We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.

This paper evaluates how the relation between firms’ cash holdings and their acquisition decisions changes over macroeconomic cycles using a sample of 47,615 acquisitions from 36 countries between 1997 and 2014. Higher cash holdings and stronger macroeconomic conditions each increase the likelihood that a firm will make an acquisition. However, larger cash holdings decrease the sensitivity of acquisitions to macroeconomic factors, suggesting that cash holdings lower financing constraints during times when the cost of external finance is high. Announcement day abnormal returns for acquirers follow a consistent pattern: They decrease with acquirer cash holdings and with better macroeconomic conditions.

When activist shareholders file Schedule 13D filings, the average stock-price volatility drops by approximately 10%. Prior to filing days, volatility information is reflected in option prices. Using a comprehensive sample of trades by Schedule 13D filers that reveals on what days and in what markets they trade, we show that on days when activists accumulate shares, option-implied volatility decreases, implied volatility skew increases, and implied volatility time slope increases. The evidence is consistent with a theoretical model where it is common knowledge that informed trading occurs only in the stock market and market makers update option prices based on stock-price and order-flow dynamics.

Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar single-class firms, consistent with insiders’ emphasis on long-term survival to access ongoing private control benefits. Such risk avoidance translates into lower borrowing costs for dual-class firms. Further, lenders are able to use specific covenants to prevent potential expropriations by insiders. The overall relationship between excess control rights and firm value may be less negative than previously thought.

This article shows that, for major equity markets, the proportion of index values attributable to the first 5 years of dividends dropped substantially in the first quarter of 2020 and that this drop was not reversed by the end of the year. In the cross section, this breakdown of dividend smoothing due to COVID-19 was less severe for firms with higher operating cash flows and more positively coskewed stock returns, and it was more pronounced for those with higher leverage and in the financial sector. Heavy dividend cutters also experienced a substantial increase in exposure to systematic risk.

How do corporate bond mutual funds manage liquidity to meet investor redemptions? We show that during tranquil market conditions, these funds tend to reduce liquid asset holdings to meet redemptions, temporarily increasing relative exposures to illiquid asset classes. When aggregate uncertainty rises, however, they tend to scale down their liquid and illiquid assets proportionally to preserve portfolio liquidity. This fund-level dynamic management of liquidity appears to affect the broad financial market: Redemptions from the corporate bond fund sector lead to more corporate bond selling during high-uncertainty periods, which generates price pressures and predicts strong return reversals.

We investigate the causal effect of intangible capital on leverage. To address endogeneity, we exploit patent invalidations by a U.S. court in which judges are randomly assigned to cases. Differences in judge leniency provide exogenous variation in the probability that firms’ patents are invalidated. Using this probability as an instrument for exogenous losses in intangible capital, we find a patent invalidation leads to a 14.1% reduction in leverage, suggesting that intangible capital causally supports leverage. This local average treatment effect is stronger in firms that use patents as loan collateral and in less creditworthy as well as smaller firms.

We hypothesize that employee flexibility enhances firm value by helping firms respond to exogenous shocks. We estimate employee-flexibility scores through textual analysis of online job reviews, and we find that a high flexibility score leads to superior stock returns for firms exposed to external risk. During 2011–2017, the value-weighted hedge portfolio formed on employee flexibility earned a 5-factor annualized alpha of 9.5% during periods of high policy uncertainty. Earnings-announcement returns also suggest that investors do not fully value workforce flexibility. These results indicate that employee flexibility is a valuable corporate intangible that helps firms to manage risk during uncertain times.

We identify the unique role of the government bond lending market in collateral transformation during periods of market stress. Using a novel database, we provide evidence that safe assets in the lending market have higher demand, higher borrowing cost, and higher usage of noncash collateral relative to nonsafe assets during stressed market conditions. Moreover, we find that market participants are able to obtain safe assets using relatively low-quality noncash collateral, allowing for collateral transformation. We show that policy interventions by central banks can help reduce safe-asset shortages by returning sought-after safe assets to the market.

We study fragmentation of equity trading using a model of imperfect competition among exchanges. In the model, increased competition drives down trading fees. However, additional arbitrage opportunities arise in fragmented markets, intensifying adverse selection. Due to these opposing forces, the effects of fragmentation are context dependent. To empirically investigate the ambiguity in a single context, we estimate key parameters of the model with order-level data for an Australian security. According to the estimates, the benefits of increased competition are outweighed by the costs of multi-venue arbitrage. Compared with the prevailing duopoly, we predict the counterfactual monopoly spread to be 23% lower.

We examine whether climate change news risk is priced in corporate bonds. We estimate bond covariance with a climate change news index and find that bonds with a higher climate change news beta earn lower future returns, consistent with the asset pricing implications of demand for bonds with high potential to hedge against climate risk. Moreover, when investors are concerned about climate risk, they are willing to pay higher prices for bonds issued by firms with better environmental performance. Our findings suggest that corporate policies aimed at improving environmental performance pay off when the market is concerned about climate change risk.

Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) find that from a forward-looking perspective, stocks are more volatile in the long run than they are in the short run. We demonstrate that when the nonnegative equity premium (NEP) condition is imposed on predictive regressions, stocks are in fact less volatile in the long run, even after taking estimation risk and uncertainties into account. The reason is that the NEP provides an additional parameter identification condition and prior information for future returns. Combined with the mean reversion of stock returns, this condition substantially reduces uncertainty on future returns and leads to lower long-run predictive variance.

Using a novel database of firm patents and board characteristics across 45 countries, we examine both within- and cross-country determinants of board gender diversity and its relation to corporate innovation. Boards are more likely to include women in countries with narrower gender gaps, higher female labor market participation, and less masculine cultures. Firms with gender diverse boards have more patents and novel patents, and a higher innovative efficiency. Further analyses suggest that gender diverse boards are associated with more failure-tolerant and long-term chief executive officer (CEO) incentives, more innovative corporate cultures, and more diverse inventors, characteristics that are conducive to an improved innovative performance.

We use an exogenous event, namely, the spillover effects of Hurricane Katrina on corporate bonds through the liquidation of bond holdings by insurance companies, to study how companies react to temporary changes in the relative availability of bond and bank financing. We find that the negative shock on bonds induces firms to shift from bond financing to bank-based borrowing and to shorten the debt maturity. This shift in debt policy does not revert in the long term. There is no significant change in capital structure, suggesting that the substitution from bonds to bank loans is sufficient for the amount of borrowing.

We analyze the bank supply of credit under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The literature emphasizes relationships as a means to improve lender information, which helps banks manage credit risk. Despite imposing no risk, however, the PPP supply reflects traditional measures of relationship lending: decreasing in bank size and increasing in prior experience, commitment lending, and core deposits. Our results suggest a new benefit of bank relationships: They help firms access government-subsidized lending. Consistent with this benefit, we show that the bank PPP supply, based on the structure of the local banking sector, alleviates increases in unemployment.

Using Internet search volume for lottery to capture gambling sentiment shifts, we show that when the overall gambling sentiment is strong, investor demand for lottery stocks increases, these stocks earn positive short-run abnormal returns, managers are more likely to split stocks to cater to the increased demand for low-priced lottery stocks, and initial public offerings (IPOs) earn higher first day returns. Further, the sentiment-return relation is stronger among low institutional ownership firms, headquartered in regions where gambling is more acceptable and local bias is stronger. These results suggest that gambling sentiment has a spillover effect on the stock market.

Firms with greater shareholder rights have a greater risk-shifting incentive, requiring more lender monitoring. Thus, a reduction in shareholder rights implies more diffused (less monitoring-intensive) loan syndicates. Using the passage of U.S. second-generation antitakeover laws as an exogenous shock that reduces shareholder rights as a natural experiment, we find that loan syndicates become significantly more diffuse after the passage of these laws. These results are confirmed in a large sample of bank loans made during the 1990–2007 period when the loan syndicate market matured. Our results show how corporate governance causally affects financial contracting and creditor control in firms.

We investigate the dynamics of observed and target leverage ratios and deviations from the targets. The cross-sectional persistence in leverage ratios is driven by persistent targets, whereas time-series variation is driven by transitory deviations from targets. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, persistence is higher when the costs of deviating from targets are lower and when the adjustment costs are higher. Deviations are less persistent for firms that are over-levered and firms that are smaller, younger, or more focused or that have lower credit ratings. In recessions, excess leverage is less persistent for larger firms and is more persistent for smaller firms.

We examine the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in the cross section of corporate bonds and find a significant uncertainty premium for both investment-grade (IG) (0.40% per month) and non-investment-grade (NIG) (0.81% per month) bonds. The economic-uncertainty premium declines as we progressively remove downgraded bonds, indicating that the premium represents an increase in required returns for bonds with higher credit and macroeconomic risk. The economic-uncertainty premia vary across equities and bonds in a manner consistent with the heterogeneous risk-aversion levels of dominant players in equities (retail investors) versus bonds (institutional investors).

We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.