Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
In the literature of the social sciences, increased political participation is often regarded as one of the symptoms of a ‘modernising’ polity,1 but there have been few attempts to examine the detailed implications in any African rural society. This short article attempts to show that the national leaders in Sierra Leone feared the implications of mass participation in politics. Basically conservative and opposed to the idea of upsetting the status quo, they were satisfied in so far as they retained the support of their people in the struggle for independence, and if thereafter they were able to command enough votes at election times. They were afraid of the changes which countrywide political ‘involvement’ might imply, since these would have threatened their own privileged position.
Page 129 note 1 The links between increased political participation and modernisation have been stressed for over ten years by such writers as Lerner, D., The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958), pp. 48–50Google Scholar; Deutsch, K. W., ‘Social Mobilisation and Political Development’, in The American Political Science Review (Menasha), LV, 09 1961;Google Scholar and Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), ch. I.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page 129 note 2 See Milnor, A. J., Elections and Political Stability (New York, 1969), p. 1.Google Scholar
Page 129 note 3 Cf. Boissevain, J., ‘The Place of Non-Groups in the Study of Science,’ in Man (London), N.S. III, 1968, pp. 542–56,Google Scholar where ‘brokers’ are described as social catalysts, who use their special manipulative talents to bring people together, and to bridge the gap between different value systems. Political brokerage and patron-client relations are now ceasing to be a neglected aspect in the study of African politics.
Page 130 note 1 This period is described by Cartwright, J. R., Politics in Sierra Leone, 1947–67 (Toronto, 1970), pp. 43–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page 130 note 2 See Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, November 1955–March 1956 (London, 1956), especially p. 148.Google Scholar
Page 131 note 1 See ibid. p. 146, and Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Conduct of Certain Chiefs (Freetown, 1957), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar
Page 131 note 2 This was a common accusation brought by chiefs against the heads of rival families, since in colonial times this indigenous family judicial system had been superseded. But some heads of families continued to hear cases, which was technically illegal, and so the charge of ‘holding an illegal court’ was one of the weapons a paramount chief could use against his enemies.
Page 133 note 1 The S.L.P.P. had tried to entrench the powers of the chiefs by ensuring that each District should form an electoral college to elect one of their number to Parliament. The anomalous status of the 12 Paramount Chiefs so ‘elected’ contributed to the constitutional crisis of 1967, which led to the Army taking over power.
Page 133 note 2 The early 1950s witnessed a ‘diamond rush’ when Kono District was invaded by thousands of diggers from all over West Africa, although Soa itself was outside this area. See van der Laan, H., The Sierra Leone Diamonds (London, 1965), pp. 2–37.Google Scholar