Given that incomes in South Africa are distributed very unequally, it might be expected that the establishment of representative democracy would result in the adoption of redistributive policies. Yet overall inequality has not declined since 1994. The electoral and party system provides uneven pressure for redistribution. The fact that poor South Africans have the vote ensures that some areas of public policy do help the poor. The post-apartheid government not only inherited a surprisingly redistributive set of social policies (welfare, education and health care), but has made changes that entail even more redistribution. But these policies do little to help a core section of the poor in South Africa: the unemployed, and especially households in which no one is working. Other public policies serve to disadvantage this marginalised constituency: labour market and other economic policies serve to steer the economy down a growth path that shuts out many of the unskilled and unemployed. The workings of these policies remain opaque, making it unlikely that poor citizens will use their vote to effect necessary policy reforms.

New leaders are often assumed to be better able to push for policy and sector reform because they are less tied in by established patronage networks. The article discusses this assumption by examining public sector reform in three East African countries under different leaders. It finds that while neo-patrimonialism is an important reason why public sector reform is often blocked, this paradigm cannot explain why some public sector reforms are actually implemented. New leaders are not always new brooms, and whether they are so depends as much on formal conditions, such as the existence of a political coalition, as on informal neo-patrimonial factors. The article also finds that in some cases, old brooms can sweep too. When succession is institutionalised, as the Tanzanian case shows, even a relatively weak leader can carry out reform effectively in his second term because he does not have to consider re-election.

This essay analyses the construction of the anti-corruption war under the civilian government in Nigeria between 1999 and 2008. We consolidate existing insights in the literature in three key ways. First, we show that in democratising contexts like Nigeria, the gravest threats to anti-corruption campaigns often emanate from a combination of intra-elite rancour and political intrigue. Second, we provide an explanation of what happens when, literally, corruption fights back. Finally, we suggest that where anti-corruption efforts are not backed by other radical institutional reforms, they fall prey to the overall endemic (systemic) crisis, a part of which, ab initio, necessitated the anti-corruption war.

The positive role that an active civil society plays in processes of democratisation is often highlighted in the literature. However, when it comes to the Middle East and North Africa, such activism is considered to be detrimental to democratisation because the predominant role is played by Islamist groups. The explanation for this rests with the perceived ‘uncivil’ and undemocratic Islamist ethos of such groups. This paper challenges this assumption and argues that Islamist associations can be a potential force for democratisation for three reasons. First, they are capable of political learning; secondly, they generate secular civil society activism as a response to their activities, increasing the number of actors in the political and social system; and finally, they can cooperate with other civil society groups on a number of issues, given that they are all subject to the same authoritarian constraints. The paper focuses in particular on the case of Morocco and the Islamist group Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan.

Recent developments on the South African political scene have raised some hopes about bringing an end to the war in Mozambique. The change of direction initiated by President F. W. de Klerk, the unbanning of the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and other previously prohibited organisations, and the progress made towards negotiations have pointed to a possible change of heart by the Government, and a relaxation of its previously hostile regional policy. There can be little doubt, given Pretoria's rôle in the whole area, and the history of its involvement in the Mozambican crisis, that changes within South Africa will be felt beyond its borders. However, it would be unwise to ignore the part played by internal factors in explaining the growth in both the scale and severity of the conflict in Mozambique over the past decade.

Despite the dramatic changes that have occurred in South Africa over the last fifteen years, the chieftaincy remains an important political institution that continues to exercise authority. It has not only been given official recognition and protection in the constitution, but has attempted to become more involved in activities such as development, local government, and elections. How this institution might affect the process of democratic consolidation, however, has failed to generate much research. This article explores the ways in which the chieftaincy has responded to the introduction of democratic electoral practices at the local level. While the chieftaincy has not been immune from the social and political changes that have swept through the country since the transition, it has nonetheless sought to direct, or redirect, these changes in ways that bolster its own authority. Many local communities expect the chieftaincy not only to assist with the formal electoral process, but also to allow for more participation within local level chieftaincy institutions. A close examination of chieftaincy–societal relations demonstrates that while the chieftaincy has been affected by new democratic rules and practices, it has also influenced how local communities practice and understand these same rules and practices. This mutually transformative process illustrates the complexity of democratic consolidation, as well as the ability of the chieftaincy to adapt to changing political and social environments without sacrificing its unique claims to authority.

During almost two decades, beginning in the early 1970s, the Horn of Africa was racked by the ravages of hunger and war. Natural disasters are not new to the region, which historically could count on at least seven major droughts each century, but in the current era they have been increasing, in part due to massive deforestation and the changing pattern of weather. It is estimated that in Ethiopia alone, because of soil erosion and deforestation, 30,000 million tons of top-soil are lost each year. A second important factor affecting the severity of famine has been the dramatic escalation in the level and intensity of civil conflict, nowhere more evident than in Ethiopia.

The observation and monitoring of elections and referenda has become a ‘growth business’ in Africa since external and internal pressures have forced the leaders of one-party states to test their political legitimacy. The closely monitored 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia heralded the first peaceful transition from a single to a multi-party system of governance with a change of leadership in English-speaking Africa. It marked the beginning of an era of confidence in the possibilities of democratic change, and confirmed the positive influence that international observers can have on such processes. Their presence was henceforth considered an essential pre-condition for acceptable transitional multi-party elections. The hopes that Zambia would indeed ‘set a standard for Africa’, and offer encouragement to nascent democratic movements on the continent have, however, remained elusive. More recent elections have been replete with controversy, intimidations, and violence. Despite being certified to varying degrees as free and fair by observers, the losers have contested the results—in Angola with arms, in Kenya and Ghana with threatened and actual boycotts.

Between 1987 and 1999, Ghana's privatisation programme generated revenues for the government equivalent to about 14 per cent of GDP from a moribund public sector which had previously been dependent on state subventions, and thus succeeded in fulfilling a key role in easing the fiscal crisis and in fostering the Structural Adjustment Programme. The big question remained, however, whether the privatisation process would help the growth of Ghana's economy and help maximise political gains. This article reviews the experience of Ghana in privatising public enterprises, and assesses the impact of the ongoing privatisation programme on the Ghanaian economy. It suggests that, in spite of the high proceeds, the net direct revenues from privatisation have been relatively modest, due to the high outstanding credit sales, the high costs of divestiture and high outstanding liabilities of privatised firms. It also appears that the programme has placed too much emphasis on public finance rationalisation and faith in the market system, and too little on sociopolitical and regulatory issues. Equally, the inadequate attention given to post-privatisation regulation of privatised businesses, and the use of the divestiture programme as a political patronage instrument to reward the regime's friends and political insiders, has conferred limited success for privatisation in achieving its goal of enhancing efficiency, private sector investment and employment.

Since African states began to obtain their political independence almost three decades ago, drought has exacerbated critical problems of social equality. In domestic politics, élites have used their control over food aid to enhance their power vis-à-vis those suffering from declines in agricultural production. Two scholars recently concluded that ‘food-relief programmes…have helped to widen the gap between rich and poor in virtually every country in which they operate’. Internationally, the industrialised states have taken advantage of drought to impose policy directions on affected African states. Often the general public has had to bear the brunt of changes in, for example, the prices of consumer goods and wages.

In the process of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation, former strong socialist sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing additional challenges in their efforts to develop the private sector, compared to those that had relatively market oriented economies. Tanzania is known for its past strong socialist orientation. This article assesses the country's effort to reform the banking system, state owned enterprises, taxation system and the public services sector, and the emergence of the private sector. Comparisons are made where relevant with the experiences from transition economies in Eastern Europe.

Major reforms have taken place in all the sub-sectors, and there is significant increase in the participation by the private sector in the economy with increased production. Private banks have increased from zero in 1994 to thirteen in 1998. Over 40 per cent of former state owned enterprises have been divested, 50 per cent of which were sold. Some are performing well, contributing to government income and reversing the drain through subsidy. The taxation system has improved. It now recognises the role played by the private sector and has introduced new mechanisms to collect taxes e.g., VAT, and plugging tax evasion loopholes. Private sector investment has increased and major developments are notable in mining and tourism.

Although the overall impact of liberalisation on the areas examined has been positive, significant weaknesses remain, especially in the regulatory frameworks required to prevent abuses of their position by private enterprises. Both corruption and an uncertain legal environment inhibit the realisation of benefits from reform. The ‘trickle down’ of welfare to poorer sections of society has been inadequate, as has the extension of financial services to small businesses and rural areas. Further public investment is required, especially in health, education and infrastructure.

Africa's police are usually assessed in terms of their adherence to democratic criteria. This results in inaccurate analysis because the police are actually governed according to presidential preference. This article uses the role of Africa's chief police officers to explore the relationship between presidents and their police, and the location of influence within the police. It identifies the significant variables shaping police governance in four countries with comparable institutional structures – Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe – and confirms the negligible role played by public accountability.

As many as seven Conférences nationales (CNs) took place in French-speaking Africa between February 1990 and January 1993, all against the background of the apparent ‘wind of change’ which is sweeping across the continent where democratic governance is eventually to replace authoritarian rule. In Benin, the assembly of delegates that met during 19–28 February 1990 was supposed to be representative of all social, religious, professional, and political interest groups whose aim was to introduce a constitutional liberal democracy. This CN managed to gain acceptance of the sovereignty which it had declared on the second day — namely, that all its decisions would be legal and binding. The authority of President Matthieu Kérékou was thus effectively emasculated, whilst the elections which were timetabled and held a year later, finally unseated him after 20 years in power. In Togo, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma was able to reject the sovereignty claimed. by the CN, held from 8 July to 28 August 1991, as the balance of power was firmly in his favour.

The West Side Boys were one of several military actors in the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991–2002). A splinter group of the army, the WSB emerged as a key player in 1999–2000. In most Western media accounts, the WSB appeared as nothing more than renegade, anarchistic bandits, devoid of any trace of long-term goals. By contrast, this article aims to explain how the WSB used well-devised military techniques in the field; how their history and military training within the Sierra Leone army shaped their notion of themselves and their view of what they were trying to accomplish; and, finally, how military commanders and politicians employed the WSB as a tactical instrument in a larger map of military and political strategies. It is in the politics of a military economy that this article is grounded.

The rise and fall of the settler societies in Africa – in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa – is to be understood in relation to the global expansion and limited contraction of European capitalism, and in the light of the notions of underdevelopment and dependency. In strong contrast with the general experience of the Third World, settler societies show a capacity for independent capitalist development, built upon the heavy exploitation of African land and labour, and policies of economic nationalism externally. They thereby avoid relegation to the periphery of the world system as perpetual suppliers of raw materials, and as providers of dependent domestic markets for the manufactures of the metropole. In the process, the colon state assumes an ambivalent position in relation to imperialism in that it co-operates with the metropole, providing a secure and cheap occupation of a strategic area in return for political support and military aid.

In the last decade the states of black Africa have taken over a score of large industries owned by multi-national corporations and thousands of small enterprises owned by non-African residents. The methods of takeover, the targets, and the stated justifications vary from country to country, and yet there is a pattern throughout it all. Africans want control in their own house. This article reviews the facts of the takings in black Africa, considers the changing international law of nationalisation, and looks into the future of this confrontation between Africans and foreigners.

This article shows the importance of understanding the pluralism of moral ideas in contemporary Africa. Although the discourse on human rights is only one aspect of that pluralism, it threatens to overshadow other ways of conceiving human dignity. The impact of the ‘human rights talk’ can be observed in Christian churches, and the article contrasts elite and lay practices in Catholic and pentecostal churches in Malawi. Drawing upon rural and urban fieldwork, the article reveals variation as much within as between these two forms of Christianity. Rather than documenting a wholesale rejection of the ‘human rights talk’, the article draws attention to the situational use of different moral ideas. In this regard, public debates on politics may be enriched by the insights gained during fieldwork among Catholic and pentecostal congregations.

This paper presents some results from the largest rural labour market survey yet conducted in Mozambique. Evidence from three provinces shows that labour markets have a significant impact on the lives of a large number of poor people, and that employers exercise considerable discretion in setting wages and conditions of casual, seasonal and permanent wage employment. The evidence presented comes from a combination of a quantitative survey based on purposive sampling with other techniques, including interviews with large farmers. The findings contrast with ideas that rural labour markets are of limited relevance to poverty reduction policy formulation in Africa, and the paper concludes with methodological, analytical and policy recommendations.

The massacre of refugees during the 1996–7 war in Congo illustrates the gap between existing legal standards and their application, as the principle of sovereignty rationalises states' behaviour against helpless people. This paper assesses available information on the scale of the massacre, concluding that about 232,000 refugees were killed. It argues that firmness in demanding justice and protecting human rights does not require ignoring the objectives of stability and prosperity for any country, but rather that it is the best way of promoting those goals and strengthening state sovereignty within the international community. To implement international law related to refugees will require making states and non-state players responsible for their actions to the international community, since any outflow of refugees creates negative externalities or costs that are unequally borne by this community.

The rise of wealth and power within the cattle-owning economy of Botswana has been accompanied by the creation of poverty and weakness. The impoverishment of the San and ‘destitutes’ was a structured, comprehensive, and long-term process, caused less by phenomena such as periodic drought than by an elite of economic and political power, and the exploitation which they practised. The growth economy of recent decades has not ameliorated the situation, but has strengthened the wealthy while neglecting or worsening the plight of the San. The state possesses the financial resources and developmental capacities to alleviate poverty, but its controllers continue to prioritise other matters.