This article is concerned with the portrayal of law in colonial conflict in the work of Senegalese author Sembene Ousmane, focussing in particular on the novel Les Bouts de Bois de Dieu. There Ousmane dramutises an actual strike of railway workers in 1947 in order to mount a prophetic critique of post-independence Senegal. In convening a tribunal to try strike-breakers, the workers demonstrate the constitutive, law-creating power which, Ousmane implies, still resides in newly independent peoples. This alternative legality is achieved in spite of the twin pressures of orthodox universalism, on the one hand, and passive traditionalism, on the other. As such Les Bouts de Bois de Dieu prefigures a radical, emancipatory legal pluralism in the colonial and post-colonial context.

Many human and financial resources are being spent on the asylum determination and appeal processes in order to distinguish those asylum applicants who require protection from those who do not. However, the majority of failed asylum seekers do not leave the country. The lack of an effective removal policy defeats the purpose of having an asylum system at all. In other words, removals of failed asylum seekers are essential to preserve the integrity and credibility of the asylum system. Since forced removals are a crucial component of our asylum system, this paper seeks to examine how they can be made more eflcient and humane. In particular, it examines the recent measures adopted through the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and proposed measures currently debated at the EU level.

Assertions that Britain is (or is in danger of becoming) a‘ blame and sue’ society are nowadays so frequently repeated in the media and elsewhere that they have all but become received wisdom. Whether they express a dangerous reality or a passing moral panic deserves serious consideration because of their potential to influence legislative and judicial agendas. This article examines what is meant by the phrase ‘compensation culture’, evaluates the recent evidence concerning it, and attempts to assess whether the concerns expressed are justified.

The recent spate of cases successfully relying on CPR 19.6 has failed to clarify the content of the ‘same interest’ required by the rule. Interpretation of ‘same interest’ must give effect to the overriding objective set out in CPR 1.1(1), which provides that cases must be dealt with ‘justly’ and ‘fairly’. In line with the aspirations of the new Civil Procedure Rules, the overriding objective emphasises improving access to justice and reducing the costs of litigation. A number of recent decisions permitting reliance on CPR 19.6 make particular reference to the rule's potential to achieve these goals. However, reducing costs is only one goal of civil procedure and it is argued that whether a procedure, or its use in particular circumstances, is just or fair depends on balancing those purposes and principles of civil procedural law which it supports against those which it inhibits. This article demonstrates how balanced reference to the principles of procedure supports a test for ‘same interest’ based on finding ‘a common question of law or fact’.

This article takes a critical look at common law constitutionalism, a theory which has received much support in public law circles of late. The first part of the article elaborates the common law constitutionalist position. The second part of the article assesses the cogency of the theory in terms of its ability to accommodate certain paradigmatic features of judicial review. The article concludes with the suggestion that public lawyers, in their forays into theory, might do better to look to the special role that judicial review plays in assessing the legitimacy of governmental action rather than its supposed connection with ‘fundamental principles of morality’.