A “bureau-shaping model” is adapted to explain how the head of a control agency can shape its culture by agenda-setting, strategic recruitment and engaging staff in “expression games” through which their reputation depends on the impression they develop of competence and commitment to the core beliefs of the agency. The postwar shaping of a “culture of balanced evaluation” at the New Zealand Treasury (NZT) reflected the hegemony of a market failure paradigm. The NZT reinvented itself in the 1980s so that it would be aligned with a reformist advocacy coalition committed to impose and institutionalize a government failure paradigm. The accumulation of a number of threats to the NZT's authority appear to be prompting another reinvention as its current secretary seeks to bring it more into line with the appreciative leadership style of its centre-left government.

Relying on social choice theory, this paper argues that uncertainty regarding future public policies is likely to be related to party institutionalization and legislative organization. The argument is evaluated using survey data from businesses in eight EU member states in East Central Europe. It finds that firms report lower concern over policy uncertainty in systems with higher party institutionalization. There is also some evidence, although less robust, that restrictive parliamentary agenda control leads to lower perceptions of policy uncertainty and this effect mediates the influence of party institutionalization. These results tend to hold if one controls for the effect of other national and firm-level factors.

This paper examines the labour standard-setting capacities of the EU and NAFTA. The social dimension to the EU is depicted as being organised along the principles of deliberative supranationalism. The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), sometimes referred to as the Labour Side Accord, which is the labour standard-setting arrangement for NAFTA, is regarded as a tri-national institutional arrangement which grafts formal international procedures onto domestic labour market regimes. The paper seeks to describe and explain how the different types of activities in which the two social dimensions are engaged can be traced back to their overall institutional design. The paper argues that EU social policy is the stronger of the two arrangements and that NAALC has significant shortcomings. Yet it also argues that NAALC holds out interesting lessons for other regional trading blocs and other global experiments in labour market standard setting as its decentralised and `horizontal' character is more in keeping with the broad institutional design of these arrangements.

This paper challenges the mechanical application of inflation accounting to public sector deficits as it has been suggested in recent years. Although the theoretical considerations underlying the proposed adjustment for the inflation premium of interest payments are well taken, the new approach has fundamentally focused on measurement issues with little attention paid to the behavioral aspects of microeconomic adjustment. This paper, therefore, raises skepticism about the usefulness of inflation accounting, if such a correction is not accompanied by a conceptual model that links behavioral responses of individuals to balance sheets and other stock variables. In a departure from previous investigations, the paper also points out the possibility that inflation accounting might have more relevant implications for public, rather than private, spending.

This article aims to map the political economy of top personal income tax rate setting. A much-discussed driving factor of top rate setting is the corporate tax rate: governments may prefer to limit the differential between both rates in order to prevent tax-friendly saving of labour incomes inside corporations. Recent studies have highlighted several other driving factors, including budgetary pressure, partisan politics, and societal fairness norms. I compare these and other potential determinants in the long run (1981–2018) by studying tax reforms of 226 cabinets in 19 advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries using regression models. I find little evidence for the effects of economic, political, and institutional factors; instead, the main determinant of the top rate is the corporate tax rate. As corporate tax rates are still declining under competitive pressure, the recently set minimum rate of 15% will not stop tax competition from constraining progressive income taxation.

Within the advanced capitalist world, Japan and France have normally been the main examples of strong, interventionist states. From the 1960s onwards, government policy in each nation attempted to cultivate a domestically based computer industry in response to American dominance. This seemed to be parallel cases of strong states attempting to target an industry in order to catch up. However, by the start of the 1980s it was clear that French policy had failed, whereas Japan was relatively successful. We explain this difference by stressing that Japanese policy was ultimately more market conforming. This occurred because Japanese companies were less dependent on government financing and procurement for their business compared to French counterparts. In short, the Japanese state had less power over its domestic computer companies than did the French state. This national difference in ‘state strength’, i.e., state-business power relations, accounts for a negotiated pattern of industrial restructuring in Japan compared to the predominantly state-led pattern in France.

As implementers, public officials have historically enjoyed substantial influence in the public policy process, but little attention has been paid to the effect of psychological elements on their attitudes towards implementing policy instruments. The authors argue that from a behavioural public administration perspective, public officials’ attitudes towards implementing certain policy instruments are not rational, but instead biased. Using two survey experiments on 1,024 Chinese public officials, this study examines the cognitive and motivational bias of public officials’ attitudes towards implementing policy instruments. The findings indicate that when public officials are presented with risk information in a negative framing, they are more reluctant to implement indirect policy instruments than direct ones, and this phenomenon becomes more pronounced when their public interest orientation is activated, rather than their personal interest orientation. The findings contribute to the theoretical understanding of the effect of psychological biases on public officials’ attitudes towards policy implementation.

Policymaking and policy outcomes are not necessarily the result of a carefully designed process but can result from intertwined political and institutional dynamics that are often difficult to predict from the outset. This article examines such a policy process, the dramatic rise in the uptake of private health insurance (PHI) in Denmark. In a comprehensive welfare state, founded on the principle of universalism, its success is puzzling. The explanation suggested here is that the rise in PHI is an example of policymaking without policy choice. The article reviews the intended and unintended effects concerning equality in health care and public finance. It also notes that the introduction of a private alternative to the universal health care system has not weakened the support for the public services.

Policy change is not an instantaneous or linear process. In fact, change includes several mechanisms working in tandem and even against one another. This article examines the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on homelessness policy in Canada. In a sector that is already plagued with emergency responses – rather than long-term solutions – the pandemic has initiated a critical juncture where policy change is possible, but not guaranteed. Although the existing failures to alleviate homelessness in Canada make policy failings even more obvious, aspects of the pre-existing Canadian response to homelessness negate change. The pandemic, however, has led to temporary solutions and created a setting where long-term change is possible. Using over 150 primary sources, this article analyses mechanisms of change and path dependence in the pandemic response to homelessness. The presence of such mechanisms is tested in three major Canadian cities.

Drawing on data for 60 Australian Commonwealth government bureaucracies 1976–86, this paper explores what measurable consequences for bureaucratic structure can be associated with staffing and spending cutbacks. It looks at cutbacks both at government-wide and at individual-bureaucracylevel, on the basis of a casualty list intended to portray the different dimensions of relative bureaucratic ‘suffering’ more systematically than has hitherto been done in the cutback management literature. It then explores associations between measures of cutbacks and indicators of structural consequences, both at government-wide and departmental level, relating that to the debate as to whether ‘leaner means weaker’ in government cutbacks. The ‘leaner means weaker’ view of bureaucratic cutbacks is hard to sustain from these data.

The landmark United States healthcare reform law – the Affordable Care Act – provides an opportunity to study the dynamics of implementation for complex, politically contentious policies. Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Model suggests that bottom-up models will dominate in such cases. I exploit variation across states in the implementation of online health insurance marketplaces to test whether the federal- (top-down) or state-managed (bottom-up) implementation model produced better outcomes. Specifically, the study examines if state, federal or partnership exchanges were most effective at offering generous plans for consumers based on premiums, deductibles and copayments in 2014, the first year of operation. The results unambiguously indicate that state exchanges were most successful. The findings provide evidence for what Matland suspected – that bottom-up models, by providing more discretion to local implementers to adapt to contexts and build coalitions, are superior for high-conflict, high-ambiguity policies.

The awareness of the structural rather than cyclical nature of economic problems caused a fundamental rethinking of the institutions and instruments of industrial policy in most OECD countries. However, studies have concentrated on a limited number of large countries, with only marginal use being made of the experience of the smaller OECD countries. The need for comparative material becomes relevant since the large economies are increasingly facing the same structural problems as the smaller ones. This article analyses the experience of the Netherlands in comparison with other small European economies. The Netherlands economy is highly intertwined with the other economies of the European Community, particularly Germany. Multinationals (many home-based in the case of the Netherlands) dominate certain sectors of the economy and exports, but smaller companies provide the bulk of employment. The loss of employment since 1970 has mostly resulted from the restructuring of large firms. Government subsidies grew considerably, and proliferated in form, in the 1970s and most went to industries experiencing structural problems. Large firms have tended to benefit most. Criticisms have been made of rescue operations, the risky nature of development credits, the obstacles to the use of schemes by small firms and the cost and ineffectiveness of the investment subsidy account. Because of declining domestic investment, public subsidies accounted for 82 per cent of all private investment by 1982. In the 1980s there has been a move away from tripartite arrangements for discussing and administering industrial subsidies to commissions of ‘independent’ experts, and the degree of organisation in labour unions in the Netherlands, already low, has declined considerably in recent years. The prevalence of centre-right governments in recent years has made it easier to reduce support for individual firms, though large grants for modernisation are made to large firms. The Netherlands appears to be one of the small open countries in which the basic linkages in the model proposed by Cameron have been broken.

The shift from a command economy to a market economy is not only a question of following appropriate macro-economic policies but also a matter of instilling a market ethic in the minds of people who had been socialized and rewarded in a non-market command economy. In that system, many concentrated on technical rules of survival. The lumpenproletariat in favoured industries were rewarded even when they shirked or pilfered from state enterprises. The ethics of the lumpenintelligentsia reflected Communist party values, as professional. associations were under party control. The maintenance of such attitudes creates substantial resistance to the transformation of the economy, because a Weberian protestant ethic is lacking. Transition does occur, but the legacy of the old ethic imposes high transaction costs, inefficiencies and inhibits forward direct investment.

In discussing unemployment problems the current literature tends to emphasise supply shocks and real wage rigidity, hysteresis, failure of relative wages to adjust to market conditions and labour market regulations as important reasons of unemployment. By making a comparative study of the unemployment problems in the Netherlands and Norway, this study emphasises the protection of industries, real interest rates and government fiscal policy as important factors explaining the difference in unemployment between the two countries.

Research finds that social media platforms’ peer-to-peer structures shape the public discourse and increase citizens’ likelihood of exposure to unregulated, false, and prejudicial content. Here, we test whether self-reported reliance on social media as a primary news source is linked to racialised policy support, taking the case of United States Muslims, a publicly visible but understudied group about whom significant false and prejudicial content is abundant on these platforms. Drawing on three original surveys and the Nationscape dataset, we find a strong and consistent association between reliance on social media and support for a range of anti-Muslim policies. Importantly, reliance on social media is linked to policy attitudes across the partisan divide and for individuals who reported holding positive or negative feelings towards Muslims. These findings highlight the need for further investigation into the political ramification of information presented on contemporary social media outlets, particularly information related to stigmatised groups.

It is widely believed by political scientists that the Thatcher Governments transformed British industrial relations and ‘curbed union power’. In contrast, most industrial relations scholars have argued that despite the legislative onslaught relatively little has changed on the shopfloor. This paper examines both claims. Much has changed in Britain since 1979. In particular, the political role of unions has altered substantially. Unions in 1991 are infrequently consulted and have very little influence. In addition, the legislative framework within which unions operate is very different; their activities are much more circumscribed by the law than previously. But much less has changed on the shopfloor; for example, there is limited evidence of a major move to derecognise unions or restrict collective bargaining. Governments can only set the legislative framework within which shopfloor industrial relations operate; it cannot determine outcomes.

Political corruption in the land sector is pervasive, but difficult to document and effectively prosecute. This article provides new evidence on political land corruption in Malta, the European Union’s smallest member state and one of the world’s most densely populated countries. It shows how the country’s highly restrictive zoning laws, along with a de jure independent regulator, have created opportunities for extensive and endemic corruption in the granting of land development permits in zones that are outside development. It provides an example of governments creating institutions as rent-collection instruments – not to correct market failures, but to create opportunities for corruption. The unique underlying data set was collected through an automated web-scraping program as the regulator first turned down then ignored freedom of information requests for the data.

Voters in many American states have considered important social policies that redefine civil liberties within their state through the initiative and referendum. An important question remaining is, are voters knowledgeable enough to make decisions on these social policies that have far-reaching effects? The common wisdom is that voters rely on information shortcuts in lieu of extensive knowledge about the issues. Unlike candidate elections, however, ballot measures lack some prominent and useful information shortcuts (i.e. party identification). We test the hypothesis that voters use shortcuts to inform their decisions on two ballot measures central to today's policy debates: California's Proposition 4 on parental notification for abortion and Proposition 8 on same-sex marriage. We show that voters do not use cues universally, and, furthermore, factual information has a limited effect on voters’ decisions. In particular, we find that the persuasiveness of an endorsement is conditional on whether an individual trusts the source.

Policy networks fulfil an important role within policymaking. Networks of public and private actors provide information to policymakers and may halt or accommodate policy change. Generally, these networks exhibit stability, but at times, they are transformed due to disruptive shocks. This article compares lobbying networks surrounding three EU financial regulatory agencies before and after the global financial crisis. Utilising network-analytical methods, the analysis assesses network change after the financial crisis and the subsequent institutional and regulatory reforms. The findings show that as lobbying networks expand, they become more fragmented. They also demonstrate that shocks stimulate the entrance of new interest groups and make repeat players more selective in their lobbying efforts. This implies that the financial regulation policy network becomes less club-like after the crisis, allowing new groups to inform regulators about their policy preferences.