Support for redistribution in developing countries has been found to be weakly related to income, meaning the poor are not much likelier than the rich to support redistribution. If not economic self-interest, what explains support for redistribution? A multilevel regression analysis covering a decade of public opinion data from 18 Latin American countries finds support for explanations centered on social affinity. Specifically, people in more culturally divided countries are less supportive of redistribution. This relationship is strongest among low-income individuals, who are more likely to support redistribution than richer people in countries with low levels of diversity, but no more likely and, by some measures, less likely to support redistribution where diversity is highest. Economic distance between groups also matters. Support for redistribution increases when middle-class incomes are closer to those of the poor than the rich. Support declines as the middle class pulls ahead of the poor.

This article introduces the concept of international clientelism and discusses how this diplomatic tool was employed by Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro as a means to get political support from several Latin American and Caribbean countries. We operationalize the concept and apply it to assess Venezuelan practices put forth in the region. We argue that the reach of Caracas’s diplomatic strategy is broader and deeper than that of simple vote-buying tactics, as it implies the promotion of structural rather than contingent ties, shielding the country against unfavorable moves in international fora. An empirical test using data for all LAC countries for the years 1999–2015 confirms that clientelistic linkages produced political support for Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly while also moving its partners away from the United States in that institution.

This article studies how public investment and other types of spending by municipal governments shape perceptions of corruption in Mexico. We argue, drawing on various strands of literature, that investment in visible public works projects should lower corruption perceptions, given the well-known difficulties in directly observing corrupt acts. Contrary to our expectations and common assumptions in studies of public investment, we find that more public investment by municipal governments is associated, on average, with higher corruption perceptions. However, this effect is mediated by individuals’ education levels. For individuals with less formal education, higher public investment correlates with higher perceived corruption, while highly educated individuals perceive less corruption when municipal public investment is high. The study uses qualitative evidence from municipal audit reports to identify a possible mechanism driving this outcome: municipal investments may not be targeted to the poorer neighborhoods with greater public service deficits.

Between 1999 and 2016, 20 former first ladies ran 26 times for the presidency, vice presidency, or Congress in Latin America. Despite the growing importance of this unique type of candidate, political analysts routinely describe them as mere delegates of ex-presidents. We argue that this view has overlooked the political trajectory of former first ladies, and we claim that women with elected political experience should be regarded as politicians who use the ceremonial role of first lady as a platform to enhance their careers. We hypothesize that first ladies with elected political experience are more likely to run for office as soon as they leave the executive branch. We test our argument by analyzing the 90 former first ladies who were eligible to become candidates in 18 Latin American countries from 1999 to 2016. The results support our argument, opening a new research agenda in the study of women’s representation.

This article disputes recent studies that find no relationship between homicides and vigilantism. Using a unique panel dataset that controls for time and region, this study shows that the relationship exists. The evidence is consistent with the theory of low-capacity states: high homicide rates indicate unchecked criminal enclaves that further corrode trust in police. The territorial gaps in the central state’s presence that O’Donnell once called “brown areas” cost people their lives. Vigilantes react through defensive movements in which ordinary people substitute for the police to fill a security gap. The panel results also indicate that wealth inequality matters. Business people reportedly finance the vigilante organizations, which helps them to sustain collective action over time. Together with income inequality, Mexico’s low-capacity state facilitated an armed vigilante movement between 2012 and 2015.

This article examines the interplay between transnational criminal actors (essentially human smugglers), local crime groups, and drug cartels in the phenomenon of trafficking in persons coming from Central America along Mexico’s eastern migration routes. The analysis focuses on sex trafficking, compelled labor for criminal activities, and other forms of labor trafficking. Through qualitative research that involved 336 semistructured interviews with migrants, activists, and other persons familiar with the subject, this work describes and maps trafficking trends throughout Mexico’s eastern migration routes. It also sheds light on the role of drug cartels and other crime groups (local and transnational) in these activities.