Chile today is experiencing a new sociopolitical compromise no less significant than the so-called “compromise state” of the 1930s and 1940s. A central feature of the new arrangement has been the performance of Chile’s party system. This role should be understood in terms of how it reflects, and helps to mitigate or aggravate, the tension between capital accumulation and the struggles over sociopolitical inclusion and distribution.

Taking the 1997-98 electoral season as its case study, this article seeks to determine whether Colombia’s party system is undergoing deinstitutionalization. The resilience of the Liberal Party and the lack of an organized alternative to the traditional parties may mean that Colombia is in the process of party system transformation.

The results of a survey of 311 members of voluntary associations in São Paulo and Belo Horizonte suggest that members of voluntary associations incorporate the values introduced by social movements during the democratization process: they claim organizational autonomy from the state, and they defend more participatory forms of decisionmaking. These findings are important for the debate between democratic consolidation and delegative democracy. Democratization might benefit from the incorporation of these actors into new participatory designs.

Democratic transitions create an opportunity for elected officials to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and create institutions that permanently shift power away from the military. This article develops a theoretical argument about how civilian control- is established. Venezuela institutionalized weak civilian control in the wake of its 1958 democratic transition, allowing the regime to survive the 1992 coup attempts. Argentina moved close to strong civilian control by 1995, although such control is exercised through questionable institutional channels.

Comparing the Aylwin and Frei administrations, this article probes the question of why civilian authorities did not always use the legal and political tools they had acquired to respond to the military’s institutional and political demands. Actors’ preferences, leadership style, and strategic decisions influence the way civilian leaders use those tools. Civilian responses have important and sometimes unintended consequences for the stabilization of the civil-military relationship in new democratic regimes.

In Brazil, an era of military confusion and dissatisfaction that followed the end of the Cold War has largely dissipated since the mid-1990s. Despite scarce federal resources under current economic policies, the Cardoso government has managed to eliminate the most immediate budgetary causes of military unrest. Military authoritarian influence remains, moreover, in areas such as Amazônia. The military’s own efforts, the president’s moral and economic support, and the legislature’s traditional apathy toward relevant issues have fostered a new form of military influence in the Brazilian democracy.