Currently, scholars hold that the government’s principal contribution to the California wine industry’s recovery from Prohibition in the 1930s was to get out of the way, freeing entrepreneurs to conduct business properly; according to this interpretation, the United States only taxed the product and impeded progress. But this article argues that in the areas of regulation, promotion, and protection of the wine industry, the federal government provided a framework for California winemakers to succeed and that, moreover, it often did so at their request and in cooperation with them. Though New Deal laws and regulations did not benefit all stakeholders equally, they did work to bring economic recovery to an industry that suffered from both Prohibition and the Depression.

This article traces the history of the Office of Economic Opportunity/Community Services Administration, focusing on Richard Nixon’s failed attempt to dismantle it in 1973 and Ronald Reagan’s successful effort in 1981. I explore main two main questions: Why was Reagan able to succeed when Nixon had failed? and What does the dismantling of the agency reveal about the development of American conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s? Drawing on original archival materials, I argue that the Reagan administration learned from Nixon’s failures and adopted a more professional, managerial stance when it dismantled the agency in 1981. In addition, recent work in history and political science has explored how the multiracial democratic vision articulated by LBJ’s Great Society helped fuel the modern conservative movement. By focusing on the long-term opposition against OEO/CSA, this article provides new insights into how conservatives articulated an alternative ideology to postwar liberalism.

This article presents a history of free speech in wartime in the United States from the end of World War I to the end of World War II.

In the decades immediately following the Vietnam War, there were no significant conflicts with free speech resulting from major policy or military action. In contrast, the global war on terror following the events of September 11, 2001, mirror in many ways where prior conflicts and government action clashed with Free Speech. Forty-five days after the worst attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act. In the months and years that followed, American forces fought abroad and opponents of and advocates for the Act fought at home. This article will review the implementation of the Patriot Act and two provisions, section 215 and 805, to follow the actions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government and those of civil liberties advocacy groups to review America’s efforts to meet the challenges of providing security for the homeland and protecting Free Speech.

Liberty of conscience, encompassing free speech, a free press, and freedom of religion, has a rich history in Anglo-American political thought, long predating the drafting of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1789. The debate over licensing acts in seventeenth-century England; the advancement of principles of toleration by John Milton, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke in the same period; the renowned, impassioned, and highly influential essays of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in Cato’s Letters; the flourishing of a relatively free press and free church in eighteenth-century colonial America; and the liberty-championing assertions in the several declarations of rights in the newly independent states of America all played a critical role in shaping and inspiring the popular views in America that made the First Amendment possible.

I argue that health insurance emerged as an important aspect of Nixon’s domestic policy agenda as a result of “policy escalation.” By policy escalation, I mean a cascading line of reasoning that causes policy makers focused on one apparently discrete issue to formulate approaches for dealing with other interconnecting policy areas. Policy escalation serves as an internal agenda-setting mechanism: as policy makers contemplate policy changes, they may attempt to imagine the ways in which change will affect the rationale, fiscal position, and execution of programs in other policy areas. In the case of health insurance, the Nixon administration’s proposal for replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children with a guaranteed minimum income forced policy makers to consider how the new program would interact with the existing Medicaid program. Consideration of this question ultimately led them to formulate an approach to overhauling the nation’s entire health insurance system.

Common examples of governance policies include regulations of lobbying, campaign-finance restrictions, and term limitations. Although the public generally favors these good-government reforms, the laws often restrict the autonomy of political elites. The histories of lobby reform in New York, Georgia, and Michigan illustrate how governance policies might be adopted despite elite opposition. In the states, initial reform efforts came about due to agenda-setting events or policy entrepreneurs. Although legislators adopted lobby reforms, they preferred transparency to other lobby reforms given its limited effect on mutualistic relationships. Initial lobby laws required only disclosure and did not restrict legislator–lobbyist interactions much. Only with the advent of additional events and entrepreneurs were the initial laws strengthened to limit interactions. The histories of reform imply that narratives of policy innovation or diffusion may be complicated somewhat by elite interests and that governance policies, once adopted, may have a unique immunity from repeal.

Borrowed capacity builds upon institutional capacity scholarship to discuss how interactions between government agencies and interest groups can increase agency resources and scope during agency formation and development. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission scholars often note the lack of capacity to implement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 during the first years of the agency. I argue that current assessments of the agency’s capacity between 1965 and 1968 are incomplete by expanding the definition of capacity to include borrowed and nontraditional forms of capacity, reviewing congressional allocations to the agency and agency budgets, and considering the active roles state and local agencies as well as interest groups played in the early implementation of Title VII. I demonstrate the agency amassed not only claims but also capacity during its early years.

This article analyzes the attitudes of Dutch employers toward social policy in the early twentieth century. Recent literature has evolved from an emphasis on power to an emphasis on preferences. Moving away from the traditional view that unions and social democrats forced social laws on employers, recent scholars suggest that firms saw specific advantages in the introduction of social laws. However, I show that the attitudes of Dutch business representatives, rather than seeking these specific advantages, merely reflected a willingness to consult, inspired by their macroeconomic view. Employers expressed the wish to attain an organized form of capitalism and accepted regulated forms of codetermination. Once the consultative platforms were in place, employers pursued strategic goals, such as labor peace and disciplining the unions. This paved the way for accepting welfare state expansion. In sum, mid-twentieth century business interests were strongly oriented toward coordinated capitalism.

On August 10, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, one of the largest fiscal deficit-reduction packages in US fiscal history. This law raised the top individual income tax rate from 31% to 39.6%, which increased the average effective tax rate for high-income earners and shifted the federal fiscal balance from deficit to surplus by the end of the century. Given major business interest groups’ criticism of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993’s heavy reliance on tax increases over spending cuts, how was the Democrat-controlled Congress able to pass this legislation? Drawing on archival evidence from the Clinton Presidential Library, this paper shows that the administration and Democratic committee chairs mobilized support from corporate CEOs, including Fortune 500 executives, asking them to lobby key legislators to support the bill. Thus, with business leaders’ support and lobbying efforts, the legislation was passed with a very slight majority.

The year 1975 marked a watershed year for Spanish-surnamed people in the United States and their relationship with the federal government. In that year Congress extended the Voting Rights Act to include a “language minority” category, requiring federal election officials to translate election materials under certain conditions. By validating language rights for language minorities, Congress expanded federal voting protections far beyond African Americans. Advocates for Spanish speakers took up the cause before Congress, which created a new federally protected category based on the long history of discrimination in education and society they collected in testimonies. These language protections catered largely to Spanish speakers, though the category also included Alaska Natives, Native Americans, and Asian Americans. The process of gaining a separate language minority status is explored in this article, which explains how Congress chose to create a law that included Spanish speakers by name.

In 1929, Congress passed a law capping the US House of Representatives at 435 seats, delegating the power to reapportion to the Executive Branch, and empowering state legislatures to redistrict with few federal limitations. The 1929 law was a compromise after nearly ten years of squabbling over how to apportion pursuant to the 1920 Census. In this article, we consider the apportionment debates of the 1920s both to better understand the politics of the era and to draw lessons that might apply to a potential reapportionment debate today. Throughout the decade, partisanship and political self-interest structured members’ votes on reapportionment. The legislation that eventually passed resulted from a compromise that greatly empowered state legislatures to redistrict freely by removing federal requirements that had been in effect since the 1870s, effectively shifting the battle over congressional representation from one over reapportionment in Congress to one over redistricting in the states.

Not long after the 1966 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, evidence emerged that unscrupulous physicians and health care organizations were gaming the system. Research over the past 50 years shows that around 10 percent of the federal government’s annual cost for these programs is attributed to fraudulent claims or abuses where hospitals and treatments have been overused for undue provider profit. This article examines early congressional attention to this problem and describes lawmakers’ attempts to find legislative solutions to it. It historicizes the dilemma of balancing the ideological limits of government regulation with cultural assumptions about professional self-regulation, focusing on a major 1972 law, the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) Act. The law launched a 10-year career for PSROs, physician-staffed peer-review boards designed to identify and sanction efforts to overcharge Medicare. The article contextualizes multiple actors’ concerns over cost containment and the crisis of faith in medical authority that persisted following failures to control professional malfeasance.

Although state constitutional conventions in the United States were once called frequently and brought about significant changes in governance, recent decades have seen little convention activity. I examine the contrast between the earlier regularity of conventions and their recent absence, but from a different perspective than is usually taken—not by explaining the recent absence but rather explaining the regularity from the 1770s through 1970s. I investigate why legislatures in prior eras agreed to call conventions and how legislators’ traditional opposition to conventions was overcome on a regular basis. After identifying the state constitutional conventions held in the US and setting aside conventions that were called to join, leave, or rejoin the Union or were instigated by institutions other than legislatures, I focus on 82 conventions called at the discretion of legislators and for reasons unrelated to joining, leaving, or rejoining the Union. I identify the issues and circumstances that were responsible for legislators’ willingness to overcome their traditional opposition to holding conventions, thereby contributing to a better understanding of both the challenges in calling conventions and the occasions when these challenges can be overcome.

This article examines Rockefeller Republicanism and its status within the Republican Party by looking at the evolution of Nelson Rockefeller’s support for social welfare policy between 1958 and 1975. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller regularly appears in histories of modern conservatism as the embodiment of the liberalism that conservatives rejected, but these works rarely account for the entirety of Rockefeller’s career. Rather than focus on Rockefeller’s challenges to the national Republican Party in 1960 and 1964, which results in an incomplete representation of Rockefeller Republicanism, this article reassesses moderate Republicanism’s perceived dominance and Rockefeller’s advocacy for liberal domestic policies and commitment to racial liberalism in New York. A full account of Rockefeller’s struggles to find common ground with conservative New York Republicans and adoption of conservative positions related to law enforcement and welfare reform thwarted one of the GOP’s best opportunities to assemble a multiracial and cross-class constituency.

Equating the U.S. government with the national government, historians of the AIDS epidemic have hitherto ignored the role of the states in shaping the early policy response to the disease. Responding to this historiographical lacuna, this article argues that California acted as a policy innovator during the initial years of the epidemic, intervening more effectively than the federal government in the areas of AIDS health care, antibody testing, and prevention education. California’s policy leadership drew significant impetus from a group of gay policy makers, who entered state employment in the early 1980s and relied extensively on clandestine and illicit strategies, particularly a network of “closeted” bureaucrats. Charting the career arcs of these gay policy makers shines a spotlight on the organizational growth of state LGBTQ groups in the 1980s and the evolving role of the “closet” in the modern gay rights movement.