New spatial patterns, with areas specializing by function rather than industry, reflect twentieth-century developments in industrial organization, the role of the state, and Britain's system of cities. In the short run, World War II and postwar regional policy increased factory-building and employment in formerly depressed areas. Longer-run effects of both helped concentrate research and development within the South near London and dispersed routinized production to other areas. Organizational links within firms and to government departments, intellectual and commercial contacts in London, and locational preferences of professional and technical workers influenced R & D location.

Unlike the case of many low-income countries, farm-level survey data show no major differences across farm sizes with regard to decision-making and economic efficiency. This similarity is attributed to the operation of efficient and competitive markets which households used effectively to offset imbalances in resource endowment. If this holds true from the 1880s to the 1930s, perhaps the benefits of commercialization were more evenly distributed than previously believed.

In 1910 one New England cotton textile operative performed as much work as 1.5 British, 2.3 German, and nearly 6 Greek, Japanese, Indian, or Chinese workers. Input substitution, and differences in technology, management, and workers' training or inherent abilities do not explain this. Instead local culture seems to have determined worker performance. Such differences, if widespread, would explain much of the international variation in wages. They also have important consequences for understanding labor migration, the choice of technique, and the sources of economic growth.

Tontine insurance, introduced in 1868, combined the features of life insurance with an unusual old-age saving plan. A portion of the annual premium was accumulated in a fund that was divided among the surviving policyholders after twenty years. By 1905, two-thirds of all life insurance in force was of this type. Despite consumer appeal, sales of tontine policies were prohibited in 1906 after the Armstrong Investigation charged the tontine business with corruption and extravagance. We argue that tontine insurance was actuarially sound and an attractive life-cycle investment. Prohibition was probably unnecessary.

International, rather than domestic, causes of both the Bank Holiday of 1933 and the calm in the banking system that followed are emphasized here. New information on gold losses by the New York Federal Reserve, rather than domestic currency hoarding, serve to explain the Bank Holiday's specific timing. Expectations that Roosevelt would devalue the dollar stimulated much of the gold loss. I also argue that Roosevelt's restrictions on gold holdings and foreign exchange dealings and his devaluation of the dollar by 60 percent were more important to the stability of the banking system after the Bank Holiday than was deposit insurance.

The failure of the Canadian Northern Railway is analyzed with a model of optimal capital structure drawn from finance theory. Ex ante bankruptcy probabilities, which are computed on the basis of different assumptions about investors' expectations, range from 40 to 90 percent; and our best estimate is about 70 percent. These high probabilities were a consequence of loan guarantees provided to the Canadian Northern by the federal and provincial governments. The guarantees induced the railway's promoters to undertake an ex ante unprofitable project and to finance that project almost exclusively with debt.

We are concerned here with the evasion of price controls in the United States and the United Kingdom in World War II. The evidence suggests that controls produced less evasive activity in the United Kingdom. After considering several explanations we conclude that the key was the degree of regimentation. The British controlled all stages of production, limited the range of products available at each stage, and allocated relatively more resources to managing and enforcing controls.

The U.S. Constitution, by taking away the power of the states to issue paper money, removed a major source of flexibility in state public finance. In their search for new sources of revenue and fiscal flexibility, the states discovered that the banks they chartered could fill the gap. Investment earnings and tax revenues derived from banks soon became major elements of state public finance. We discuss the nature of these early business-government relationships and provide the first systematic assessment of their relative importance in state finance.

Three possible explanations for the emergence of the Canadian central bank in 1935 are examined: that it reflected the need of competitive banking systems for a lender of last resort, that it was necessary to anchor the unregulated Canadian monetary system after abandonment of the gold standard in 1929, and that it was a response to political rather than purely economic pressures. Evidence from a variety of sources (contemporary statements to a Royal Commission, correspondence of chartered bankers, newspaper reports, academic writings, and estimation of time series econometric models) rejects the first two hypotheses and supports the third.

Output per farm worker in the northern United States and Britain in the early nineteenth century was many times that inEastern Europe or in medieval England and wages were correspondingly higher. Technical progress explains little of the high American and British productivity in the early nineteenth century, nor, in the American case, does abundant land per worker. Instead, most of the difference derived from more intense labor in America and Britain.