosive” part of the European Continent, the Greek position in the specific region should be discussed and analysed thoroughly and comprehensively rather than partially.

The economic status of a country may be analyzed and measured in terms of a number of different attributes and components. The present study focuses on capital formation (i.e. generation of new wealth in the form of capital) because capital formation is a major and comprehensive determinant of the economy's growth. The ability of an economy to generate sufficient new capital is the foundation of its strength and vitality; only to a limited extent may domestic capital formation be supplemented by foreign funds.

Youth and their experiences, opinions and attitudes in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) have typically been left unexamined by both academics and policy makers. Nor is there much attention paid to historical analysis of youth who lived in the socialist period, which could shed some light on the mentality of young generations in present-day BiH. This article provides a historical view of socialist youth in Tito's era, with a special focus on BiH in the late 1980s. The second section provides a survey of how young people live in one of the Yugoslav successor states, BiH, examining the continuity and discontinuity of socio-political and ideological conditions in which youth lived in socialist Yugoslavia. The third section looks at the relationship between youth and the international community, the dynamics of which shed light on common features of both pre- and post-war BiH. Specifically, it will examine the internationally funded and organized “Successor Generation Initiative” (SGI) youth program, which aimed to educate youth in democratic values and develop their leadership skills.

This article concerns collective identities in the context of EU enlargement and the post-Soviet transition of Estonian society, particularly of the two main ethno-linguistic groups: ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. The empirical basis of the study is formed by factor structures of self-identification. The data were obtained from nationally representative surveys carried out in 2002, before Estonia joined the EU, and in 2005. The thinking patterns behind the structures of self-categorization are discussed mainly on the basis of theoretical concepts of individualization and transition culture. For background information, comparative data collected in Latvia (2006) and in Sweden (2003) are used. The survey results reveal that in the post-communist transformation, EU integration and spread of global mass culture have homogenized the mental patterns of the Estonians and the Russians. It is characteristic of post-communist Estonia that both minority and majority groups have utilized trans-national and civic identity and individualistic patterns of self-identification in terms of (sub)culture and social and material achievement, extracted from social norms and existing structures. Surveys confirm that for political actors in both Estonia and Russia it is hardly possible any more to create a common umbrella identity for the Russians in Estonia—the self-designation patterns of the Estonian Russians have been emancipated during the transition period.

Long live the constitution! Long live the republic! Long live the people! Perish the nobility and the rank of the czar!

Nationalism in the East has long been considered to be different from nationalism in the West. Although Hans Kohn's famous dichotomy has been challenged, it still determines the way most people look at Eastern nationalism. Nationalism in the East is seen as authoritarian, ethnic and cultural in contrast to the democratic, civic and political nationalism of the West. According to the common view, Western nationalism is based on modern liberal, constitutional ideas, which makes it democratic, while Eastern nationalism is based on cultural belonging, which makes it conservative or regressive and hostile to foreign influence.

Civil society, to the extent that it exists today in Bosnia, has developed alongside the recasting of women's roles in public life. Researchers equate civil society in Bosnia today almost exclusively with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The early post-war NGOs grew out of the peace movement that took shape before and during the open conflict of 1992–1995. Peace organizations evolved to a large extent from feminist organizing and organizations in the Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Thus, to study the origins of Bosnian civil society, we must begin with the struggle for equal rights for women in modern Yugoslavia.

The end of the Cold War drew increasing attention to ongoing and new ethnic conflicts—particularly because many of the high-profile new conflicts broke out amid the ruins of communism. Since 11 September 2001 there has been even more discussion about whether and how Islam contributes to international and civilizational conflict. However, there has been little work attempting to understand whether Islam plays any distinctive role in ethnic conflicts. Much work on ethnic conflict assumes that Islam is just one possible component of ethnic and national identities, and that it has no distinctive influence. Others examine whether Islam always has a similar impact on ethnic conflict—typically based upon identifying states or minority groups as having majority Muslim populations.

The Republic of Buryatia, along with 12 other former Soviet states during the same year, had declared its sovereignty no later than 8 October 1990. This did not actually mean a declaration of independence. Rather, this step was taken to urge the central government to acknowledge Buryatia as a free and equal partner at the political level. Boris Yeltsin, during his time as Russian president, did much to support this claim by propagating a vision of a post-Soviet Russia as a union of free peoples with equal rights. The central government in Moscow therefore recognized the existence of relatively autonomous regions. This was also done to respond to the interests of the different ethnic groups, which became increasingly important in the political sphere.

The basis of a civil nation is common goals, common values, trust in the government, and the understanding that the government serves us. The main task of the people [now] is to avoid military service, taxes, and the authorities in general. Under such conditions, it is impossible to form a civil political nation.

National identity was already the object of scholarly studies by the 1950s and 1960s, e.g. by analysts such as Karl Deutsch and Ernest Hass, to a great extent inspired by the start of European integration and German and French reconciliation. One of the crucial questions has been (and still is) to what extent national identity constitutes a barrier to Europeanization and integration, and to what extent overlapping multiple identities can co-exist.