The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one of the “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” provided for in Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal is established by Annex VI to the Convention which is its Statute. Within the Tribunal is established the Seabed Disputes Chamber which has jurisdiction to deal with respect to deep-sea mining activities covered by Part XI of the Convention.

The Tribunal performs three different but closely related functions. The first is to offer a forum of choice for states parties to the Convention to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The second function is to provide a special, and largely mandatory, procedure for dealing with disputes in connection with the interpretation and application of the provisions of Part XI of the Convention. This is the function of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber also has competence to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly and Council of the International Seabed Authority. Thirdly, the Tribunal serves as a residual and compulsory mechanism for the settlement of certain disputes identified by the Convention as requiring expeditious decision, such as applications for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crew or requests for the prescription of provisional measures pending final decisions in cases. The Tribunal may also deal with disputes arising under other maritime agreements, if the agreements so provide.

The Tribunal commenced operations in October 1996. It has completed organizational work for its administrative judicial functions. It has adopted its Rules, the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Procedure and Guidelines to assist parties appearing before it. It has also established special Chambers. The Tribunal has already dealt with one application for the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested in a foreign port and one request for provisional measures. Proceedings are in progress on the merits of the first case submitted to it.

This paper is concerned with the denunciation of declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Optional Clause and the impact that the 1984 Judgment of the Court in the jurisdictional phase of the Nicaragua case may have had upon it. In this decision the Court found that the principle of good faith is of paramount importance in the legal regime of the Optional Clause and introduced in that regime the element of a ‘reasonable time’ for the denunciation of declarations of indefinite duration and silent as to termination. The relevant passage of the Judgment is discussed with a view to determine the contours of this requirement and the ways it may operate in practice.

The article surveys the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga cases which inaugurated jurisprudence of the 21 Member International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany, with delivery of two important decisions on prompt release of the vessel and its crew (1997, Case No. 1) and on provisional measures of protection (1998, Case No. 2). The decisions provided precedential instances of application by the Tribunal of Articles 292 and 290 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea respectively, and of the relevant provisions of the ITLOS Rules. The prescription of provisional measures of protection formed the incidental proceedings of the pending M/V Saiga (Merits) case which is to be settled by ITLOS in mid-1999 (Case No. 2) and is to be the subject of a separate article. In view of the ITLOS Statute and the Rules being closely modelled in the Statute and the Rules of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), careful attention is given to comparison of the inaugural practice of ITLOS with the longstanding practice of the ICJ, and preservation of judicial consistency by ITLOS is particularly commended. A history of the M/V Saiga dispute, intertwined with domestic proceedings before Guinean courts, is for the reader's convenience outlined in a Chronological Table annexed to this article.

The subject-matter of this article is the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Following an exposition of the relevant facts, it continues with a critical analysis of the Judgment of the Court. In addition to a brief analysis of the issues involving the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility, the law of state succession, and the treaty obligations of Hungary and Slovakia relating to the use of Danube water and the protection of its environment, it focuses on the rules and principles of general international law concerning the use of international watercourses and the protection of the environment that were applied by the Court in this case.

The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, adopted in October 1997 (together with the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice and the Guidelines Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases Before the Tribunal) follows the model of the Rules of the International Court of Justice with rather relevant differences. Some of these differences depend on the need of more expeditious and less expensive proceedings: in particular, the provisions introducing time limits and those in the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice which eliminate in most cases the requirement of Notes by each judge. Others depend on the specific characteristics of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These include the provisions on intervention, on preliminary objections and proceedings, on provisional measures, on prompt release of vessels and crews, and on activities in the international seabed Area. In this category can also be included the provisions on the participation in proceedings by international organizations and natural and juridical persons.

Over the years the International Court of Justice has come to play a mediative role in the settlement of disputes. This article focuses on the negotiation process by the International Court of Justice during the settlement of inter-state disputes. Various cases that were brought before the International Court of Justice are discussed to elaborate on this growing trend.

The subject-matter of this article are the issues of treaty law as expounded in the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. The following problems are discussed: unilateral suspension and abandonment of obligations deriving from the binding treaty; the principle of fundamental change of circumstances; unilateral termination of a treaty; applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this case; legal status of so-called ‘provisional solution’; impossibility of performance and material breach of treaty; the application of the principle of ‘approximate application’; and the principle pacta sunt servanda. The issues arc discussed at the background of the Drafts of the International Law Commission.

On 2 November 1992, Iran filed an application instituting proceedings against the United States in respect of a dispute arising out of the attack on and the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes. In it, Iran contended that these acts constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in 1955.

Indictment of 10 November 1995.

The law relating to state succession played a small but important role in the World Court's recent decision in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. Hungary's argument that the 1977 Treaty had not survived the transition from Czechoslovakia to Slovakia notwithstanding, the Court found that the 1977 Treaty had continued to be in force. Hungary presented several arguments relating to succession: the absence of consent; and that only certain rights and obligations (but not the Treaty itself) had survived. The present article analyzes these arguments in context and concludes that the Court came up with the right decision, but through a process of reasoning that is less than fully convincing.

On 6 November 1997, at the age of 91, Judge Haopei Li passed away. Elected in 1993, Judge Haopei Li was one of the first eleven judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He was a member of the Appeals Chamber.

Indictment of 10 November 1995.

This commentary will give an analysis of the purpose of the first site visit by the International Court of Justice, viewed in the context of the Court's specific judicial functions under its Statute and Rules; the factors bearing upon the success of the site visit; and the circumstances, in reality somewhat limited, in which the exercise might usefully be repeated in future cases.

The conclusion of the ICTY's first trial offered the Trial Chamber an opportunity to expound upon the elements of the crime of persecution which, until this point, had been left undefined.

On 24 April 1998, the United Nations signed an agreement with Norway on the Enforcement of Sentences imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Agreement entered into force upon signature. Similar agreements have been signed with Italy and Finland on 6 February 1997 and 7 May 1997 respectively.

In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros proceedings, the parties, viz. Hungary and Slovakia, defended their conduct, amongst others, with arguments derived from the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility, and from the law of state responsibility itself. In its judgment, the International Court of Justice disentangled the mixture of arguments derived from the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility advanced by Hungary, and drew a clear line between these two branches of international law. Second, it rejected several circumstances that were advanced by the parties to preclude the wrongfulness of their conduct. On both these accounts, the author opines that the declaratory dicta of the Court have contributed to the development of the law of state responsibility. Third, the Court decided on the legal consequences of the intersecting internationally wrongful acts committed by Hungary and Slovakia. According to the author, the Court erred in its reasoning on this account by confusing the award of cessation of the internationally wrongful acts with the award of reparation for these acts.

Indictment of 10 November 1995.

The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia lists certain offences that might constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity. It does not, however, define any of these offences, among which are torture, inhuman treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious bodily harm. Although their meaning is clear in plain language, their legal definition is not. This article attempts to find the customary international law definition of these crimes.

In the summer of 1997, a member of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia met with Slavko Dokmanović in Serbia in order to lure him into Croatia, where he was ultimately arrested by UN peacekeeping personnel, Dokmanović was the subject of a sealed indictment for his role in the execution of 261 people forcibly taken out of the Vukovar hospital in 1991. The Tribunal rejected Dokmanović's argument that the manner of his arrest violated the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and international law. In doing so, the Tribunal focused on the distinction between ‘luring’ and ‘forcible abduction’, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter might, constitute grounds for dismissal in a future case. The article argues that the Tribunal's decision rests on an artificial distinction between luring and abduction which may needlessly discourage future apprehensions undertaken by NATO and UN troops in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. What the Tribunal in Dokmanović should have focused on, is that there is no violation of international law where the Security Council or the Tribunal has authorised law enforcement activities, where the state has consented to such activities, or where such activities are necessary under the principle of self-defence. Moreover, even where the manner of apprehension violates international law, the Tribunal may apply the so-called ‘Eichmann-exception’, while at the same time recognising that the mala captus bene dententus principle is generally inconsistent with the modern law of human rights.

The relationship between national jurisdictions and the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda raises many problems. One of them concerns the surrender of indicted war criminals from national jurisdictions to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Several obstacles stand in the way of effective surrender to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. This contribution focuses on the legal obstacles that may be encountered in this respect. By means of the case of the failed surrender of Ntakirutimana from the United States to the Rwanda Tribunal, it will be demonstrated that legal assistance to the Ad Hoc Tribunals is of a fundamental different nature than legal assistance offered to foreign tribunals.