Critical Race Theory (CRT) has become a flashpoint of elite political discord, yet how Americans actually perceive CRT is unclear. We theorize that Republican elites utilized a strong framing strategy to re-define CRT as an “empty signifier” representing broader racial and cultural grievances. Using a survey and a pre-registered experiment among U.S. adults (N = 19,060), we find that this strategy worked. Republicans exhibit more familiarity with CRT and hold more negatively valenced (and wide ranging) sentiments toward CRT, relative to Democrats. Moreover, compared to teaching the legacy of racism in schools, Republicans are significantly more opposed to teaching CRT while Democrats express greater uncertainty. Our findings suggest that by framing CRT as a broad term that envelopes many grievances (including those beyond the scope of CRT), Republican elites have shaped a subset of Americans’ understanding of and attitudes toward CRT.

Black women have come to be seen as a dominant force in American politics—particularly in support of the Democratic party. However, this dominance in the political sphere has not translated to dominance in the economic sphere. Despite Black women’s outperformance of their Black male peers in higher education outcomes and overrepresentation in the labor force, there is still an economic gap between Black women and their male counterparts. In addition, regional differences in cost of living have led to diverging local conditions for Black women as well. What do Black women’s socioeconomic outcomes mean for their political ideology and political preferences? Few studies capture intra-group variation among Black women and how the context in which they live may shape their economic and sociopolitical outlook. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, we examine how the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and their political beliefs and the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and political preferences are conditioned by region. We capture the individual factors and regional context that shape differences among Black women in their political beliefs and policy attitudes. This research furthers our understanding of differences in Black women’s politics.

Negative racial stereotypes routinely work together with myths about American equality to undermine public support for policies that would reduce inequality. But what happens when white Americans are confronted with information about structural racial inequality, which contradicts the myth of equal opportunity? Evidence from an original survey experiment conducted among approximately 4,000 white Americans demonstrates that emphasizing the systemic origins of racial inequalities in the COVID-19 pandemic makes respondents more accepting of policies aimed at reducing racial inequalities in a variety of domains. Qualitative insights from post-treatment reflections further show that facing the reality of structural inequality disrupts blame-based narratives and generates support for policies meant to confront inequality. The findings suggest that discussing structural inequality can disrupt individualistic understandings and increase approval for policies that promote equality across multiple domains; they also illuminate why opponents of equality see discussions of structural inequality as so threatening.

Election skepticism has become a persistent feature of American politics since the Obama era. Such beliefs are most prevalent among White Americans and especially Republicans, and they are resistant to change. Conspiracy theory studies have shown that such beliefs are linked to feelings of ingroup victimization, at times associated with election loss. We draw on theories of White ingroup processes to argue that White grievance—the belief that Whites are victims of discrimination—is a key correlate of election skepticism among White Americans. White grievance was employed in the Obama era, but it was weaponized by Trump in the 2020 election. Our results based on four national datasets (2012–2020 ANES, 2021 YouGov) show that controlling for negative outgroup attitudes and other factors, White grievance is a significant predictor of election skepticism in all four studies. In 2020, the effect is stronger among White Republicans and independents. We also show that White identity/consciousness has the opposite effect, generally boosting trust in elections. Furthermore, a lagged dependent variable model using the 2016–2020 ANES panel shows that White grievance remains significant even after an LDV is included in the model.

Scholars are increasingly interested in “of color” identities. Yet, studies of “of color” identities have neglected attention to the gendered identities of men who could be categorized as “of color.” Meanwhile, women of color are playing a growing role in US politics as candidates and elected officials but are underrepresented in comparison with their presence in the population. We investigate whether Black and Latino men express a “men of color” linked fate and whether it has implications for support for women candidates of color. We seek to understand how Black and Latino men’s gender, race, and “of color” identities impact their evaluations of women candidates who are Black, Latina, and “of color” to better understand coalitional possibilities across gender and race lines. We find that Black and Latino men subscribe to “men of color” linked fate, with political consequences.

Seven decades after Brown v. Board, Black students continue to lag White students. This article analyzes six experiments conducted over three decades to study whether, consistent with social identity theory, White Americans are more supportive of funding increases for nonracially targeted educational programs that benefit their racial ingroup compared to race-targeted programs. We also ask whether racial prejudice is a factor, if implicit or explicit racial priming accounts for any observed differences, and if the effects have changed over time. Our results show that consistent with social identity theory, White Americans are more likely to favor funding increases for public schools or programs for poor children, categories that are majority White, than programs targeted to Black children. Furthermore, we find no evidence of implicit or explicit racial priming. Across all experiments and all years, interactions between racial priors and the treatments are null. We conclude that ingroup favoritism, not prejudice nor racial priming, explains racially discriminatory support for increases in education funding.

How do residents evaluate zoning relief applications for new houses of worship? Do they decide based on the facility’s expected level of nuisance, the religion of the house of worship, or the attitudes of neighbors and local officials? Using a conjoint survey experiment, this paper shows that religion is the most important predictor of resistance. People are more likely to resist new mosques than Christian churches, irrespective of other facility properties. Furthermore, this paper highlights the significant role of partisanship in residents’ evaluation of zoning relief applications. Republican respondents were more likely to reject minority houses of worship and support Christian churches than Democrats, moderating the influence of religion. Such bias has important implications for the zoning relief application process. Local officials should evaluate residents’ opposition differently when the application concerns minority groups.

How does interior immigration enforcement affect how undocumented immigrants describe their interactions with state and societal institutions? Although there is some evidence that points to a broad range of chilling effects that result when local law enforcement officials work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement, there is no systematic study that collectively examines the impacts that may result with such enforcement efforts. We situate our paper as evidence of the homeland security state and show how contemporary interior immigration enforcement subjugates undocumented immigrants in nearly all facets of their interactions with state and societal institutions. To illustrate this, we embedded an experiment in a survey (n = 594) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, they report that they would be less likely to report crimes they witness or are victims of to the police, use public services that require them to disclose their personal contact information, do business that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, and participate in public events where the police may be present, among other main findings.

How does the general public perceive immigrants, whom do they think of when thinking about “immigrants,” and to what extent are these perceptions related to the actual composition of immigrant populations? We use three representative online surveys in the United States, South Africa, and Switzerland (total N = 2,778) to extend existing work on the perception of immigrants in terms of geographic coverage and individual characteristics. We also relate these responses to official statistics on immigration and integration patterns. In all three countries, there are significant discrepancies between perceptions of immigrants and their real proportion in the population and characteristics. Although we observe clear country differences, there is a striking pattern of people associating “immigrants” with “asylum seekers” in all three countries. We consider two possible explanations for the differences between perceptions and facts: the representativeness heuristic and the affect heuristic. In contrast to previous research, we find only partial support for the representativeness heuristic, whereas the results are consistent with the affect heuristic. We conclude that images of “immigrants” are largely shaped by pre-existing attitudes.

This paper analyses the ethnic penalty by focusing on the racialization of labor market outcomes beyond the migrant penalty. An illegitimate statistical or taste-based discrimination can be revealed specifically by distinguishing migrants into ethnic groups. Accordingly, ethnic penalty based on five different ethnic groups was estimated through the difference in employment and job quality with respect to natives. The analysis was conducted at the country and European average levels using 16 European countries under a framework of ethnic penalty processes in the labor market. According to the analysis, Eastern Europeans were the most prominent ethnicity regarding higher employment across the 16 countries, although they were mostly posited in unskilled jobs. Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa were shown to be subject to a double penalty in both measures, and the penalty tendency was much clearer for females. Asians and South Americans showed the least penalty, while sub-Saharan Africans were revealed to hold an in-between position.

The radical right has become a central political force in most Western democracies. This process has been the result of the normalization and mainstreaming of its political leaders, discourses, and visions of society, notably involving the scapegoating of immigration and the use of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. However, the normalization and mainstreaming of radical right actors competing for the leadership of their overall political family remain an under-researched topic. The scope of the current article is to explore this phenomenon by considering the case of France, which after the United States, is the largest Western state that could potentially be ruled by a radical right president with extensive executive powers. The analysis shows that actors competing for the leadership of the radical right in a given country can generate diverging strategies of normalization and mainstreaming to secure their political distinction. Immigration and the Great Replacement constitute, respectively, a topic and a conspiracy theory that are emphasized and/or downplayed by opportunistic stakeholders weaving a web of interactions to define their comparative legitimacy and supremacy in the public sphere.