How does interior immigration enforcement affect how undocumented immigrants describe their interactions with state and societal institutions? Although there is some evidence that points to a broad range of chilling effects that result when local law enforcement officials work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement, there is no systematic study that collectively examines the impacts that may result with such enforcement efforts. We situate our paper as evidence of the homeland security state and show how contemporary interior immigration enforcement subjugates undocumented immigrants in nearly all facets of their interactions with state and societal institutions. To illustrate this, we embedded an experiment in a survey (n = 594) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, they report that they would be less likely to report crimes they witness or are victims of to the police, use public services that require them to disclose their personal contact information, do business that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, and participate in public events where the police may be present, among other main findings.

Do locals discriminate against themselves by favoring foreigners with higher expected purchasing power? Drawing on theories of prejudice, discrimination, and colonialism, I argue that in colonized and post-colonial countries, local home sellers discriminate against local potential homebuyers while favoring foreigners with expected higher purchasing power, anticipating a more profitable transaction. I support this argument with evidence from a preregistered online audit study targeting discriminatory attitudes toward local home buyers. In the study, fictitious home buyers with distinctive language and ethnic names emailed 1,512 home sellers (realtors and homeowners) across all municipalities in Puerto Rico. Home sellers reported more houses available to Americans and invited them to more house showings than Puerto Ricans. My estimates indicate that ethnic discrimination exists in the Puerto Rican housing market. These findings provide new insights into ethnic dynamics in colonized and post-colonial societies and underscore concerns about recent legislation that turned Puerto Rico into a tax haven.

Do Indigenous peoples in present-day Canada display lower levels of diffuse support than non-Indigenous settlers? Given settler colonial relations (both historic and contemporary) and Indigenous peoples’ own political thought, we can expect that Indigenous peoples would have even lower perceptions of state legitimacy than non-Indigenous peoples. However, there are conflicting expectations regarding whether the descriptive representation of Indigenous peoples in settler institutions is likely to make a difference: on one hand, Indigenous people may see themselves reflected in these institutions and consequently feel better represented; on the other hand, these forms of representation do not challenge the underlying colonial nature of these institutions. Using data from the 2019 and 2021 Canadian Election Studies, our statistical analysis demonstrates that: (1) diffuse support is significantly lower among Indigenous peoples than non-Indigenous peoples, including people of color; (2) Indigenous respondents across multiple peoples have similarly low levels of diffuse support, and (3) being represented by an Indigenous Member of Parliament does not change the levels of diffuse support among Indigenous peoples. Overall, our research highlights the outstanding challenges to achieving reconciliation through the Canadian state and points to ways large-N analyses may be made more robust.

Political wrangling over Critical Race Theory (CRT) in the United States has produced policies banning its teaching in jurisdictions across the country. However, laws touted as “anti-CRT” have little in common with the original, academic origins of the phrase. In this study, we use a Qualtrics-based survey experiment to assess how participants’ support for a ban will change depending on whether the ban reflects core tenets of academic researchers’ use of CRT, the phrase itself, or elements common to many of the laws intended to ban it. We find that these three different frames do indeed change support for such policies, and the effects are dependent upon partisanship. We interpret our results to be empirical evidence of the phrase “Critical Race Theory” complicating political discourse.

This paper analyses the ethnic penalty by focusing on the racialization of labor market outcomes beyond the migrant penalty. An illegitimate statistical or taste-based discrimination can be revealed specifically by distinguishing migrants into ethnic groups. Accordingly, ethnic penalty based on five different ethnic groups was estimated through the difference in employment and job quality with respect to natives. The analysis was conducted at the country and European average levels using 16 European countries under a framework of ethnic penalty processes in the labor market. According to the analysis, Eastern Europeans were the most prominent ethnicity regarding higher employment across the 16 countries, although they were mostly posited in unskilled jobs. Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa were shown to be subject to a double penalty in both measures, and the penalty tendency was much clearer for females. Asians and South Americans showed the least penalty, while sub-Saharan Africans were revealed to hold an in-between position.

Previous work suggests that African American and Latino voters lack political cohesiveness. Recently, these findings have been cited by opponents of “minority aggregation,” which is the idea that African Americans and Latinos can be thought of as constituting a single “class of citizens” when filing claims under the Voting Rights Act. I replicate one influential study, Rocha (2007), with updated data and greater attentiveness to moderating conditions that are meaningful in voting rights law. My findings suggest African Americans and Latinos are more cohesive than previously thought, especially in majority–minority jurisdictions. Furthermore, cohesion cannot be explained solely by shared partisanship.

What is the effect of personal discrimination on the political engagement of ethnic and racial minorities? Existing research theorizes increased engagement, but evidence is mixed. The discrimination and political engagement link is tested across six countries: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Interest in politics and political actions (e.g. protest and donations) show constant relationships: people who have experienced discrimination have more interest in politics and take more political actions. There is no clear evidence of different effects of political vs social discrimination. However, the link between turnout and discrimination varies systematically across countries: a positive correlation in three separate American datasets, but mixed and null in other countries. This may be the result of the distinctive American conflict over voting rights for racial minorities. The conclusion discusses priorities for future research, including a focus on establishing causal relationships and testing mechanisms.

How do residents evaluate zoning relief applications for new houses of worship? Do they decide based on the facility’s expected level of nuisance, the religion of the house of worship, or the attitudes of neighbors and local officials? Using a conjoint survey experiment, this paper shows that religion is the most important predictor of resistance. People are more likely to resist new mosques than Christian churches, irrespective of other facility properties. Furthermore, this paper highlights the significant role of partisanship in residents’ evaluation of zoning relief applications. Republican respondents were more likely to reject minority houses of worship and support Christian churches than Democrats, moderating the influence of religion. Such bias has important implications for the zoning relief application process. Local officials should evaluate residents’ opposition differently when the application concerns minority groups.

Using a national audit of mayors in the United States, this paper examines responsiveness to Latine lesbian and gay constituents who request that their city issue an LGBTQ pride proclamation. Drawing on theories of intersectionality, descriptive representation, and political institutions, we articulate the conditions under which mayors are responsive to public-facing constituency service requests to issue LGBTQ pride proclamations. We find that mayors are more responsive to requests from lesbian couples than gay couples. In addition, baseline responsiveness to our inquiry was influenced by mayors’ identity characteristics. LGBTQ mayors were more likely to respond than non-LGBTQ mayors, but Latine mayors were less likely to respond than non-Latine mayors. In addition, mayors who represent cities where nondiscrimination ordinances protect LGBT people from discrimination were more responsive than mayors who represent cities where LGBT people are not protected from discrimination. These findings demonstrate how intersectional frameworks can advance audit experiments and that shared descriptive characteristics do not inevitably translate into responsiveness, a common assumption in single-axis studies of representation.

How does the general public perceive immigrants, whom do they think of when thinking about “immigrants,” and to what extent are these perceptions related to the actual composition of immigrant populations? We use three representative online surveys in the United States, South Africa, and Switzerland (total N = 2,778) to extend existing work on the perception of immigrants in terms of geographic coverage and individual characteristics. We also relate these responses to official statistics on immigration and integration patterns. In all three countries, there are significant discrepancies between perceptions of immigrants and their real proportion in the population and characteristics. Although we observe clear country differences, there is a striking pattern of people associating “immigrants” with “asylum seekers” in all three countries. We consider two possible explanations for the differences between perceptions and facts: the representativeness heuristic and the affect heuristic. In contrast to previous research, we find only partial support for the representativeness heuristic, whereas the results are consistent with the affect heuristic. We conclude that images of “immigrants” are largely shaped by pre-existing attitudes.

Seven decades after Brown v. Board, Black students continue to lag White students. This article analyzes six experiments conducted over three decades to study whether, consistent with social identity theory, White Americans are more supportive of funding increases for nonracially targeted educational programs that benefit their racial ingroup compared to race-targeted programs. We also ask whether racial prejudice is a factor, if implicit or explicit racial priming accounts for any observed differences, and if the effects have changed over time. Our results show that consistent with social identity theory, White Americans are more likely to favor funding increases for public schools or programs for poor children, categories that are majority White, than programs targeted to Black children. Furthermore, we find no evidence of implicit or explicit racial priming. Across all experiments and all years, interactions between racial priors and the treatments are null. We conclude that ingroup favoritism, not prejudice nor racial priming, explains racially discriminatory support for increases in education funding.

The radical right has become a central political force in most Western democracies. This process has been the result of the normalization and mainstreaming of its political leaders, discourses, and visions of society, notably involving the scapegoating of immigration and the use of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. However, the normalization and mainstreaming of radical right actors competing for the leadership of their overall political family remain an under-researched topic. The scope of the current article is to explore this phenomenon by considering the case of France, which after the United States, is the largest Western state that could potentially be ruled by a radical right president with extensive executive powers. The analysis shows that actors competing for the leadership of the radical right in a given country can generate diverging strategies of normalization and mainstreaming to secure their political distinction. Immigration and the Great Replacement constitute, respectively, a topic and a conspiracy theory that are emphasized and/or downplayed by opportunistic stakeholders weaving a web of interactions to define their comparative legitimacy and supremacy in the public sphere.

Researchers are increasingly reliant on online, opt-in surveys. But prior benchmarking exercises employ national samples, making it unclear whether such surveys can effectively represent Black respondents and other minorities nationwide. This paper presents the results of uncompensated online and in-person surveys administered chiefly in one racially diverse American city—Philadelphia—during its 2023 mayoral primary. The participation rate for online surveys promoted via Facebook and Instagram was .4%, with White residents and those with college degrees more likely to respond. Such biases help explain why neither our surveys nor public polls correctly identified the Democratic primary’s winner, an establishment-backed Black Democrat. Even weighted, geographically stratified online surveys typically underestimate the winner’s support, although an in-person exit poll does not. We identify some similar patterns in Chicago. These results indicate important gaps in the populations represented in contemporary opt-in surveys and suggest that alternative survey modes help reduce them.

Scholars are increasingly interested in “of color” identities. Yet, studies of “of color” identities have neglected attention to the gendered identities of men who could be categorized as “of color.” Meanwhile, women of color are playing a growing role in US politics as candidates and elected officials but are underrepresented in comparison with their presence in the population. We investigate whether Black and Latino men express a “men of color” linked fate and whether it has implications for support for women candidates of color. We seek to understand how Black and Latino men’s gender, race, and “of color” identities impact their evaluations of women candidates who are Black, Latina, and “of color” to better understand coalitional possibilities across gender and race lines. We find that Black and Latino men subscribe to “men of color” linked fate, with political consequences.

Black women have come to be seen as a dominant force in American politics—particularly in support of the Democratic party. However, this dominance in the political sphere has not translated to dominance in the economic sphere. Despite Black women’s outperformance of their Black male peers in higher education outcomes and overrepresentation in the labor force, there is still an economic gap between Black women and their male counterparts. In addition, regional differences in cost of living have led to diverging local conditions for Black women as well. What do Black women’s socioeconomic outcomes mean for their political ideology and political preferences? Few studies capture intra-group variation among Black women and how the context in which they live may shape their economic and sociopolitical outlook. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, we examine how the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and their political beliefs and the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and political preferences are conditioned by region. We capture the individual factors and regional context that shape differences among Black women in their political beliefs and policy attitudes. This research furthers our understanding of differences in Black women’s politics.