This article discusses the 1857 African porters' strike in Salvador, Brazil. Mobilisation for this unique movement was organised through work groups, based on ethnic affiliation, within which Africans developed a street culture with its own rules, rituals and symbols, all of which were essential to the creation of the group's identity and to pursue resistance in the urban slavery environment. The movement lasted for a week and it may have been the first of its nature in the history of urban Brazil.

On 1st May 1917 m Rio de Janeiro, protesters took to the streets carrying placards and shouting slogans denouncing high prices and miserable living conditions. Over the succeeding months the May Day protest mushroomed into an unprecedented general strike of more than 50,000 workers in the federal capital. Rio de Janeiro had witnessed frequent protests and agitation against taxes, high prices, shortages, poor housing and public services and the cost of transport during the late Empire and first decades of the Republic.1 What was different about May Day 1917 was that complaints over consumer, community-based issues affecting the general populace triggered off a wave of trade-union militancy unique in the city's history.

Beginning with Brazil's origins as a nation, and continuing to the present, the relationship between race and politics in that country has been a close and integral one. Portuguese state policy made black slavery the very foundation of Brazil's social and economic order during three centuries of colonial rule. That foundation remained in place even after independence, with the paradoxical result that Brazil became ‘the last Christian country to abolish slavery, and the first to declare itself a racial democracy’. Indeed, perhaps nowhere is the connection between race and politics in Brazil more evident than in the concept of ‘racial democracy’, which characterises race relations in that country in explicitly political terminology.

This article explores some of the connections between race and politics in Brazil by examining four moments in the history of black political mobilisation in that country. Geographically, it focuses on the south-eastern state of São Paulo, which by the time of emancipation, in 1888, housed the third-largest slave population in Brazil (after neighbouring Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro), and which has formed a centre of black political action from the 1880s through to the present. Chronologically, it focuses on: the struggle for the final abolition of slavery in the 1880s; the rise and fall of the Frente Negra Brasileira in the 1930s; the black organisations of the Second Republic; and the most recent wave of black protest, from the mid-1970s to 1988.

The purpose of such an exercise is twofold. First, placing these moments of black mobilisation in a century-long time-frame makes it possible for us to see them not as isolated episodes, but as chapters in a long-term, ongoing history of black protest and struggle in Brazil.

The truth commissions in El Salvador and Honduras attempted to offer the transitional civilian governments a way to balance their moral and legal obligations with practical political constraints; namely to reconcile calls from different sectors of society to either punish or forgive those responsible for past human rights violations; and to establish new and independent institutions without precipitating a backlash from vested interests which could derail the whole democratic transition. This paper examines the parameters in which these truth commissions operated, and evaluates the role they played in trying to facilitate the democratisation processes in Honduras and El Salvador.

This commentary surveys some of the trends and gaps in current research on criminal justice reform in Latin America – with a focus on Brazil, and on two specific areas: police and prison/penal reform. It explores two principal themes: the uneven and thin production of knowledge about criminal justice issues; and the impact this has on policy reforms and on the ways in which these are framed and interpreted in terms of their relative success and failure. Overall it argues that we still know very little about criminal justice institutions and the actors within them. We also need many more finely-grained analyses of the dynamics of reform efforts and of the policy environments in which these take place in order to understand how and why reform initiatives are often derailed or subverted, and, more rarely, flourish and can be embedded and replicated.

This paper uses the 1996–2001 National Socioeconomic Survey panel database to analyse poverty dynamics in Chile, drawing a distinction between chronic and transient poverty. We found that while 20 per cent of the population was living below the official poverty line both in 1996 and 2001, only 9 per cent of the population was poor at both dates. We also found that when the poverty line was raised, the amount of households which could be considered chronically poor rose steadily, whereas the transitory component of poverty remained more or less stable. Analysis of the direct reasons for changes in household poverty status leads us to the conclusion that labour dynamics are far more relevant than demographic changes. Household heads who suffered health problems are significantly less likely to leave poverty. Household human and physical capital are also relevant, as well as the sector in which the household head works. Simulating this exercise using different poverty lines reveals that some variables are not robust to changes in the definition of poverty, while others which originally appeared to be insignificant become so for most other possible poverty lines.

Through an ethnographic account of contemporary relations between Ashéninka men and mestizos on the Ucayali River in Eastern Peru, this article examines how individuals use specific cultural idioms in their attempts to counteract the exploitative nature of economic relations. Specifically the article considers how the institutions of ayompari trading partners and compadrazgo (godparenthood) are used by Ashéninka and mestizo individuals respectively to understand and try to control their relationships within the local economic system of habilitación. The article concludes by noting the continued importance of these individual relationships in light of recent changes to Peru's forestry laws.

As Brazilian federal deputies approach the end of their legislative terms, they have four major political career options: to retire from electoral politics; to run for state legislative office (regressive ambition); to run for re-election (static ambition); or to run for higher offices (progressive ambition). We developed a model that focuses on the determinants of political career choices by incumbent federal deputies in the 1998 Brazilian election. We argue that it is not the nature of political ambition that determines the career choices of federal deputies, but the evaluation of the risks and costs. A nested logit regression was used to estimate the impact of the distinct political strategies used by incumbents during their terms and their previous electoral campaigns in their choices of career. The main findings suggest that an incumbent's career choice is decisively influenced by the strategies they adopt to effectively use their resources.

On 28 February 1885 Guatemala's Liberal dictator, Justo Rufino Barrios, declared the Union of Central America, and made it plain that this would be achieved through force of arms if the four other Central American Republics did not consent to his decree. On 5 and 6 March, as Costa Rica's Liberal state began to plan a popular mobilisation against the Guatemalan threat, an article appeared in the pages of El Diario de Costa Rica, written by a resident Honduran man of letters, Alvaro Contreras. It was called ‘Un héroe annómino’. Curiously, though, this hero is not anonymous at all. The article soon reveals that his name is Juan Santamaría, a humble footsoldier who, during the Battle of Rivas in 1856, had volunteered to burn down the Mesón de Guerra from where William Walker's filibusters were decimating Costa Rican troops with rifle fire. The attempt was successful, but Santamaría sacrificed his life in the process. The invention of Costa Rica's ‘almost unknown soldier’ had begun.

Crime reflects social values, for it indicates what is viewed as abnormal or deviant behavior (and conversely what is acceptable behavior), and the degree to which that behavior is abhorrent to society in general. In addition to reflecting general values, crime as it involves one racial, sexual or social group can shed light on the attitude of the ruling elite toward a specific group, and the social position of that group within a larger context. Lastly, crime reflects class and power relations by allowing us to study the relationship of the criminal to the victim and their relationship to the legal mechanism. The study of crime as a valid field for historical research has been well explored by European historians but, within the field of Latin American history, it is relatively new.1 It is, nevertheless, an area deserving of study in our attempt to understand more fully colonial Spanish society.

The centenary in 2000 of Gilbert Freyre's birth occasioned a number of retrospectives on his place in Brazil's history. This article focuses on Freyre up to 1933, the year in which Casa Grande & Senzala was published. Emphasis is given to such formative influences as his undergraduate study at Baylor University, his graduate study at Columbia University and his subsequent travels in Europe. In these years Freyre rejected an invitation to stay in the USA and strengthened his resolve to return to Brazil and make his career as a writer. The theme he soon adopted was Brazil's viability as a modern nation, notwithstanding its supposed defects of race and climate.

To date, factor endowments or comparative advantages in the international economy, have been at the centre of explanations for the economic performance of Argentina in the nineteenth century. Historians have focused on the increasing volume of rural exports and the availability of land on the frontier. Yet, the contemporary fiscal and monetary events have been ignored. From the 1820s to the 1860s, the state was mainly financed by issues of inconvertible paper currency. Hence, depreciation and high volatility of the means of payment became a basic feature of the Buenos Aires economy. This article will reassess the expansion of the rural economy in the light of the impact of inflationary finances.

Between the years 1805 and 1809, the Spanish Metropolitan Government secured an estimated total of between 10,500,000 and 12,750,000 pesos by the appropriation of the capital and sale of landed properties belonging to Pious Foundations and Chantries. The present article deals with (i) the nature and functions of these Foundations; (ii) why Spain was forced to order their appropriation; (iii) the course of the implementation of the appropriation, known as the ‘Consolidación de vales reales’; (iv) the persons and institutions affected, and adjacent incomes of the Ramo de Consolidación; (v) the effects in New Spain. Secondary sources concede the importance of the appropriation, but rarely offer more than rudimentary details. Through the use of primary sources, the present article attempts to remedy in a small measure that dearth of information.

The inauguration of electric streetcar service by two foreign-owned companies in Montevideo in 1906 set off an intense debate between the city's elite and its anarchist workers over the nature of progress. The streetcar became a contested symbol of modernity as the elite attempted to dictate the terms of a new urban order. Anarchists countered with an alternative vision of progress that emphasised social equality, education and liberty, and they competed for the sympathy of the middle class which grew increasingly ambivalent towards the streetcar. Trolley workers resisted a new system of discipline at the workplace and eventually led the city's first general strike, with broad public support.

Cocoa, coca, cotton, and sugar are of great interest. The development of any one of the four crops would bring about great relief to people's present miseries and would not hurt nearby provinces… The development of one province need not occur at the expense of another. (Francisco de Viedma, 1787).2

The UK detention of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998 was hailed at the time as an unprecedented demonstration of the possible efficacy of ‘global civil society’ networks in holding former heads of state to account for crimes against humanity. This article nonetheless questions the concept, as well as the practical efficacy, of globalised civil society action or ‘human rights lawyering’ as a trigger for the prosecution of past human rights violations. Based on extensive field research, the article argues that domestic factors, including domestic actor pressure and national judicial change, have proved more significant than international law or international activism in recent re-irruptions of the human rights accountability issue in Latin America's Southern Cone. The case of El Salvador, meanwhile, shows that transnational initiatives, while occasionally successful in their own right, have not been able to interrupt or foreshorten domestic post-transitional trajectories to the extent of independently creating favourable accountability conditions.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s political liberalisation, including the reduction of the military's institutional prerogatives, occurred in Colombia despite the increasing strength of an internal insurgency. Why would Colombia's national political elite weaken the institutional role of the armed forces in the context of an escalating internal war? What was the role of paramilitary groups, which were responsible for the vast majority of massacres and political violence against suspected unarmed civilians, during the 1990s? This paper argues that the elite civilian politicians who dominated the Colombian state promoted formal institutional changes, but tolerated paramilitary repression in order to counteract a strengthening guerrilla insurgency. These civilian leaders represented a modernising elite focused upon co-opting political opposition and establishing neoliberal economic reforms, thus constructing a Low-Intensity Democracy.

During the first decades of the present century, in that area of eastern Cuba which lies beyond a boundary formed by the Rio Cabreras in the north and the Rio Jobabo in the south, a unique social transformation took place which is of particular interest and importance. More than simply a transition from the traditional to the modern, Oriente's society underwent revolutionary change as a result not only of foreign influence but also of foreign control and design calculated to produce both modernization and ‘Americanization’. As it became increasingly apparent that these twin objectives could not be easily accomplished, a third consideration, economic, advantage, quickly emerged and rose to a position of dominance. Capital accumulation and the profit motive catalyzed a process of change produced by the reaction of two dissimilar cultures: one comparatively inert and native, the other highly dynamic and foreign, to produce sugar and a mutated society. Perhaps all societies which were once heavily engaged in sugar culture have developed mutations in some sense of the word, but in Oriente's case the term is particularly apt.

The Mensalão trial was Brazil's most important political corruption trial ever and an emblematic ex post accountability success. More than 28 individuals were convicted in relation to a legislative vote-buying scheme, many by the very officials they helped appoint. We relay the trajectory of the scandal cum trial, explain its successful prosecution and assess its implications. The article argues that the Mensalão has proved pivotal for Brazil's institutional and legal advances and asks – more than a quarter of a century after a new constitution – whether the country is entering into a stronger, more enduring relationship with the rule of law.

This article challenges the traditional depiction of the late colonial repartimiento de comercio as a system of forced production and consumption. Employing a micro-economic analysis of the repartimiento's operation in Oaxaca, it argues that peasant participation in the alcaldes mayores' repartimientos was voluntary, not coerced, and that the repartimiento should be understood instead as a system of consumer and producer credit designed to operate under colonial conditions of high risk. Repartimiento credit was expensive, but it permitted peasants to participate more extensively in markets as consumers and producers. ‘Indians are capable of requesting the cargo of a flotilla, and [so] it is a vulgarity and a misunderstanding of the repartimiento to say that they are forced.’