Securing the personal safety of citizens has traditionally been a state monopoly. However, increased fear of crime and victimization has produced individual and community actions to secure personal safety. This paper discusses the emergence and development of the community-initiated ‘Civil Guard’ in Israel, a sweeping movement which emerged in 1974 from a growing fear of terrorism. This grass roots initiative has raised government's concern over its ability to monitor, inspect and control the volunteers. The national police has co-opted the entire movement in three phases. In the first, a spontaneous emergence of self-help initiatives covered the country. Next, the movement was transformed into a national body of volunteers with a clear legal status, albeit under the complicated and joint auspices of the national police and local government. Finally the national police force co-opted the ‘Civil Guard’ into auxiliary units. What began as a neighborhood-based, self-help initiative was molded into a quasi-governmental, police-oriented voluntary organization.

Forecast errors in budgetary variables are frequent. When systematic, they are a source of concern, as they signal misconduct in fiscal policymaking, undermine the government’s credibility and compromise long-term fiscal sustainability. This paper analyses the characteristics of fiscal forecasting and implementation errors in Italy using real-time data over the period 1998–2009. Several empirical methods are applied in order to identify the features of policymakers’ behaviour in preparing and implementing annual fiscal policy and to discover potential determinants in the formation of the implementation errors. Our results show that implemented budgetary plans systematically fall short one year ahead of ambitious planned adjustments for the main public finance aggregates. Fiscal illusion dominates revenue and GDP forecasting, and preliminary data releases are severely biased estimators of the final data, especially for expenditures. The role of the parliamentary session in driving a severe expenditure drift is confirmed.

Despite promises by European Union (EU) policymakers to “fundamentally change” cybersecurity certification, they have recently created a regime that is strikingly similar to already existing certification arrangements. How can we explain this puzzle? Through a process-tracing analysis based on 41 documents and 18 interviews, this article traces the development of the EU cybersecurity certification regime over the past two decades. It deconstructs certification into standardisation, accreditation, certification, and evaluation; analyses how each regime component changed over time; and discusses to what extent causal mechanisms that are derived from classic theories of EU integration explain the limited nature of policy change. The observed dynamics uncover a “Europeanization on Demand” model that allows national authorities to completely control the extent of integration. This study challenges the dichotomous understanding portrayed by EU integration literature, of mutually exclusive dynamics of market or core state powers integration, highlighting intriguing political dynamics in EU cybersecurity policymaking.

With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, European governments extensively intervened to avert a severe economic recession. Taxation is a crucial instrument to achieve such economic objectives, but it also represents a redistributive tool in democratic societies. Generally, left-wing parties are more supportive of progressive taxes and redistribution than right-wing governments. As a crisis response, one could assume that European governments, especially social-democratic ones, reinforced a redistributive stance to compensate for the substantial amounts of public money used to bail out financial institutions. Based on the tax reforms introduced between 2008 and 2010, the paper explores the tax strategies adopted by European governments. The findings do not reveal a direct effect of party politics on taxation but rather show that pressures from the capital markets significantly restrained governments’ policy capacities to act.

While information exchange is essential in the policy process, little is known about how divergent subgroups filter actors’ technical and political information exchange, blocking learning processes. Guided by social identity, group entitativity, and self-categorisation theories, we introduce the concept and measurement of identity-based subgroups referring to informal clusters shaped by the self-referent perception of similarities among actors. The identity-based subgroup is recognised as a precursor for coalition building in a policy subsystem but received inadequate attention in the research on Advocacy Coalition Framework. We examine how divergent identity-based subgroups moderate the links between relational embeddedness and technical/political information exchanges in an adversarial fracking policy network in New York. Our quadratic assignment procedure multiple regression indicated that, despite trust, policy actors from different identity-based subgroups are less likely to share technical and political information in the network. When two actors’ identity-based subgroups are different, competition is more likely associated with lower technical information exchange in the network. These findings extend research on information exchange in adversarial policy subsystems.

In this article, we describe two experiments measuring the impact of a collection of interventions informed by behavioural sciences to reduce unemployment. In a small-scale pilot study (n = 2,383) run in partnership with a Jobcentre in the UK, we found that small changes to the way jobseekers interacted with employment advisers showed promising effects. Based on these findings, we refined our intervention and tested it in a second, larger trial (n = 88,033) across 12 Jobcentres in the UK. We found that our intervention significantly increased off-flow from benefits. These experiments demonstrate that policies and programmes aimed at reducing unemployment can benefit greatly from a deeper understanding of the behaviours of jobseekers and employment advisers. Further, we suggest that this approach could have positive implications for other areas of public policy.

This paper examines policy planning systems in British central-local government relations, and in particular the formal, structured relationship in the local transport policy sector, as a means of exploring the impact in intergovernmental relations of the form of linkage between institutions. This impact is analysed in terms of central government's ability to use the planning system to promote policy processes and promote and regulate policy content in the locality. The use of specific and block grants by central government as a potential instrument of control in relation to policy planning systems is discussed. An examination of limiting cases reveals the importance of local resources in minimising central government influence through the policy planning system, and suggests that institutions will seek to restructure the form of linkage or underlying resources when they see themselves loosing advantage to others.

This paper seeks to explain why Finland, which is further from the main population and productive centres of Europe and arguably more different and more prone to asymmetric shocks than some countries that have chosen to stay out of Stage 3 of EMU, chose to participate. We argue that economically relatively marginal issues affected the choice. How the decision-making process is conducted can be as important as the balance of information on which the decision is based. We also use evidence after the event on how the economy reacts to show that some of the problems hypothesised beforehand have turned out rather more favourably than expected. In particular Finland has experienced a substantial positive asymmetric shock in the ICT sector where membership of EMU has had a very clear positive effect on the impact on the economy. Lastly we offer some limited evidence that membership of EMU itself forces some of the changes to institutions and behaviour that are required to cope with the new pressures.

Not long ago, I found myself at an athletic breakfast. Having long supported a broader-based, lower-rate income tax, with fewer tax preferences, I was dismayed to discover a letter from an administrator requesting all present to protest against the new reform on the grounds that by weakening tax preferences it would reduce contributions to the University in general and sports in particular. To this special interest – all interests are special to those who care about them – one can add, among numerous others, museums, opera companies, and sports franchises. Indeed, until I started writing this review, I was unaware of how tax preferences help increase the salaries of athletes. These franchises make substantial income from box seats bought by corporations that can write them off as business expenses. Absent this subsidy, franchise income, hence allowable salaries, would be less. Do we want to subsidize athletes? Or owners? How is this to be avoided while protecting the busboys, waiters, and other people who depend on the ablity of businessmen to write off meals and drinks?

Anti-crime policy is often unresponsive to reductions in crime. To address why, we provide a model and empirical test of how citizens’ anti-crime policy preferences respond to information. Our model shows that preferences for anti-crime policy hinge on expectations about the crime rate: punitive policies are preferred in high crime contexts, whereas social policies are preferred in low crime contexts. We evaluate these expectations through an information experiment embedded in the 2017 Latin American Public Opinion Project survey conducted in Panama. As expected by our theory, a high crime message induced stronger preferences in favour of punitive policies. Unanticipated by our theory, but in line with cursory evidence and survey results, we find that a low crime message did not induce stronger preferences in favour of social policies. These findings are consistent with policy ratcheting: punitive policies increase during periods of high crime and remain in place during periods of low crime.

Since day-to-day implementation of exchange-rate policy has been neglected in the literature on international monetary relations, U.S. and Japanese intervention policies in the post-Bretton Woods period are analyzed. The determinants of Japanese intervention policy are clearly identified: international coordination and U.S. intervention increase the amount of Japanese intervention. A strong tendency to ‘lean against the wind’ and some indication of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy exist as well. On the other hand, U.S. intervention policy is more elusive. There is some evidence, however, that Japanese and German intervention as well as the Louvre Accord and Democratic administrations led to larger amounts of U.S. intervention. Some interpretations are offered as to why it is difficult to unravel U.S. policy.

This paper discusses the prospects of Greece, Portugal and Spain completing stage 1 of the Delors plan. Much of the academic literature on the removal of capital controls seeks to extend the experience of the ERM countries in the 1980s. We argue that its applicability for southern Europe is not straightforward, because these countries have not had the same experience of operating the ‘old’ ERM with capital controls, and examine the implications for these countries of removing capital controls for macroeconomic, and especially, fiscal policy. Intermediate institutional arrangements may be necessary and we consider how EC-wide measures may help these countries in this transitional phase. For the next phase of European integration, the focus of the EC should be on developing appropriate public institutions at the European level to promote positive integration.

A long time ago I received a letter from Rex Stout inviting me to join the Authors' Guild, a letter no doubt sent to all who had books published. I didn't join because I didn't think of myself primarily as a writer, but as an aspiring scholar who merely set out the results of investigations that, so to speak, wrote themselves. Writing was incidental, not essential. Some years later a similar letter arrived. By then, having spent several hours a day writing most days, I joined. I had become a writer, if not by accomplishment, at least by occupation. Only recently, however, have I thought of myself as a writer by vocation, as a person who cares about the quality and craft of writing as inseparable from the content of whatever I am trying to communicate. Indeed, for me, writing has become an integral part of thinking.

Starting from the relative success of the Austrian economy in the 1970s the problems of industrial policy and the position of industrial policy in the context of economic policy are examined. Policies directed towards improving the industrial structure have had a lower priority than policies aimed at producing sufficient total economic growth to avoid unemployment and disputes over the distribution of the GNP. The structure of Austria's foreign trade shows that Austria still has not achieved the industrial structure appropriate for a small industrial country in an exposed geographical position. In Austria the problems of industry are regarded as legitimate affairs of government and, although there is criticism of the details of government intervention, the economic responsibility which is conferred on the government is an extensive one. Austria's political culture exhibits both consociationalist traits, with most laws being passed with the support of the two big parties,, and ‘social partnership’ in the form of voluntary co-operation between the unions and employers' associations. The political consensus means that discussion tends to revolve round technical rather than fundamental issues of industrial policy. Since the early 1970s the preservation of full employment has become the dominating industrial policy goal of the Austrian government; as a result, policy is mainly reactive rather than proactive. Fiscal investment aids are by far the most important industrial policy instrument, though their use has been criticised. There are also direct expenditure schemes, aimed at particular sectors as well as the general stimulation of investment; these aids have also been criticised. The prospects for the introduction of industrial policies more focussed on qualitative changes in industrial structure are not considered good, but political stability seems assured.

Drawing upon theoretical studies on the policy impact of political parties, this article address cross-national differences in financial policy choice and capital market development in Malaysia and Thailand. An explanatory approach that considers inter-party organisational dimensions in tandem with intra-party structural attributes shows that financial and regulatory policies have varied significantly between Malaysia and Thailand in response to the national configurations of political parties. The different patterns of policy choices, in turn, have led to varied capital market structures and development trajectories. Thus the theoretical literature on the political economy of financial capitalism in developed countries, which stresses the importance of domestic political institutions, has implications for the political underpinnings of financial market reforms in emerging market countries.

In the extensive literature on the rules versus discretion debate three related, but logically distinct, areas of debate are frequently confused: the active versus passive policy debate, the rules versus discretion debate proper, and the open-loop (i.e. fixed) rule versus closed-loop (i.e. contingent) rule debate. Section 2 of this paper examines the nature of and interrelations between these three areas of debate. In section 3 the contributions of economic analysis to the debate are explored in an apolitical framework, in particular, the arguments for rules proposed by Friedman and Kydland and Prescott are assessed. Section 4 extends this framework to take into account the political dimension and the rules versus discretion debate is viewed as a cost-benefit problem involving both political and economic factors. A general conclusion is that since the rules versus discretion debate is an exercise in political economy, the debate cannot be properly assessed in the sterile apolitical framework of pure economic analysis.

Are the systems of collective labor relations in member countries of the European Communities converging towards a common European system of industrial relations? In this paper the hypothesis is put forward that the national systems have not been converging in the past and probably will not do so in the immediate future. The analysis is based on changes in procedural rules of collective labor relations and on data on labor unions, strikes, wage structure, and government employment.

This article argues that public opinion on retirement is related to people’s causal beliefs about how labour markets work. Whereas voters do not think that there is an employment trade-off between older and younger workers in some European countries, in others, this is a dominant paradigm. When they believe this trade-off exists, people are more hostile to reforms that lead to longer working lives. The article uses Eurobarometer data to investigate the determinants of this belief – for instance, more people being led to believe in such a trade-off under high levels of labour market regulation. The article then goes on to show that this belief is related to policy preferences about early retirement. Finally, the article illustrates the political consequences of this belief and shows that it affects many policy areas even beyond early retirement.