This paper is an attempt to study the economic foundations of one African state; Masina in the interior delta of the Niger south of Timbuctu, a short lived jihad state of the nineteenth century, has been chosen because it is relatively well-documented, literate, and followed an established pattern of Islamic taxation. Some attention is paid to the special needs of public expenditure in an Islamic theocracy; the system of taxation is examined, and it is shown that the revenue from the pastoral sector was probably greater than that from trade. Each section of the economy, pastoral, cultivating, fishing and trade is considered, and some attempt is made at estimating the scale of trade. Finally the process of state formation is discussed; it is suggested that there was little change in the means of production, but radical changes in the relations of production. Religious, military and fiscal aspects of the state were intimately interconnected, with Islam providing the ideological basis. Lack of foreign exchange was a continuing weakness, and the state ultimately went down in military defeat because of its inability to import firearms.

The nature of relations between the neighbouring West African caliphates of Sokoto and Hamdullahi in the early nineteenth century has been the subject of speculation by students of the western and central Sudan from the time of Barth's visit to the area in the mid-nineteenth century. Now, working from several new manuscript finds and the evidence built up by scholars who have studied the two caliphates in detail, a tentative reconstruction of relations between the states in the crucial period 1817–37 is possible. What emerges is evidence of an intricate balance between the two caliphates and their mutually acknowledged spiritual advisers from the Kunta confederation in the Azaouad in which economic and strategic priorities as well as internal politics and theological matters all seem to play a role in determining the nature of relations between Hamdullahi and Sokoto.

During the 1840s and early 1850s, when France was employing either the mutual right of search with Great Britain or independent naval squadrons to suppress direct French participation in the transatlantic slave trade, French governments condoned commercial relations between French traders and Brazilian or African slave dealers. As of 1840 French merchant vessels were involved in carrying goods destined for the slave trade from France or Brazil to slave stations on the African coast; at times these French freighters were even sold and transformed into Brazilian slavers on the African coast. On several occasions these actions were brought to the attention of the French foreign and colonial offices by concerned French officials in Africa or Brazil, but the governments of both the July Monarchy and the Second Republic consistently instructed their agents to employ only persuasive measures to discourage what they avowed to be indirect French participation in the slave trade. Despite their abolitionist sentiments, French statesmen like François Guizot came to the conclusion that it was impossible to prohibit French nationals from trading with slave merchants because such actions would interfere with the freedom of trade and adversely affect French maritime commerce. French merchants continued to co-operate closely with Brazilian slavers until Brazil abolished the slave trade in the early 1850s.

During the colonial period, the Maasai were conspicuous for their unwillingness to become involved in, or to co-operate with, colonial rule in Kenya. Between 1895 and 1904, however, the Maasai and the British had entered an informal alliance to further their mutual interests. The Maasai, badly hit by the human and animal plagues of the 1880s and early 1890s, needed time to recover their stock and to reorganize their society. The British, hampered by lack of money and troops, and in a weak position, could not afford to antagonize the Maasai who controlled their lines of communication. Co-operation proved fruitful for both sides. The Maasai were able to get stock by joining punitive expeditions, while the British relied on them to supply irregular troops. Olonana, the Maasai laibon, was able to enlist British influence in support of his claims to paramountcy against his brother, Senteu, who lived in German territory. The contrast between German and British policy towards the Maasai illustrates some of the advantages which the British and the Maasai gained from their alliance. After 1904, this alliance began to break down as their interests diverged. Olonana was left isolated as both sides began to work out a new understanding.

The Nandi protest of 1923 is examined in its Kenya-wide context and is seen to be the result of the increased pressures brought to bear on Kenya Africans in this period—pressures for African land, labour and taxes, which greatly affected the Nandi as well as other peoples. The Nandi political protest to colonial policies in this period, in contrast to that of the Kikuyu, however, focused on the traditional leadership of the Nandi orkolyot, or ritual expert, and, as such, mirrors the relative lack of socio-cultural change in Nandi before 1923, and the continuing viability of the traditional Nandi economy and political structure. Squatting, which began in this period, is seen as a key factor contributing to this viability, at the same time as it presented new threats to Nandi economic independence, which the political protest centred on orkoiyot Barserion attempted to counter. An examination of the Nandi protest of 1923, therefore, also contributes to an understanding of the political expression of that sector of the African population which has often been ignored in studies of the origin of political protest in Kenya.

This study is offered as a contribution to the literature on African protest movements during the era of colonial rule. Existing studies of migration emphasize the socio-economic aspects of motivation and have tended to gloss over or even omit migrations in which the dominant factor was disapproval of colonial policy. Existing studies of African protest movements focus on armed confrontations, perhaps because of their greater dramatic appeal.

The case of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta illustrates a phenomenon found in various parts of French West Africa and, indeed, in other colonies, particularly the Belgian and Portuguese territories. The causes of protest migrations were usually related to the same resentments which provoked revolt in localities where armed confrontation was the only option. These compelling factors included forced labour, burdensome taxation, conscription, requisitions and an attack on indigenous political institutions, notably chieftaincy. The use of repressive police measures, as manifested in the Native Penal and Indigénat Codes, exacerbated African discontent. Judging from the French reaction to the exodus from the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, it is clear that migrations, as protests, proved far less costly to Africans and had much the same effect on the colonial authorities as did other more militant forms of protest and rebellion.