The Seven Years' War warrants a reinterpretation of the colonial paper-money experiment. Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina with fiduciary standards issued large quantities of paper money to finance the war accompanied by only moderate increases in the rate of inflation. Massachusetts with its pure specie standard financed the war with interest-bearing debt and fared little better, if not a little worse. Success of war finance in Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina can be attributed to paper-money issues that financed government expenditures and were matched by imposition of tax labilities for early redemption.

William H. Dean, Jr. argued the development of a commercial agglomeration at any site is a function of three interrelated variables: trade routes, position, and nodality. Industrial agglomerations follow commercial ones. Dean's theory is discussed and applied to Chicago's growth before the Great Fire of 1871. The initial development of Chicago's transportation infrastructure is described. Data for the balance of receipts and shipments of selected items and growth rates for receipts and shipments from 1854 to 1871 are presented.

The boll weevil's impact on southern agriculture poses a dilemma. Micro-level evidence suggests the weevil triggered a transition out of cotton, but macro-level indicators fail to register much long-term impact. Econometric simulation of boll weevil impact—taking into account the low demand elasticity for southern cotton, differences between states in the timing and levels of infestation, and long-term supply and demand shifts independent of the weevil—shows that the two sets of evidence are not inconsistent.

The factors responsible for the South Carolina Low Country's rapid economic rise in the eigthteenth century and for the area's subsequent lapse into stagnation and decline are described and analyzed. The conclusion is that the rise and fall of the Low Country grew out of the white settlers' early economic commitment to the production of plantation staples with bound labor. The Low Country was locked into a pattern of economic development that required a high demand for low country staples. When demand for low country staples abated, the area faced economic ruin.

An index of childhood mortality is proposed as a good measure of socioeconomic well-being and inequality. The index is used to investigate the relationship between childhood mortality and occupation and income of parents. The sources consist of the 1900 United States Census public-use sample and the published 1911 Census of Marriage and Fertility of England and Wales. Results revealed more inequality in mortality and income across social-class groupings in England and Wales than in the United States. The outcome arose more because of relatively higher childhood mortality for white-collar groups in the United States than because of a better situation for blue-collar groups.

There has been some dispute about the impact of New Deal policies on the business climate. Some historians have argued that the New Deal frightened business, and others that it encouraged business. This paper analyzes the impact of the New Deal on business investment by looking at the response of investment to the outcome of the 1934, 1936, and 1938 elections, as well as the passage of certain New Deal legislation. The data reject the hypothesis that the New Deal frightened off business investment.

The expansion of short-staple cotton production into the southern backcountry during the nineteenth century opened opportunities for backcountry planters and yeomen alike. But contrary to the claims made by agricultural reformers, South Carolina upcountry farmers did not neglect the production of foodstuffs. The Upcountry as a whole was self-sufficient in foodstuffs though a significant minority of farms failed to achieve self-sufficiency. Thus a limited local market in foodstuffs developed, but it did little to stimulate the development of towns in the region.

Currency depreciation in the 1930s is almost universally dismissed or condemned. This paper advances a different interpretation of these policies. It documents first that depreciation benefited the initiating countries. It shows next that there can be no presumption that depreciation was beggar-thy-neighbor. While empirical analysis indicates that the foreign repercussions of individual devaluations were in fact negative, it does not imply that competitive devaluations taken by a group of countries were without mutual benefit. To the contrary, similar policies, had they been even more widely adopted and coordinated internationally, would have hastened recovery from the Great Depression.

The southern textile mill village has received little empirical attention. I summarize the results of ongoing research using the records of the Courtenay Mill of Newry, South Carolina. There is evidence that stable family life was rewarded, mill housing was used to create dependence, and locally recruited workers recieved less pay than those from other areas. I conclude with a discussion of the possible causes of the local operative earnings differential and indicate other areas for future research.

The pre-1914 U.S. banking industry is not easily characterized as a market operating through a price system. The endogenous development of the clearinghouse as the industry's organizing institution can be explained by inherent characteristics of demand deposits. During banking panics the clearinghouse united banks into an organization resembling a single firm which produced deposit insurance.

This paper examines the economic consequences to the Soviet Union of not participating in proposed aid programs in the immediate postwar period. The cost of World War II to the Soviet Union is compared with the value of economic aid received in the postwar period and with aid potentially available. The traditional story—which suggests that had the USSR received some combination of the proposed aid prgorams, in lieu of reparations, the postwar impact would have been significantly reduced—is rejected.