Whilst the crime of murder, and its equivalents, is clearly defined and subject to extensive jurisprudence in every jurisdiction, no attempt has been made to give this crime a definition at the international level. For the international criminal tribunals, such as the ICTY, to work effectively, and fairly, this and other major crimes must be clearly defined from the outset. This paper briefly compares the approach to murder as a class of homicide across major legal systems. It reveals that, for all their differences, each system makes many of the same distinctions between classes of homicide, and provides us with similar conceptual tools to help us find a workable and just definition for this most serious of crimes.

On 10 July 1998, the Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded the review of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Six new rules were adopted and 25 others amended. Changes include the assignment by the Trial Chamber of one of its members as pre-trial Judge after the initial appearance of an accused and the streamlining of the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In addition, in the future Chambers will render one combined judgment determining whether the accused is guilty, and if found guilty, imposing sentence.

In a world of sovereign states, gathering evidence is one of the major challenges for the new international criminal tribunals. The decision in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, shows some of the difficulties. The Tribunal finds it has the power to issue compulsory orders to sovereign states for the production of evidence, although not to issue a subpoena as such. The Tribunal also assumes the power to review a state's national security privilege, a holding that may challenge the more protective provisions of the new Rome treaty for a permanent International Criminal Court. However, the Appeals Chamber's declaration that there is no power to summon particular government officials, even for eyewitness testimony, that document production must be limited, and that its orders cannot be directly enforced, may hobble the Tribunal's capacity to muster the necessary proof at trial.

With a number of sentencing judgments expected in cases pending before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the enforcement of sentences has become an important concern. The author discusses theoretical and practical issues raised in this regard, including the juridical basis for enforcement as well as the Model Agreement regarding modalities of enforcement. On the basis of this Model Agreement, a number of agreements has been concluded with individual states. The author concludes that the nature of the Tribunal has necessitated the development of novel and sometimes artificial measures for the enforcement of sentences.