The initial government debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio and the government's commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GDP ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary–fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with “normal shocks,” perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds—under commitment—the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long- and short-term bonds.

The paper investigates whether US regions respond differently to shocks in the crude oil market. We disentangle oil market shocks into distinct demand and supply shocks and examine the response of regional personal income to these shocks. Results indicate that for most regions, oil supply shocks decrease real personal income. Except for the Rocky Mountains and the Southwest, global aggregate demand shocks are recessionary, typically about a year and a half after the shock. When we split our data into oil-producing and non-oil-producing regions, we find that global aggregate demand shocks have no effect on oil-producing regions but cause a decrease in income in non-oil-producing regions. Our analysis further indicates that oil-specific demand shocks have positive and persistent impacts on oil-producing regions but are recessionary in non-oil-producing regions. We also document significant asymmetries in the regional responses to small versus large oil shocks. In addition, the paper shows that regional differences in industrial composition explain some of the variation in the responses of real regional personal income to oil shocks.

Can officially reported output figures be externally validated? This paper presents a dynamic panel framework for assessing statistics using verifiable signals of economic activity. In this context, satellite readings of nitrogen dioxide, a byproduct of combustion, are forwarded. The problem of validating China's reported gross domestic product at the sub-national level during two recent downturns is considered. During the Great Recession period, reported figures are validated for some regions, but not others, including specifically those known to be inaccurate.

This paper derives the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) transfer scheme, UI benefits, and UI contribution fees: When a worker has to earn his or her UI eligibility through work, the UI benefits do not last forever, and the UI agency has imperfect monitoring power on the strategic behavior of the worker. We show that the consideration of the UI eligibility rule generates the effective entitlement effect, which serves as an additional incentive device and alters the nature of the optimal UI transfer scheme established in literature. In contrast with previous studies, we find that when the effective entitlement effect is large, it completely removes the moral hazards in job searches, job acceptances, and job quits. As a result, the optimal UI benefits and contribution fees become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the existing UI system.

A recent theoretical literature highlights the role of endogenous firm entry as an internal amplification mechanism of business cycle fluctuations. The amplification mechanism works through the competition effect (CE) and the variety effect (VE). This paper tests the significance of this amplification mechanism, quantifies its importance, and disentangles the CE and VE. To this end, we estimate a medium-scale real business cycle model with firm entry for the U.S. economy. The CE and VE are estimated to be statistically significant. Together, they amplify the volatility of output by 8.5% relative to a model in which both effects are switched off. The CE accounts for most amplification, whereas the VE only plays a minor role.

This paper proposes a new theoretical framework aimed at understanding the link between technological change, skill premium, and employment. We build an endogenous growth model of directed technological change with vertical research and development (R&D) in which low-skilled workers might be organized in a trade union. This union can act as a monopoly seller of labor and decide unilaterally the low-skilled wage, or as a managerial union that bargains wage and employment with the employers' federation, i.e., firms. Our results suggest that (i) the impacts of trade unions on technological-bias and on the level of (un)employment crucially depend on their type and preferences; and (ii) trade unions can actually increase low-skilled wages and employment if they have some bargaining power and are employment-oriented. Furthermore, our framework provides some highlights to explain the relationship between wage dispersion and the deunionization process that occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States during the 1980s.

This paper examines the consequences of international financial integration in a two-sector standard incomplete markets model with occupational choice under risk and financial constraints affecting entrepreneurial activity. We endogenize international productivity differences and discuss the implications of international integration for the macroeconomy, inequality, and welfare. Lending countries are characterized by tighter domestic constraints and experience an increase in gross national product, whereas the gross domestic product effect is ambiguous. We conclude that international integration is beneficial only for economies where there are substantial financial constraints on entrepreneurial activity. Otherwise, a majority of households suffer, due to the unequal distribution of welfare gains and losses across the heterogeneous population.

This paper investigates the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty by using three recently constructed US economic uncertainty proxies. Emphasis is placed on examining the informational value of these indicators and their ability to better predict economic activity. We focus on the direct and/or indirect transmission chains of economic uncertainty on US macroeconomic aggregates, the magnitude of the forecast improvement induced by economic uncertainty and the strength of the observed dynamic relations. Our results show that macroeconomic uncertainty can help in forecasting key macroeconomic aggregates across multiple horizons, and this predictive power is economically and statistically significant. The two macroeconomic uncertainty measures anticipate industrial production and consumption directly, and investment and employment indirectly, with a time-delay. The transmission chains for investment include consumption and the stock market as intermediate variables, and for employment consumption and investment. No substantial evidence of feedback effects from real activity to macroeconomic uncertainty is found. Moreover, asymmetry in macroeconomic uncertainty is found to be important. Upside and downside uncertainty produce significant macroeconomic effects, yet downside uncertainty produces the strongest impact. Results from a “news-based” economic policy uncertainty measure are weaker.

We assume that firms are more risk averse than households and that they manage their risk through a financial sector, which consists of learning and hedging. Firms that learn (by observing demand shocks) face less uncertainty and produce more than firms that hedge (by selling future production at a fixed price). If a policy or parameter change stabilizes the economy, then there is less learning and usually less production. Welfare, however, is usually maximized when the financial sector, which requires inputs but does not directly provide utility or affect production, is smallest. Monetary policy can improve welfare by either taxing learning or subsidizing hedging. If firms are risk averse over nominal profits instead of real profits, then interest rate policy can also improve welfare by stabilizing prices and thus minimizing the size of the financial sector.

The financial woes that initiated the financial crisis of 2007/08 have, at least in part, been traced to excessive bank risk-taking. What induced this behavior? One explanation is the persistently low short-term interest rates during the mid-2000s. We exploit an extensive panel of matched Austrian banks and firms during 2000–2008 to investigate the effects of the European Central Bank's (ECB) policy of persistently low interest rates during 2003q3–2005q3. Our analysis suggests that this policy likely caused Austrian banks to hold risker loan portfolios than they would have in its absence.

Money-demand specifications exhibit instability, especially for long spans of data. This paper reconsiders the welfare cost of inflation for the US economy using a flexible time-varying (TV) cointegration methodology to estimate the money-demand function. We find evidence that the TV cointegration estimation provides a better fit of the actual data than a time-invariant estimation and that the throughout unitary income elasticity only exists for the log–log form over the entire sample period. Our estimate of the welfare cost of inflation for a 10% inflation rate lies in the range of 0.025–0.75% of gross domestic product (GDP) and averages 0.27%. In sum, our findings fall well within the ranges of existing studies of the welfare cost of inflation. We find that the welfare cost averages 7.4% higher during expansions than recessions for 10% inflation rate. Finally, the interest elasticity of money demand shows substantial variability over our sample period.

Using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, this paper provides deeper insight into unemployment dynamics in Germany. We identify a technology shock and two policy shocks that play a central role in business cycle research. Accordingly, we enrich the discussion on the sources of unemployment dynamics by considering demand-side impulses. The worker reallocation process varies substantially with the identified shocks. The job-finding rate plays a larger role after a technology shock and a monetary policy shock, whereas the separation rate appears to be the dominant margin after a fiscal policy shock. Technology shocks turn out to be relatively important for variations in the transition rates. Regarding policy shocks, our results point toward fiscal interventions as a promising instrument but with several limitations.

This paper studies optimal labor-income taxation in a simple model with credit constraints on firms. The labor-income tax rate and the shadow value on the credit constraint induce a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. It is found that optimal policy prescribes a volatile path for the labor-income tax rate even in the presence of state-contingent debt and capital. In this respect, credit frictions are akin to a form of market incompleteness. Credit frictions break the equivalence between tax smoothing and wedge smoothing; therefore, as the tightness of the credit constraint varies over the business cycle, tax volatility is needed in order to counter this variation and, as a result, allow for wedge smoothing.

This paper explores how different credit market and banking regulations affect business fluctuations. Capital adequacy- and reserve requirements are analyzed for their effect on the risk of severe downturns. We develop an agent-based macroeconomic model in which financial contagion is transmitted through balance sheets in an endogenous firm-bank network, which incorporates firm bankruptcy and heterogeneity among banks to capture the fact that contagion effects are bank specific. Using concepts from the empirical literature to identify amplitude and duration of recessions and expansions, we show that more stringent liquidity regulations are best to dampen output fluctuations and prevent severe downturns. Under such regulations, both leverage along expansions and amplitude of recessions become smaller. More stringent capital requirements induce larger output fluctuations and lead to deeper, more fragile recessions. This indicates that the capital adequacy requirement is procyclical and therefore not advisable as a measure to prevent financial contagion.

We estimate asymmetries in innovations to Solow residuals for 11 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries using stochastic frontier analysis. Likelihood ratio statistics and variance ratios imply that all countries with net energy imports have significant negative asymmetries, whereas other countries do not. We construct a simple theoretical model in which the measured Solow residual combines effects from technology, factor utilization, and the terms of trade. For oil importers, the model implies an asymmetric response of measured total factor productivity to oil price increases and decreases. When we condition Solow residuals separately on positive and negative oil price changes to allow asymmetric responses, evidence for remaining negative asymmetric innovations to the Solow residuals vanishes for all countries except Switzerland. Switzerland's relatively dominant financial sector suggests that their asymmetries could be due to a financial crisis, a hypothesis that we test and fail to reject.

We show that, even in a framework in which monopolistic exploitation of patents does not occur, patents still give rise to serious drawbacks. We rely on a recombinant growth framework that provides a stylized but clear description of the formation of knowledge externalities. In our setting a benevolent government buys immediately new patents in a competitive market and releases their contents for free. We show that inefficiencies nevertheless arise and welfare can be improved by correcting the market price through a tax–subsidy scheme. We characterize the (asymptotic) steady-state equilibrium, and some properties of the transitional path. We show that if certain conditions are met, then the economy will converge to its (asymptotic) balanced growth path, and along such a pathgrowth will be independent of the policy parameter; conversely, transition dynamics are affected by the choice of the policy parameter. We then quantitatively analyze the effect of different policy interventions on welfare, and show that stricter tax (weaker appropriability) regimes lead to higher social welfare.

This paper incorporates an education signaling mechanism into a dynamic model of production and asks if “higher education as a signal” helps explain the simultaneous increase in the supply and price of skilled relative to unskilled labor in the United States since 1980. The key mechanism is that if college degrees serve as a signal of unobservable talent and talent is productive at the workplace, then improved access to college will enable a higher fraction of the population to signal talent by completing college, resulting in degrees being a better signal about talent and a widening skill premium. When I assess the contribution of signaling in the model calibrated to the US economy from 1980 to 2003, I find that about 10% of the increase in the skill premium can be attributed to the signaling mechanism, after adjusting for the potential decline in the quality of college graduates.

We analyze job switching and wage growth of young workers, separately considering the jobs experienced by workers before and after college completion. These two groups of jobs consist of very different occupational compositions. Workers with many jobs before college completion (JBCC) and with little or no job experiences before college completion have similar subsequent wage paths. These facts can be interpreted that JBCC contribute less to career building compared to the ones after college completion. If we disregard all JBCC, the number of jobs that are experienced by workers before age 35 are about three jobs fewer than the total number of jobs.

We examine “Forward Guidance Contracts,” which penalize central bankers for choosing high interest rates. We integrate those contracts into the New Keynesian Framework and show that they can be used to overcome a liquidity trap. Moreover, although the government takes only a share of the social benefits into account when it has to decide whether to offer the contract, we demonstrate that for plausible parameter values the government will always find it desirable to offer the contract in a liquidity trap but not in normal times. Finally, we show that the optimal duration of such contracts is typically very short.

This paper examines optimal policy in a macroeconomic model with collateral constraints. Binding collateral constraints yield inefficient competitive equilibrium allocations because they distort the optimal utilization of real resources. I identify the set of policy instruments that can be used by a Ramsey planner to achieve the first-best and the second-best (i.e., constrained planner's) allocations. A system of distortionary taxes on capital and labor income, along with direct lump-sum transfers among borrowers and lenders replicates the first-best outcome. The tax rates correct for the marginal distortions, whereas the direct lump-sum transfers perform income redistributions among the agents. In absence of direct lump-sum transfers, the distortionary taxes have an additional role, i.e., to perform implicit income transfers, and only second-best outcomes are attainable. I also derive the optimal policy in response to real and financial shocks, and show how the policy recommendations differ depending on the set of policy instruments available.