Using U.S. census survey data on CEOs’ residence in their formative years, I document a negative relation between CEOs’ endowed family wealth and managerial performance. Consistent with the view that CEOs born into low-income families face higher entry barriers but may possess greater levels of ability that enable them to become CEOs, I find that CEOs born into less privileged families outperform those from higher-wealth families. The outperformance of CEOs from less wealthy families is not driven by risk taking or omitted variables. Overall, my results suggest that CEOs’ social endowment provides a useful signal for their managerial ability.

More frequent, larger, and more recent debt and equity issues in the prior 3 fiscal years are followed by lower stock returns in the subsequent year. The intercept of a q-factor calendar-time regression for the value-weighted (VW) portfolio of firms with at least 3 large issues is −0.63% per month (t-stat. = −4.31). Purging the factor returns of recent issuers increases the magnitude of the estimated underperformance following frequent equity issues. A VW Fama–MacBeth regression shows that firms with 3 equity issues underperform nonissuers by 0.65% per month (t-stat. = −2.65). Earnings announcement returns are low following frequent issues, especially equity issues.

Using the introduction of Fox News as a natural experiment, we investigate whether partisanship in television news coverage influences fundamental corporate decisions. We find that during the George W. Bush presidency, firms led by Republican-leaning managers headquartered in regions into which Fox was introduced shift upward their total investment expenditures and financial leverage. Our findings imply that in making fundamental corporate decisions, Republican-leaning managers are swayed by the Republican slant of Fox that presents an optimistic macroeconomic outlook. The results highlight the importance of heterogeneity in media slant in understanding the role of the media in corporate decision making.

How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows that regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from regions with higher social capital receive larger bids from individual lenders and have higher funding success, larger loan sizes, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from regions with higher social capital take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from regions with high (low) social capital.

I use an accounting reform to assess the agency cost of debt in diversified firms. Those firms that switch from single to multiple segments following the reform suffer a 12% increase in their bond spread when compared with their stand-alone peers. Consistent with lenders anticipating underinvestment and asset-substitution incentives, diversified firms with high cash-flow volatility across divisions suffer the highest increase in borrowing costs. I employ a novel approach that allows abstracting from unobservable characteristics that would otherwise influence the pricing of diversified firms’ debt.

We conjecture that marketplace lending provokes an increase in the quantity of entrepreneurship, particularly in more regionally disadvantaged areas, albeit at lower average quality. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits exogenous variation in borrowers’ access to marketplace loans along U.S. state borders, we estimate a 10% increase in marketplace lending causes a 0.44% increase in business establishments per capita. The effects are more pronounced for less experienced entrepreneurs, for small and less profitable firms, firms more dependent upon external finance, in industries with lower sunk costs of entry, and for low-income regions with inferior access to financial institutions.

Does financial development facilitate micro-entrepreneurship? Using randomized surveys of over 1 million Indian households and bank-branch location as predetermined by government policy, we find that access to finance shifts workers from informal micro-entrepreneurship into formal employment. Financial access reduces the likelihood of being self-employed but benefits micro-enterprises with employees, as well as formal firms. Using data on 400,000 firms, we find that in districts with more banks, firms have higher loans, productivity, employment, and wages than firms in less banked districts. This evidence suggests a labor-market mechanism by which financial development facilitates growth: by shifting workers from unproductive micro-entrepreneurship into productive employment.

Using detailed data on company visits by Chinese mutual funds, we provide direct evidence of mutual fund information acquisition activities and the consequent informational advantages mutual funds establish in local firms. Mutual funds are more likely to visit local and nearby firms both in and outside of their portfolios, but the ease of travel between fund and firm locations can substantially alleviate geographic distance constraints. Company visits by mutual funds are strongly associated with both fund trading activities and fund trading performance. Our results show that geographic constraints and costly information acquisition amplify information asymmetry in financial markets.

We find that acquirers create higher shareholder returns when advised by investment banks with more experience in the target industry. This finding is stronger when acquirers face more difficulties understanding and evaluating the targets. Further analyses show that these banks help acquirers avoid overpaying for targets and thus capture more of the deal synergy rather than making deals generating higher synergy. Our results are robust to controlling for an exhaustive set of determinants of acquirer returns and an identification strategy that exploits exogenous shocks to the supply of investment banks with target-industry experience.

We examine whether superior understanding of technological innovation is a source of mutual fund managers’ ability to garner positive abnormal returns. Consistent with our hypothesis, the inter-quintile annual net Carhart alpha spread for mutual funds sorted on changes in the technological similarity (TS) of their portfolio holdings is 282 basis points. Moreover, because changes in TS are largely orthogonal to other predictors of mutual fund success (e.g., industry concentration, active share, fund R2, and lag fund alpha), changes in TS can be combined with other measures to help identify the best performing funds.

We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences (e.g., fees and renegotiations). Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: Syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers.

CEO trustworthiness is positively related to long-term excess returns after buyback announcements. When the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is trustworthy, statements that the stock is undervalued are more credible. CEO trustworthiness is initially measured by the extent to which people in the county where the company headquarters is located trust each other. Further, the positive impact of trustworthiness on excess returns is higher when the CEO has been a long-term resident of a high-trust county, and correspondingly, trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of financial misreporting. Our conclusions are confirmed when we use alternative measures of trustworthiness such as employee trust and CEO integrity.

The U.S. government uses its voting power to direct IMF loans to countries where U.S. banks are exposed to sovereign default (a de facto bailout). This effect is stronger in years when the costs of direct bailouts are higher and is also found among major European IMF members. We find that de facto bailouts reduce government incentives to default and that U.S. Congressional voting on IMF funding is consistent with a private interest view of government. Overall, we identify an alternative mechanism through which governments can backstop the losses of large multinational banks.

Theory says an American call should never be exercised early, except possibly just before an ex-dividend date. But the best market bid is regularly lower than the intrinsic value for in-the-money short-maturity options. An American option can always be exercised to recover the intrinsic value, whereas selling a European call in the market may return considerably less. The article derives the liquidity value of American exercise in closed form as a function of the bid–ask spread and shows empirically that it is of comparable magnitude to, and often greater than, the theoretical value of American exercise to collect a dividend.

Prior research finds that Dodd–Frank Act’s regulations on credit rating agencies (CRAs) increase rated firms’ risk of rating downgrades, regardless of their credit quality. Our difference-in-difference estimates suggest that after Dodd–Frank, low-rated firms, which face steep costs from a further downgrade, significantly reduce their debt issuance and investments compared to similar unrated firms. Our results are not driven by credit supply or the financial crisis. They reveal an unintended consequence of Dodd–Frank: Greater regulatory pressure on CRAs leads to negative spillover effects on firms concerned about credit ratings, regardless of their credit quality.

We solve a flexible model that captures transactions costs and infrequencies of trading opportunities for illiquid assets to better understand the shadow costs of illiquidity for different origins of asset illiquidity and heterogeneous investor types. We show that illiquidity that results in suboptimal asset allocation carries low shadow costs, whereas these costs are high when illiquidity restricts consumption. As a result, the shadow costs are high for short-term investors, investors who face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who desire to allocate a large fraction of their wealth to illiquid assets.

Using unique real estate data that allow for accurately measured capital gains, we examine whether sell propensities depend on the magnitude of a seller’s capital gain. We find that short-term sell propensities are flat over losses and increasing in gains. Consistent with their higher sell propensities, selling prices are lower for properties with larger gains. Large-sized short-term stock investments also have sell propensities that are flat over losses and increasing in gains, although the sell propensities of typical-sized short-term stock investments are V-shaped. Our findings provide empirical support for theories of realization utility.

Did the rise of Chinese import competition in the early 2000s affect banks’ credit supply policies? Using bank-firm-level data on the universe of Spanish corporate loans, we find that banks rebalanced their loan portfolios away from firms facing Chinese import competition and toward profitable firms in nonexposed sectors. Banks supplied more credit also to the construction sector, albeit independently of firms’ profitability. This was not due to banks’ exposure to the housing boom. Rather, the geographical concentration of the manufacturing industries competing with China left local banks with few alternatives other than local construction firms to rebalance their loan portfolios.

Standard portfolio choice models predict that investors consider the tax implications of trading. However, individuals are disposed toward realizing gains and holding losing investments, behaviors that worsen their performance. We show, in an experimental market, that increasing tax salience reduces the disposition effect between 22% and 47%, leading to higher portfolio balances without increasing total trading activity. Using field data, we find that investors’ disposition is sensitive to taxes around tax rate changes when taxes are likely salient. Our analysis demonstrates that increasing tax awareness can affect households’ portfolio choices, which suggests policy implications for improving financial decision-making.

We hypothesize that social trust, in mitigating contracting incompleteness, may have an important effect on the activeness and effectiveness of delegated portfolio management. Using a complete sample of worldwide open-end mutual funds, we find that trust is positively associated with the activeness of funds and that trust-related active share delivers superior performance (e.g., approximately 2% per year for cross-border investments). Moreover, “trust in the market” and “trust in managers” play important yet different roles for different types of cross-border delegated portfolio management. Our results suggest that trust acts as a fundamental building block for delegated portfolio management.