La mayor parte de los esquemas teóricos contemporáneos explicativos de la migración están fuertemente inclinados del lado de la oferta laboral debido a que están focalizados en los lugares de emisión de fuerza de trabajo y en los migrantes originarios de estos espacios. Sin embargo, los factores colocados del lado de la demanda laboral son incluso más importantes. A partir del ejemplo de los trabajadores rurales indocumentados de Tamaulipas empleados en la agricultura en los Estados Unidos argumento que el reclutamiento de mano de obra construye un estímulo importante de la inmigración ilegal.

This article explores the cases of two satirical publications—The Clinic (Chile, 1998–) and Barcelona (Argentina, 2003–). Through critical humor, visual subversions, and parody, these independent magazines challenged mainstream journalism and official political discourse, offering alternative interpretations about the ruling class and society after traumatic periods—Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile and the 2001 economic crisis in Argentina. Through interviews with the editors and content analysis, this article examines how these satirical publications responded to their respective national contexts by questioning the functioning of power on several levels of society, and how they evolved after they became popular, negotiating their space within the national mediascape. This study also suggests the notion of hybrid alternative media to describe these publications, which became part of a liberating process of collective healing. Initially perceived in opposition to mainstream media in contexts when the press’s credibility had decreased, they filled gaps in their society’s political communication.

How does civil society affect support for the political system during times of political crises? Some argue that civil society strengthens support for political systems by increasing trust and participation. Yet recent scholarship demonstrates that civil society can also facilitate mobilization and dissent, which may undermine support for the political system, especially in times of crisis. We test these competing claims using individual-level data from a country in the midst of a major political crisis: Bolivia in 2004. We find that membership in civil society organizations leads to higher levels of diffuse support for the political system even during a crisis—and even among those who have recently participated in protest. Civil society, however, is not associated with higher support for government during the crisis. Despite extremely high levels of mobilization, extreme dissatisfaction with government, and evidence that membership in associations actively facilitates political protest, civil society continues to be positively associated with support for the political system.

This paper presents a typology of different constitutional conceptions, which are designed to help us classify the constitutional conceptions and debates that appeared in Latin America during the nineteenth century and to compare the opposing ideas that were present at the time. Three broad categories of constitutional projects are defined: (1) conservative models, characterized by the defense of political elitism and moral perfectionism; (2) majoritarian or radical constitutions that sought to reach out to the popular sectors and anchored themselves in a form of moral populism; and (3) the individualist or liberal constitutions. This analysis explores the ideas and principal architects of these various constitutional initiatives for a number of Hispano-Latin American nations for the 1810-60 period, when the basic features of their constitutions were shaped.

This article explores the governing logics and political implications of citizen security in Puebla, Mexico, specifically, the Programa Nacional de Prevención del Delito (National Program for the Prevention of Crime, PRONAPRED). Taking a biopolitical perspective, the article centers on how citizens are produced through the application of citizen security initiatives. This production operates at two levels: the regulation of populations and the molding of subjects. First, vital statistics and risk-related variables highlight those populations that exceed the median for risk. Second, those at-risk groups are targeted for training to reduce their susceptibility to violence. Training focuses on the individual, asking citizens to identify and minimize risk in a manner that emanates from and contributes to security governance. The political ontology of citizen security is this citizen/citizenry coincident with official measures. The democratic aspirations of citizen security are consequently muted, as security governance locates citizens within the confines of state power and, at the same time, holds them separate from this power to produce citizen existence.

The existing literature relating ethnic fragmentation to public good provision sheds little light on inequalities in access to public goods across groups, despite the fact that some of the causal factors underlying the hypothesized relationship seem to predict such inequalities. This article seeks to fill this gap by examining the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and both the level and distribution of access to clean water in Mexico, using regression analysis at both the municipal and individual levels for the period 2000–2005. Using the divide between indigenous and nonindigenous people to measure ethnic fragmentation, the results first replicate the general finding in the literature: more fragmented municipalities have worse access to clean water, all else being equal. However, this worse access is not equally distributed. Instead, there is a systematic gap in water access between indigenous and nonindigenous people, even after controlling for fragmentation and other relevant factors. The findings have important implications for future research regarding ethnic fragmentation and public good provision.

This article will focus on the interactions between the Venezuelan government and FEDECAMARAS, the umbrella organization of most Venezuelan private-sector groups, while a strategic policy was being formulated and implemented that FEDECAMARAS regarded as seriously detrimental to the interests of the Venezuelan private sector. This policy was developed after the official devaluation of the Venezuelan bolívar on 18 February 1983 and consisted of two stages: first, the government refused to supply foreign currency at the rate of 4.3 bolívares to the dollar, the predevaluation rate (PDR), for any foreign debts contracted by private enterprises prior to 18 February, a decision that forced many debtor companies to obtain foreign currency at the floating rate. This rate increased from approximately 8 bolívares to the dollar in March 1983 to some 25 to the dollar in late 1986. Second, the government imposed a price freeze and then price controls. This policy, which was simultaneously regulatory and redistributive, was vehemently opposed by FEDECAMARAS. Yet the results of the organization's efforts indicate that its actual influence has been overstated.

This research note investigates class tension between rural women in the context of a grassroots women's development project in the village of Guadalupe in the Mexican state of Querétaro. These tensions affected the cooperative's internal dynamics, economic choices, and inevitably its lack of success. My study found these class tensions to be gendered in that they were manifestations of patriarchy as well as dependent capitalism.

This article deals with the disputed terminology used to refer to the Brazilian military regime (1964–1985). On one side is the traditional “military dictatorship” nomenclature, which places the armed forces at the center of the political system during the period in question. Conversely, the more recent “civil-military dictatorship” terminology notes that the regime depended on civilian allies in business and government, as well as popular support, throughout its existence. My entry point is a heated 2012 debate between journalist Pedro Pomar and the radical art collective Coletivo Zagaia. I explore how new social actors that emerged after redemocratization have become central to the struggle over human rights in Brazil and, more specifically, how the dictatorship is remembered in the present. This debate among scholars, activists, bloggers, and journalists is fundamentally about memory, accountability, and, I argue, the quality of Brazilian democracy today.

This article explores the role of the samba subgenre partido alto as a mode of resistance to modernization and the Brazilian military regime’s disfiguration of samba music in the 1970s. This resistance ultimately led a handful of samba musicians to create the Grêmio Recreativo de Arte Negra Escola de Samba Quilombo in 1975. While it is true that Quilombo nurtured Afro-Brazilian music and culture, the author demonstrates that its leader and cofounder, Antônio Candeia Filho, acted as a samba preservationist and a pioneer, referencing music of the African diaspora, but also as someone who drew the line when it came to espousing Pan-Africanism. The aversion to Pan-Africanism in Rio de Janeiro’s samba community heightened in the late 1970s, as Black Soul, among other foreign sounds and cultural presences, was perceived as a threat to the primacy of samba.

This article considers how changes in Latin American countries’ age structures may affect their long-term economic performance through the impact on labor supply, dependency ratios, and productivity. It analyzes fourteen Latin American countries using population projections for 2015–2050 and considering three scenarios. The basic scenario assumes constant sex- and age-specific behavior concerning employment, while the other two scenarios imply increases in female activity rates and significant human capital accumulation. The results illustrate the heterogeneity of Latin American countries. In some of them, major productivity increases can only be achieved through substantial changes in the incorporation of women into the labor market, and especially in the educational level of the population as a whole. However, in most of the region’s countries, the demographic factor is still favorable and there is scope to exploit the demographic dividend.

On may 7, 1966, a representative group of scholars who were invited to Washington, D.C. for a meeting sponsored by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies (of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council) and the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress, formed the Latin American Studies Association. The members of the Latin American Research Review Board, representing the institutions contributing to the support of the Review, were among the scholars invited to this meeting. When, on May 12 it was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia with a “perpetual” term, the new Association became a legal entity, a tax-exempt, non-profit professional body created by scholarly area specialists to meet their particular and growing needs.

In much of Latin America during the 1950s, Raúl Prebisch, then Executive Secretary of the Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL, known in English as the Economic Commission for Latin America, or ECLA), was recognized as a progressive and innovative development theorist and policy activist. In certain government circles in the United States, meanwhile, he was viewed with suspicion as a leftist critic of standard economic wisdom. Yet in his home country of Argentina during the same period, Prebisch was commonly identified with both conservative groups and liberal economic thought.

O antipetismo explica o voto de pelo menos 40 por cento dos eleitores brasileiros para os quais a ideia de eleger o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) é inadmissível. O antipetista típico tende a ser descrito pela literatura como sujeito branco, escolarizado e anticorrupção. Neste trabalho, argumento que os evangélicos pentecostais, em sua maioria eleitores não brancos e de baixa renda, formam uma sólida base antipetista. Isso ocorre porque os eleitores desse grupo associam ao PT um conjunto de pautas vistas como “identitárias” e “anti-família”. Para testar esse argumento, utilizo dados de quatro rodadas do LAPOP que permitem distinguir a filiação religiosa e analisar o comportamento eleitoral dos respondentes nas eleições realizadas entre 2002 e 2018. Os resultados indicam que os evangélicos pentecostais são menos propensos a (1) votar no PT nas eleições presidenciais; (2) manifestar sentimentos de simpatia em relação ao partido; (3) recompensá-lo nas urnas pelos ganhos em bem-estar induzidos pela implementação do programa Bolsa Família.

Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples in Latin America face higher poverty rates and are disproportionately represented among the poor. The probability of being poor is between two and three times higher for indigenous and Afro-descendants than whites. Using comparable fiscal incidence analyses for Bolivia, Brazil, and Guatemala, I analyze how much poverty and inequality change in the ethnoracial space after fiscal interventions. Although taxes and transfers tend to reduce the ethnoracial gaps, the change is very small. While per capita cash transfers tend to be higher for the nonwhite population, spending on these programs is too low, especially when compared with the disproportionate number of poor people among nonwhites.