Many social scientists have examined the intricacies of modernisation, political modernisation, and political development, but they have not clearly distinguished between these concepts. Their research emphasis has been on the instruments of change, such as political parties, ideologies, and charismatic leaders, and they have insufficiently delved into the issue of what actually changes during the processes of modernisation and political development. In addition, a number of analyses are unintentionally culturally biased as many western values are viewed as ‘positive’, and the ultimate ends of historical evolution which are presented seemingly suffer from ethnocentric wish-fulfilment.

There are few objectives considered more compelling by developing countries than the need to attain their economic freedom. Throughout the Third World, from Bolivia and Botswana to Burma, few themes arouse such mass enthusiasm as the clarion call to economic independence. However, despite its potency in shaping many national goals and policies, very little intellectual effort has been expended in analysing the concept and exploring its ramifications in the realms of politics, economics, or sociology.

Unlike many other African countries, Liberia is endowed with an impressive capacity for rapid economic development. Not only are her natural resources rich enough to finance this, but in relation to her population they are, indeed, capable of ensuring unimpeded growth in her output per capita.1 This article deals with Liberia's development during the last two decades. It shows the marked and rapid growth in the product of her economy, and how this has yielded a subtle and gradual improvement in the life of her people.

This article originated in the study of one Northern Ghanaian group, the Frafras, as migrants to the urban areas of Southern Ghana. It describes the economic activities of the low-income section of the labour force in Accra, the urban sub-proletariat into which the unskilled and illiterate majority of Frafra migrants are drawn.

Price inflation, inadequate wages, and an increasing surplus to the requirements of the urban labour market have led to a high degree of informality in the income-generating activities of the sub-proletariat. Consequently income and expenditure patterns are more complex than is normally allowed for in the economic analysis of poor countries. Government planning and the effective application of economic theory in this sphere has been impeded by the unthinking transfer of western categories to the economic and social structures of African cities. The question to be answered is this: Does the ‘reserve army of urban unemployed and underemployed’ really constitute a passive, exploited majority in cities like Accra, or do their informal economic activities possess some autonomous capacity for generating growth in the incomes of the urban (and rural) poor?

The development of African studies in our time has unearthed what is regarded as a storehouse of esoteric lore, a happy hunting ground for ethnologists, anthropologists, and linguists, a paradise for the mythopoeic and archetypal critic. But as literature? Indeed, some ‘civilised’ people still feel a strange unease that the black man should have a literature at all. Yet African oral and written materials, even a decade or two ago regarded primarily as of ethnological and anthropological interest, are today being investigated as authentic literature, part of the international mainstream. Black literature has arrived.

In the past several years there has been a proliferation of studies on coup d'états in Africa and the political role of African military structures. Armies have been analysed in terms of their social and ethnic composition, training, ideology, and socialising influences. Intense debate has focused around the overt and covert reasons for their intervention in the political arena. Simple and complex typologies of civil–military relations and of military coups have been constructed; statistical data – both hard and soft – has been marshalled and subjected to factor and regression analysis, in order to validate general or middle-range theories of military intervention. And once in power, the officer corps' performance has been examined in order to generate insights into its propensity to serve as a modernising or developmental agent.

In the literature of the social sciences, increased political participation is often regarded as one of the symptoms of a ‘modernising’ polity,1 but there have been few attempts to examine the detailed implications in any African rural society. This short article attempts to show that the national leaders in Sierra Leone feared the implications of mass participation in politics. Basically conservative and opposed to the idea of upsetting the status quo, they were satisfied in so far as they retained the support of their people in the struggle for independence, and if thereafter they were able to command enough votes at election times. They were afraid of the changes which countrywide political ‘involvement’ might imply, since these would have threatened their own privileged position.

Recent articles by André Simmons and K. M. Barbour have analysed the various advantages of, and strategies for, regional economic integration in West Africa.1 This note focuses on the technical obstacles of full integration, and then on sub-regional economic co-operation as a more practical alternative.

How can one agree upon an accepted distribution of the benefits from regional economic integration? How could this be implemented among the West African countries ? These are the most difficult and contentious problems associated with forming and operating any customs union and free trade area among the developing countries. If an acceptable distribution of benefits does not come about, then ‘the operation of existing groupings may easily be rendered ineffective or, in extreme cases, they may collapse. The experience of the last few years demonstrates that this is not a remote possibility.’2

In a recent issue of this Journal – Vol. IX, No. 4, December 1972 – Rodolfo Salcedo explores the question of causal sequences in the modernisation process. His article illustrates three serious weaknesses in current research into this problem: (i) the inadequate conception of modernisation as a dependent variable, (ii) the choice of theoretically significant independent variables in discussing paths to modernisation, and (iii) the neglect of political participation as a relevant factor.

One of the major concerns of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone during the operation of the West African Currency Board was the alleged relationship between the money supply and the balance of payments. It was argued by critics that changes in foreign exchange reserves tended to exert a preponderant influence on the monetary base, the main determinant of the money stock – which, in turn, is a good indicator of the thrust of monetary forces. The aim of this note is to discover the extent to which the monetary authorities have influenced the ‘base’ since the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

The shortage of capital has always been viewed as one of the crucial bottlenecks in the process of economic development, although recently the emphasis seems to have shifted to the shortage of skilled manpower. Whether it is defined to be only physical or also human – i.e. training, education, and health – capital formation still constitutes the cornerstone of the theory of, and plans for, economic development. Almost by definition, underdeveloped countries are short of capital.