This paper examines the interaction between ‘radical’ constitutional change, in the form of political devolution, and property systems in the UK, from the perspective of those at the margins of those systems. The paper adopts a property ‘from below’ approach and critically applies the theoretical framework developed by AJ van der Walt in Property in the Margins. In that book, van der Walt outlined how property systems frequently operate to resist democratic and constitutional change and transformation through the functioning of the property paradigm, which refers to a set of doctrinal, rhetorical, and logical assumptions and beliefs about the relative value and power of discrete property interests in law and in society. Building on van der Walt's work, this paper takes eviction, which represents the landlord's apex right, as a case study and considers how qualifications of that right have been reformed by the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016. It is argued that while the strength of the property paradigm is apparent in both English and Scottish property systems, Living Rent, a national tenants’ union in Scotland, have organised tenants to effectively contest and, in some respects, displace the logic of the property paradigm during the reform process.

The aim of this paper is to inform a sociological jurisprudence of the implied duty in the contract of employment of mutual trust and confidence. Present analyses of the emerging term have been doctrinal in nature. Such scholarship contributes a normative internal perspective to what can be understood as the jurisprudential project of guarding and maintaining law as a practice of regulation. This paper seeks to generate knowledge that will allow for an extension of the jurisprudential analysis to take into account how mutual trust and confidence may manifest in contemporary conditions of work. This is achieved by, first, presenting original sociological data of the employment relation in a work context likely to demonstrate practices that resonate with features of mutual trust and confidence – that of early-stage digital technology startups – and, secondly, contrasting this empirical account with doctrinal conceptions of the term. Findings unsettle the dominant jurisprudential account of mutual trust and confidence as positively contributing to the social goal of labour law as operating to counter the power of capital.

Questions of statutory interpretation form a significant portion of administrative law cases. Accordingly, judicial methodology in this area requires careful consideration by public law commentators. The core aim of this paper is to question the general orthodoxy that statutory interpretation is invariably a question for judges. In recent times, one prominent argument has been that between jurists arguing that interpretation should be the realisation of Parliament's intention (‘intentionalist’), and those who prefer the closely related but subtly distinct focus on its objective purpose (‘purposivist’). I contend that this argument, framed as a question over the inter-institutional relationship between Parliament and the courts, focuses on how interpretation is carried out without considering who is best placed to do the interpreting. Given, as I demonstrate with a series of case studies, that in hard cases the distinction between interpretation and discretion/policymaking can become obscure to the point of nullity, the debate fails to consider institutional arguments for judicial deference on questions of law. Moreover, and counterintuitively, the arguments of the intentionalists/purposivists can be used to bolster an argument for deference. My conclusion adopts a wider lens, setting out a broader constitutional argument for, and addressing objections against, cautious and context-sensitive deference.

Drawing on a dataset of 263 contempt of court decisions, this paper examines a widespread but under-interrogated phenomenon: imprisonment for breach of injunctions. Across a wide range of contexts – from cases involving anti-social behaviour, protest, Gypsy and Traveller communities – courts across the country are using their civil contempt of court powers to imprison individuals for breaching injunctions. As the first research to date that explicitly examines this issue, the paper falls into four parts. First, it introduces the powers to make an injunction; in section 2 the courts’ powers on committal are outlined. Section 3 introduces the dataset on which this paper is based. Finally, section 4 explores the geographical distribution of cases, sentencing decisions, and the representation of defendants in these proceedings. We identify significant disparities in the application and enforcement of injunctions, raising critical questions about legal practices, fairness and equality. We advocate for ongoing academic research in this area.

The past decade has seen a marked shift in the regulatory landscape of UK higher education. Institutions are increasingly assuming responsibility for preventing campus sexual misconduct, and are responding to its occurrence through – amongst other things – codes of (mis)conduct, consent and/or active bystander training, and improved safety and security measures. They are also required to support victim-survivors in continuing with their education, and to implement fair and robust procedures through which complaints of sexual misconduct are investigated, with sanctions available that respond proportionately to the seriousness of the behaviour and its harms. This paper examines the challenges and prospects for the success of university disciplinary processes for sexual misconduct. It focuses in particular on how to balance the potentially conflicting rights to privacy held by reporting and responding parties within proceedings, while respecting parties’ rights to equality of access to education, protection from degrading treatment, due process, and the interests of the wider campus community. More specifically, we explore three key moments where private data is engaged: (1) in the fact and details of the complaint itself; (2) in information about the parties or circumstances of the complaint that arise during the process of an investigation and/or resultant university disciplinary process; and (3) in the retention and disclosure (to reporting parties or the university community) of information regarding the outcomes of, and sanctions applied as part of, a disciplinary process. We consider whether current data protection processes – and their interpretation – are compatible with trauma-informed practice and a wider commitment to safety, equality and dignity, and reflect on the ramifications for all parties where that balance between rights or interests is not struck.

This paper considers the relationship between litigants in person (LiPs) and conspiracy theories and seeks to answer two questions: how, and why, do some LiPs come to be conspiracy theorists? The majority of LiPs, of course, do not become conspiracy-minded. There is also no evidence that LiPs are more likely than anyone else in legal proceedings to be conspiracists, only, perhaps, that it is more obvious when they are. But there continue to be individuals who have conspiracist explanations for difficulties or failures they experience throughout legal proceedings. And while it is widely held that some LiPs hold eccentric beliefs about the law, there has been little attempt to understand how and why LiPs may come to acquire or articulate these beliefs. This is presumably because it has not been considered important to interrogate the views of people already often assumed to be ‘difficult’ or eccentric. This paper contends, however, that trying to understand how and why these conspiracist beliefs are acquired matters very much. This is because conspiracy theories can give us a critical insight into how negative experiences of litigation can result in a loss of faith or trust in legal institutions.

Austerity measures and the cost-of-living crisis have led to rising poverty rates and violations of socioeconomic rights in the UK and Europe. However, there are limited routes of redress for these violations in many European countries. Claims using Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to address violations of socioeconomic rights are suggested but not fully described in the academic literature. The European Court of Human Rights has found violations of the Convention in very limited circumstances caused by poverty and destitution. These circumstances include violations of the ECHR in cases of insufficient food being provided to those detained by the state. This paper considers possible violations of Article 3 ECHR in relation to food poverty. It argues that hunger is a violation of human dignity and provides tangible evidence of degrading treatment. It identifies benefit caps, the two-child limit, and benefit sanctions as policies that can lead to food poverty and, as a result, could amount to degrading treatment. For some living in food poverty due to these policies, Article 3 ECHR may provide a route of redress.

This paper analyses legal responses to the problem of debt taken out due to coercion within an intimate relationship. Coerced debt differs from other forms of domestic abuse, as it involves a contractual relationship between the victim and a third-party lender. Legal responses must consider whether the victim should be released from her contractual obligation. The paper employs a theoretical lens of vulnerability and relationality, examining lenders’ duties to combat coerced debt, as well as contractual doctrines of undue influence and duress, which allow victims to have transactions set aside under certain circumstances. The paper argues that victims are being failed by an inadequate legal response. The law views vulnerability as an exceptional state and relationality as a constraint, rather than inherent features of the human condition. Through the social construct of the ‘free market’, lenders are consistently favoured by the law, with little obligation to ensure that transactions are free from coercion. The paper concludes with a call for the state to take greater responsibility for coerced debt and to allocate the risk differently than it currently does. This will promote higher levels of resilience for victims and allow them to escape abusive relational contexts.

Recent years have witnessed significant developments in medical negligence jurisprudence. In 2015, the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board famously departed from the House of Lords decision in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital by ruling that the professional practice test set out in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee no longer applied to the doctor's duty to give advice to the patient. In particular, the Supreme Court in Montgomery held as follows:

A defendant (D) will commit the tort of false imprisonment where, without lawful justification (consent, valid warrant, etc), they intentionally confine a plaintiff (P) to a restricted space. In Blackstone's terms, ‘to constitute the tort of false imprisonment there are two points requisite: 1. The detention of the person; and, 2. The unlawfulness of such detention’. In GE v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, Ireland's Supreme Court answered a question about the damages recoverable where Blackstone's two conditions have been met: can P recover substantial (rather than nominal) damages for false imprisonment against D where, had P not been unlawfully detained by D, P could and would have been lawfully detained by D for the same period, under identical conditions?

Litigation funding has become an essential ingredient in collective actions for breaches of competition law brought in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In the recent PACCAR proceedings, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the nature and enforceability of litigation funding agreements (LFAs) between third-party litigation funders and group representatives where the success fee is determined as a percentage of the damages award.1 The Court held with a 4:1 majority (Lady Rose dissenting)2 that the LFAs in question are damages-based fee agreements (DBAs) and, as such, unenforceable. This judgment has wide-ranging consequences, as the CAT is unlikely to allow collective actions to proceed if the funding agreements cannot be relied on. The decision has caused uncertainty and upheaval in the funding market as a considerable number of funding agreements in collective proceedings contain DBAs. It also triggered legal challenges in collective proceedings where funders are seeking to amend the funding agreements to deal with the Supreme Court ruling.3 The fall-out from the decision suggests that funding rules for collective actions may need more legislative attention – litigation funding was given some thought during the drafting of the opt-out action regime, but the legal framework for litigation funding remains fragmented and open to interpretation.4