We study the following conjecture.

Conjecture.Let T be an ω-stable theory with continuum many countable models. Then either i) T has continuum many complete extensions in L 1(T), or ii) some complete extension of T in L 1has continuum many L 1-types without parameters.

By Shelah's proof of Vaught's conjecture for ω-stable theories, we know that there are seven types of ω-stable theory with continuum many countable models. We show that the conjecture is true for all but one of these seven cases. In the last case we show the existence of continuum many L 2-types.

It is generally known that infinite symmetric groups have few nontrivial normal subgroups (typically only the subgroups of bounded support) and none of small index. (We will explain later exactly what we mean by small). However the standard analysis relies heavily on the axiom of choice. By dint of a lot of combinatorics we have been able to dispense—largely—with the axiom of choice. Largely, but not entirely: our result is that if X is an infinite set with ∣X∣ = ∣X × X∣ then Symm(X) has no nontrivial normal subgroups of small index. Some condition like this is needed because of the work of Sam Tarzi who showed [4] that, for any finite group G, there is a model of ZF without AC in which there is a set X with Symm(X)/FSymm(X) isomorphic to G.

The proof proceeds in two stages. We consider a particularly useful class of permutations, which we call the class of flexible permutations. A permutation of X is flexible if it fixes at least ∣X∣-many points. First we show that every normal subgroup of Symm(X) (of small index) must contain every flexible permutation. This will be theorem 4. Then we show (theorem 7) that the flexible permutations generate Symm(X).

Where AR is the set of arithmetic Turing degrees, 0(ω) is the least member of {a(2) ∣ a is an upper bound on AR}. This situation is quite different if we examine HYP, the set of hyperarithmetic degrees. We shall prove (Corollary 1) that there is an a, an upper bound on HYP, whose hyperjump is the degree of Kleene's . This paper generalizes this example, using an iteration of the jump operation into the transfinite which is based on results of Jensen and is detailed in [3] and [4]. In § 1 we review the basic definitions from [3] which are needed to state the general results.

Say that an incomplete d.r.e. degree has almost universal cupping property, if it cups all the r.e. degrees not below it to 0′. In this paper, we construct such a degree d, with all the r.e. degrees not cupping d to 0′ bounded by some r.e. degree strictly below d. The construction itself is an interesting 0″′ argument and this new structural property can be used to study final segments of various degree structures in the Ershov hierarchy.

The probability logic is a logic with a natural interpretation on probability spaces (thus, a logic whose model theory is part of probability theory rather than a system for putting probabilities on formulas of first order logic). Its exact definition and basic development are contained in the paper [3] of H. J. Keisler and the papers [1] and [2] of the author. Building on work in [2], we prove in this paper the following probabilistic interpolation theorem for .

Let L be a countable relational language, and let A be a countable admissible set with ω ∈ A (in this paper some probabilistic notation will be used, but ω will always mean the least infinite ordinal). is the admissible fragment of corresponding to A. We will assume that L is a countable set in A, as is usual in practice, though all that is in fact needed for our proof is that L be a set in A which is wellordered in A.

Theorem. Let ϕ(x) and ψ(x) be formulas of LAP such that

where ε ∈ [0, 1) is a real in A (reals may be defined in the usual way as Dedekind cuts in the rationals). Then for any real d > ε¼, there is a formula θ(x) of (L(ϕ) ∩ L(ψ))AP such that

and

It was J. E. Baumgartner who in [1] proved that when a weakly compact cardinal is Lévy-collapsed to ω2 the new ω2 inherits some of the large cardinal properties; e.g. if S is a stationary set of ω-limits in ω2 then for some α < ω2, S ∩ α is stationary in α. Later S. Shelah extended this to the following theorem: if a supercompact cardinal κ is Lévy-collapsed to ω2, then in the resulting model the following holds: if S ⊆ λ is a stationary set of ω-limits and cf(λ) ≥ ω2 then there is an α. < λ such that S ∩ α is stationary in α, i.e. stationary reflection holds for countable cofinality (see [1] and [3]). These theorems are important prototypes of small cardinal compactness theorems; many applications and generalizations can be found in the literature. One might think that these results are true for sets with an uncountable cofinality μ as well, i.e. when an appropriate large cardinal is collapsed to μ++. Though this is true for Baumgartner's theorem, there remains a problem with Shelah's result. The point is that the lemma stating that a stationary set of ω-limits remains stationary after forcing with an ω2-closed partial order may be false in the case of μ-limits in a cardinal of the form λ+ with cf(λ) < μ, as was shown in [8] by Shelah. The problem has recently been solved by Baumgartner, who observed that if a universal box-sequence on the class of those ordinals with cofinality ≤ μ exists, the lemma still holds, and a universal box-sequence of the above type can be added without destroying supercompact cardinals beyond μ.

Professor R. L. Goodstein's neat proposal for formalising and proving the Policeman — the logical truth mentioned in my paper — illustrates the main thesis of that paper, viz., that in formalising the logic of indirect discourse one needs to avoid assigning what was said, and the report that it was said, to different levels of a semantical hierarchy. But there are two main difficulties in his proposal:

1. It is not quite clear whether the axioms and rules of Prof. Goodstein's system are to be such that substitutivity of the biconditional is maintained for all wff. If so, the system takes no account of the referentially opaque quality of indirect discourse. For example, the analogue for “If Sir Walter Scott always says the same as the author of Waverley, then George III says that anything Sir Walter Scott says is true if and only if George III says that anything the author of Waverley says is true” would be provable, though this statement is not logically true. If “A(x){Bx→x)” is well-formed (as it must be for Professor Goodstein's proof), the corresponding theorem is

2. In interpreting the letters “A”, “B”, etc. as operators, so that sentences are the substitution-instances both for variables like “x” and for schematic functions of those variables like “Ax”, Professor Goodstein's system does not provide for formalising logical truths in which ordinary predication also plays a part: e.g., “If the policeman says that all women are dangerous drivers and anything the policeman says is true, then no non-dangerous drivers are women”.