I examine whether the time-varying cost of capital is considered in firms’ capital budgeting decisions. For this test, I measure the conditional cost of equity using individual equity option prices. I find that corporate investment responds negatively to fluctuations in the option-implied cost of equity and the weighted average costs of capital. Furthermore, through decomposing marginal $ q $, I reveal that the cost-of-capital elasticity of empirical investment is almost identical to its productivity elasticity, as theory predicts. These findings suggest that firms’ discount rates are updated accurately in practice despite the failure of conventional frameworks, such as factor-based models, in this regard.

The absence of observable innovation data for a firm often leads us to exclude or classify these firms as non-innovators. We assess the reliability of six methods for dealing with unreported innovation using several different counterfactuals for firms without reported R&D or patents. These tests reveal that excluding firms without observable innovation or imputing them as zero innovators and including a dummy variable can lead to biased parameter estimates for observed innovation and other explanatory variables. Excluding firms without patents is especially problematic, leading to false-positive results in empirical tests. Our tests suggest using multiple imputation to handle unreported innovation.

We study trading and risk management decisions of banks in over-the-counter markets, accounting for 2 types of risk: payoff risk from loans and counterparty risk from trading activities. Our model provides empirically supported predictions on the structure of the interbank credit default swap (CDS) market: i) banks with high default probabilities either buy or sell CDS contracts; ii) because of the counterparty risk friction, payoff risk is only partially shared; and iii) safe banks act as intermediaries and help diversify counterparty risk. Banks manage their default probabilities to become creditworthy counterparties, but they do so in a socially inefficient way.

The interaction between product market competition, R&D investment, and the financing choices of R&D-intensive firms on the development of innovative products is only partially understood. We hypothesize that as competition increases, R&D-intensive firms will: i) increase R&D investment relative to existing assets in place; ii) carry more cash; and iii) maintain less net debt. Using the Hatch–Waxman Act as an exogenous shock to competition, we provide causal evidence supporting these hypotheses through a differences-in-differences analysis that exploits differences between the biopharma industry and other industries, and heterogeneity within the biopharma industry. We also explore how these changes affect innovative output.

China has experienced significant capital flight over the past two decades. Despite anecdotal evidence that some of this capital has been invested in foreign residential markets, not much is known about its destination and impact. We examine the effects of capital inflows from China on residential property prices and the real economy in the USA and global metropolitan areas. We show that inflows had significant effects on residential property markets and employment in regions that i) have strong ethnic ties to China and ii) are destinations of Chinese students. We document spillovers to geographically adjacent regions without strong Chinese links.

Discount rates affect stock prices directly via the discount-rate channel or indirectly via the cash-flow channel because expected future cash-flow growth varies with the discount rate. The traditional Macaulay duration captures the effect from the discount-rate channel. I propose a novel duration measure, the effective equity duration, to capture the effects from both channels. I estimate it around unexpected policies in the federal funds rates. I find that the equity yield curve is hump-shaped because expected future cash-flow growth increases with the discount rate. The effective equity duration captures information other than monetary policy risk.

Passive exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are ideally suited to style-level feedback trading because of their high liquidity, ease of short selling, and pure play on investment styles. I find strong evidence of short-term style-momentum trading in ETFs. Institutional investors that use ETFs do not act as arbitrageurs by trading against style momentum. Institutions, especially less sophisticated ones, are themselves style-momentum traders. Moreover, recent style-level demand predicts style-level return reversals. These findings suggest that uninformed positive feedback trading by less sophisticated market participants can destabilize financial markets in the short run.

We study the agency implications of increased disclosure using a regulatory change in the mutual fund industry as an experimental setting. This quasi-natural experiment mandated more frequent portfolio disclosure, which we show imposes managerial skill-reassessment risks from investors on funds with high relative performance volatility. In turn, this risk translates into greater agency costs to investors. We show that high-volatility funds, relative to low-volatility funds, responded to the increased skill-reassessment risk after regulation with an increase in management fees and a decrease in risk taking. These actions get transmitted to fund investors in the form of inferior net performance.

Average cumulative abnormal returns around proxy statements containing “in-depth” disclosures of planning for CEO succession are significantly positive indicating that succession planning is a value-added undertaking. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment based on a 2009 SEC ruling that induced more succession planning disclosures, we find that succession planning is not value-adding for all firms. Rather, succession planning is value-enhancing for larger, more complex, and more stable firms. Importantly, CEO succession planning appears to be value reducing for smaller, simpler, and less stable firms.

Mandatory disclosure of CEO compensation peers signals potential outside opportunities for the cited CEOs by revealing which companies view them as viable executive candidates. CEOs cited often as compensation peers (especially by larger firms, which represent attractive employment opportunities) are more likely to leave for better positions or receive compensation increases. Equity-based awards following cites by larger firms have shorter vesting periods, suggesting these CEOs gain negotiating power relative to their boards. The disclosure requirement enhanced labor market transparency and led to higher compensation for highly cited CEOs without penalizing less cited CEOs, putting upward pressure on CEO compensation.

Analyzing several developed and emerging international markets, I test the ability of global, regional, and local models to explain a large set of 134 cross-sectional anomalies. My main finding is that both global and regional factor models create substantially larger average absolute alphas than local factor models. Annual (absolute) anomaly portfolio alphas are on average 1.7 and 1.1 percentage points higher, respectively, with global and regional than with local factor models. Even for the most recent period, there is no evidence of a catch-up of global and regional factor models. There is substantial potential for international diversification of anomaly strategies.

We investigate whether external industry tournament incentives influence the design of executive-compensation contracts. Using staggered negative mobility shocks as exogenous disruptions to tournament incentives, we show that firms treated by these shocks act to restore their executives’ diminished implicit risk-taking incentives by increasing compensation vega. On average, post-shock compensation vegas increase by approximately 10%. These effects are considerably larger for treated executives with strong tournament incentives and high ex ante mobility. Mobility shocks have no impact on compensation delta or total pay. Our results shed light on how explicit risk-taking incentives are optimized with respect to executive career concerns.

This study examines corporate leverage during systemic banking crises in an international setting, including 85 countries from 1987 to 2017. Using the historically determined component of institutions and exogenous variations in institution building, the analyses show that leverage cyclicality varies substantially across institutional settings. Leverage is strongly countercyclical under more binding constraints on the capital supply, suggesting important supply effects of such crises on leverage. Weak institutions are more conducive to crises and uncertainty. Leverage countercyclicality is more pronounced during crises that coincide with higher uncertainty, whereas leverage is procyclical with stronger legal systems and information sharing in capital markets.

Existing studies relate the puzzling low average returns on out-of-the-money (OTM) index call and put options to nonstandard preferences. We argue the low option returns are primarily due to the pricing of market volatility risk. When volatility risk is priced, expected option returns match the realized average option returns. Moreover, consistent with its theoretical effect on expected option returns, the volatility risk premium is positively related to future index option returns and this relationship is stronger for OTM options and at-the-money straddles. Finally, we find the jump risk premium contributes to some portion of OTM put option returns.

We show that the 2016 Brexit Referendum had multifaceted consequences for corporate America, shaping employment, investment, divestitures, R&D, and savings. The unexpected vote outcome led U.S. firms to cut jobs and investment within U.S. borders. Using establishment-level data, we document that these effects were modulated by the reversibility of capital and labor. American-based job destruction was particularly pronounced in industries with less skilled and more unionized workers. U.K.-exposed firms with less redeployable capital and high input-offshoring dependence cut investment the most. Data on the near universe of U.S. establishments also point to measurable, negative effects on establishment turnover (openings and closings). Our results demonstrate how foreign-born political uncertainty is transmitted across international borders, shaping domestic capital formation and labor allocation.

Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm (PPF) can be undesirable to directors. Still, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining PPFs, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.

Using cash flows from a large sample of buyout and venture funds, I show that private equity (PE) distributions predict returns in the industries of funds’ specialization. My tests distinguish timing skill from reactions to market conditions and spillover effects of PE activity. Fund managers foresee comparable public firms’ earnings but sell at the industry peaks only if they have performance fees to harvest. These results have implications for manager selection and improve our understanding of PE fund returns and the role of PE in capital markets.

We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shaped function of firm centrality in the input–output trade-flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links), provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) as a result of investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market-timing ability.

This paper exploits an influx of Chinese students to U.S. universities from 2000 through 2018 to study synergies between banks’ deposit-taking and lending activities. Banks that are more recognizable by Chinese students experience higher deposit inflows and increase their local credit supply. This credit supply expansion only occurs in information-sensitive credit markets: small business loans and second lien mortgages. Such increase concentrates in nontradable sectors and is more pronounced at locations where managers have more autonomy. The results indicate that deposits from local consumers convey private information about the local credit market, which helps banks in information-sensitive lending.

Fund flows are more correlated among funds with similar investment horizon, consistent with correlated demand for liquidity. We find that stocks held by institutions with more heterogeneous investment horizon are more liquid and have lower volatility of liquidity. Identification tests confirm that the improvement in stock liquidity holds when the increase in investor heterogeneity arises from an exogenous shock due to the 2003 tax reform. In addition, extreme flow-induced trading by institutional funds has a bigger price impact when stocks have a less heterogeneous investor base. Moreover, the premium associated with stock illiquidity is concentrated in stocks with low investor heterogeneity.