To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a bounded policy acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas – foreign aid, UN peace-keeping operations, and environmental quality – that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system.

This article has two objectives. One is to explain the rise of female political representation in local assemblies in Tokyo's 23 Special Wards. The other is to examine how political women in Japan have or have not changed since the publication of Susan Pharr's Political Women in Japan in 1981. When Tokyo first saw the emergence of a new type of local assembly women in the 1990s, they consisted of well-educated suburban housewives who led the Seikatsusha Nettowaku movement. In the past 15 years, however, Tokyo has witnessed a decline in ‘housewife politicians’ and a further diversification in the types of political women. This article pays special attention to a new type of political women called Mama Giin (literally, mommy politicians). Mama Giin are professional working mothers, who have become local assembly women to address deficiencies in childcare services. Their numbers increased as socio-economic changes and party realignment reshaped supply and demand for female candidates in Tokyo. Most of them accept the gendered responsibilities for childcare very much like Pharr's New Women did in the 1970s. The younger cohorts of highly educated women enjoy greater job options and life choices unavailable to the New Women of their mothers' generation. However, they do not necessarily challenge Japan's patriarchy. This article examines the biographies of female local politicians in Tokyo's 23 Special Ward assemblies to understand the rise of Mama Giin.

This article aims to explore the effects of quasi-SNTV (Single Non-transferable Vote) under the Largest Remainder Proportional Representation (LRPR) in Legislative Council (LegCo) elections in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) after the British handover of 1997. Although the quasi-SNTV results from the inability of political parties to control their candidates, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) can obtain more seats in total than they could by coordinating around one single list if they can successfully control their party label and the political camps can coordinate different parties and candidates. The quasi-SNTV in Hong Kong is notable for the strategic coordination found in its alliances, a key aspect that differentiates it from Colombia's quasi-SNTV. The DP's failure can be attributed to its internal conflicts and the lack of coordination among the pro-democracy alliances. In contrast to the democratic camp, which lacks any overriding authority to coordinate different parties and candidates, the pro-China's united front machinery facilitates coordination and helps the DAB perform better than the DP in quasi-SNTV.

Singapore's strategic play to secure international wealth management market share has been very successful. Serious questions, however, were raised in relation to this ascendency as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC, beginning in 2007) drove the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US) to become proactive in clamping down on tax evasion and other areas deemed by them to be undesirable within the international financial system. This paper will examine the Singapore government's decade-long growth policy of its wealth management sector, and how it has been impacted upon by international regulatory responses. Further, it examines how in stark contrast to the EU and the US, Indonesia has been far less successful in its diplomatic efforts to have Singapore address financial diplomacy issues (tax evasion and ill-gotten gains from corruption) in relation to Indonesian citizens residing in Singapore. This article will argue, however, that Singapore's less than robust response to Indonesia's constant requests for action maybe to the long-term detriment of Singapore itself.

Economics is now a large part of foreign policy. (George Yeo, May 2005, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore)

Singapore Inc's new growth strategy in a whole range of services from real estate as a new asset class to lifestyle, taps millionaires and billionaires who value privacy, political stability, and sensitivity to money laundering implications. (Low, 2010: 171)

The Koizumi Administration got off on the right foot with a high approval rate over 85 % in April 2001, and swept Upper House Election held three months later (Inoguchi, 2002). However, it lost the support of legislators, media, and constituents because of his failure to get the reform process off the ground. Most salient of the legislative records is that the batting average of the cabinet sponsored bills has experienced a dramatic fall in the 153rd (27 September to 7 December 1001) and 154th (21 January to 31 July 2002) sessions, registering the second lowest figure for the last decade. Clearly the Prime Minister's legislative coalition has been significantly weakened (see Table 1; see Table 2 for the distribution of seats by political party).

The political autonomy of Chinese provinces derives from their economic independence. After the 2008 economic crisis, budget deficits increased significantly in most Chinese provinces, making them more reliant on financial support from Beijing. Provinces suffering high deficits will lose their political clout in both local and national politics. Therefore, provinces with large deficits tend to be less resistant to the enforcement of the law of avoidance and underrepresented in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. We find that in provincial standing committees, the members who are native or have more birthplace ties are more likely to be ranked behind the outsiders, especially so in provinces with a high level of deficits. We also find that provincial-standing-committee members from high-deficit provinces have a low possibility to obtain seats in the party's Central Committee. These findings confirm the close relationship between economic independence and political autonomy of Chinese provinces. In addition, we find that the logic of economic independence cannot depict the whole picture and that regional pluralism is also an important concern when the party manages its provincial leadership teams.

The East Sea (or Sea of Japan) (ESR/SOJ) Rim region, in which five countries – Japan, China, Russia, and North and South Korea – have their own coastal areas, is complex and dynamic, with many emerging regional security concerns. In this paper, the author tries to show that there is the possibility of a maritime regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region by investigating the level of public support, in Japan and South Korea, for the formation of a regional regime. Based on the theoretical assumptions of constructivism, the author analyzes what kinds of individual's social position factors influence the level of support for regional regime formation by conducting a nested regression model of survey datasets. The results of the statistical analysis suggest that people with a high level of national pride in South Korea are more likely to support a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region. In contrast, for Japanese people, there is no relationship between people's national pride and the level of support for regional regime formation. The economic recession in Japan since the early 1990s has made public concern more about domestic policy than about foreign policy issues. Based on strong support of the bottom, public opinion towards regional regime formation, the South Korean government may play a leading role in developing a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region (when the process of negotiation begins) as in the case of Japan in nineteenth century.

According to the expressive view of voting, a voter derives expressive utility from casting a vote. We present two possible sources of expressive utility: social interaction with voters having the same political preferences, and interestingness of the election. First, it has been suggested that a voter's expressive utility may increase when there are more voters having the same political preference. We extend this line of study and test the hypothesis that a voter's expressive utility increases as the number of voters having the same political preferences increases in the local community, where interaction occurs more frequently with others than it does with others in distant communities. Second, we propose and test the other hypothesis, that voters’ expressive utility is larger when the election is more interesting. Using 2008 parliamentary election data from Korea, where the election consists of both 245 single-member districts and only one nationwide district for proportional representatives, we find supporting evidence for these two arguments: the turnout rate is significantly and positively related to the share of proportional representation votes for the largest party in each single-member district; the turnout rate is also significantly and positively related to the number of polls for single-member district election conducted by major broadcasting companies, which we use as a proxy variable for interestingness of the election.

The political survival of Kim Jong-un's regime in North Korea has been a major international concern since his accession in 2012. While international research has endeavored to diagnose the stability of the regime based on its limitations and weaknesses due to political, economic, and international factors, studies based on baseline theoretical models of leadership stability have rarely been undertaken. This paper employs selectorate theory to address this issue, by identifying the selectorate and winning coalition in North Korea and illustrating their relationships with Kim Jong-un's political survival. To reexamine the analytical framework and results, this study has undertaken in-depth interviews with high-level North Korean defectors who have served in key power apparatuses of Kim Jong-il and/or Kim Jong-un's regime. It analyzes how frequent co-optation of top aides, economic ideologies, and policies are utilized for political survival. It further explains the correlation of his political survival with the party-dependent bureaucracy, internal reign of terror, development of nuclear capacity, and continuous military provocations. However, as the regime further intensifies the reign of terror, the possibility of a coup d’état by the selectorate and coalition cannot be completely ruled out.

Since its democratization, South Korea has widened the population coverage of various social programs, yet the generosity of most programs remains shallow. Existing studies offer state/elite-centered explanations for this move toward a weak universalistic welfare state. I suggest that the move rather accurately reflects citizen attitudes as well: a majority of Koreans across economic classes support welfare state expansion, yet a large segment of the self-proclaimed supporters are unwilling to pay for the expansion. I argue that underlying such mixed attitudes is the perceived unfairness of the tax and transfer systems. More specifically, (1) the perception of unfair contribution vis-à-vis other taxpayers and (2) the perception of unfair fiscal exchange with the government significantly lower one's willingness to contribute to the welfare state. My analysis of a nation-wide survey lends support to my argument. My findings have important policy implications for the emerging economies where, despite a growing citizen demand for social protection, the fiscal support base for welfare state expansion is frail.

In the wake of the intensifying Sino–Japanese rivalry in Asia, a new third-party market cooperation (TPMC) framework emerged in late 2018. The new mechanism was inaugurated around the time of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Beijing, displaying new attempts at Sino–Japanese economic diplomacy. Nonetheless, this article highlights the absence of major cooperative outcomes and suggests a pessimistic vision of TPMC's future, as three pairs of politico-economic gaps have led to asymmetries in the approaches adopted by China and Japan. First, a government-to-government policy asymmetry occurred between China's initiatives and Japan's responsiveness, as the latter merely utilized the TPMC as a temporary diplomatic tool to restore bilateral relations in late 2018 and appeared to have lost its policy momentum in the following years. Second, asymmetries in business modes and investment management between the two countries' enterprises have led to technical barriers in materializing the two governments' agreements into specific TPMC business collaboration. This study illustrated a project of Sino–Japanese collaboration in building a high-speed railway in Thailand, and saw this failed case as a warning for existing gaps of commercial modes. Third, both countries are now confronted with domestic underdeveloped public–private partnerships between state and private sectors. This article also aims to provide some policy-oriented implications for steadily implementing the Sino–Japanese TPMC in the future.

The paper examines the domestic politics explanations to Japanese security policy expansion between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. In response to the various explanations offered in the literature, such as the implementation of administrative and institutional reforms since 1994 that resulted in the centralization of the decision-making process, changes to the balance of power of political parties within the Japanese political system, and shift in the type of politicians that dominate the LDP, opposition parties and security policymaking structure, this paper argues that it is important to incorporate collective identity into understanding Japanese security policy expansion. Two reasons highlight the importance of collective identity – first, without collective identity, it is difficult to understand the type of security policy produced as the discussion of vision is omitted; and, second, collective identity reveals the organizational make-up of the security policymaking structure that is responsible for the formulation of security policy. To explicate the collective identity–institution relationship, this paper focuses on Japanese security identity and the Japanese security policymaking regime in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Two security identities for Japan are examined – the peace-state and international-state; and three elements of the regime are studied – the agents involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process, the decision-making structure of the security policymaking, and the role of the US. This paper aids in our understanding of how collective identities are sustained and supported within an institution, and how Japanese security policy expanded in the post-Cold War period.

This study explores whether and under what conditions foreign aid can help improve the donor country's image in countries that did not receive aid. We identified a world heritage site restoration project, which is visible, localized, has no political strings attached, and deals with global public good, as a most-likely type of foreign aid that can generate this positive effect. In light of the literature suggesting that tensions with the target country undermine public diplomacy effectiveness, we expect the positive effect will be more pronounced in non-recipient countries with which the donor country has a more amicable relationship. To empirically investigate our argument, we field a survey experiment in a developed non-aid-recipient country, Australia. We provide information to the Australian public about an aid project to restore the Angkor Monument in Cambodia conducted either by China or South Korea. We find that information on Korea's aid to Cambodia improves the image of Korea and the willingness to cooperate with the Korean government among Australians. No such effect, however, is observed in the case of similar aid by China whose relations with Australia have been strained in multiple domains. Our findings have policy implications for donor countries seeking to utilize the soft power element of foreign aid as a public diplomacy tool.

The role of the court system in national policymaking has long been a central issue in democratic theory. Two contending theories, the traditional view and the realist one, have been offered to explain the influence of the judiciary compared to other political institutions. Looking at the subject from Dahl's realist perspective, it is hypothesized that supporters of the ruling majority generally have a favorable attitude toward the courts, ceteris paribus. This study sheds some light on the issue of public support by examining the public's evaluation of the judicial system in Taiwan. It evaluates the impact of political factors (especially party identification) on public support for the judiciary, based on the results of a national survey carried out in 2014 to assess public attitudes toward the courts and other political institutions. The findings reveal that, compared with other institutions, the courts enjoy a relatively high degree of popular confidence. The results also confirm the realist view that supporters of the policymaking majority generally hold favorable attitudes toward the judiciary, whereas opponents of the ruling coalition tend to express lower levels of diffuse support for the courts.

In order to better understand the individual-level motives for ticket-splitting, Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study has since 2001 included a question aimed at measuring respondents’ preferences for checks and balances. We argue that this set of questions, designed to measure a combination of Fiorina's policy-balancing hypothesis and Ladd's cognitive Madisonianism, is inconsistent with principles of survey methodology and thus produces data that are suboptimal. Following a method developed by Carsey and Layman, we propose an alternative concept, the policy-balancing index derived from the perceived ideological distance between respondent and political parties, which both avoids methodological violations and provides us with a more precise concept to work with. We test the index and find it to be a significant determinant of ticket-splitting behavior.

The loss of life that resulted from the sinking of the fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru by the nuclear submarine USS Greeneville off Hawaii in February 2001 exemplifies the risks to United States–Japan alliance relations posed by US global military deployments. Following a pattern of incidents involving the US military in Japan itself, the collision violated Japanese expectations of benevolence from its stronger partner and put considerable pressure on the government to seek public apology and reassurance. This article examines the interplay of culture, national security interests and domestic politics in framing both perceptions and diplomacy during the crisis. While differences at both the cultural and security levels complicated diplomacy, asymmetry in the respective domestic political stakes, combined with overriding and largely congruent security interests, helped the United States to provide Japan with the requisite reassurance. After a decade of alliance drift, both Japan and the United States were determined to forestall defection by their alliance partner.

This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

How do parties and candidates react to electoral system reform? While the literature on causes and consequences of electoral reforms is receiving increasing attention, we lack a systematic micro-level account on how parties and candidates adopt to changes in electoral rules and district boundaries. This paper examines the case of the Japanese Liberal Democrats to explore how the party has managed to accommodate a surplus of incumbents to a reduced number of nominal tier seats following the 1994 electoral reform. By using micro-level data, I examine how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has matched candidates based on their expected electoral strength and ideological positioning to new districts. Moreover, I investigate how the newly instituted party-list allowed the LDP to avoid its disintegration at the local level by systematically defusing local stand-offs through the handing out of promising list positions. My findings help to understand how the LDP could avoid its disintegration and could continue to dominate Japanese politics until today.

The performance of the Japanese Diet in 2003 indicates that a new political era may have begun. The rate at which government sponsored bills were passed in 2003 was 11 per cent higher than in 2002. The unity of government parties, especially the unified support of the Komei Party, the high approval rates of Koizumi Cabinet, and changes in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, all contributed to this high passage rate. Most notable was a change in the treatment of national security issues. The confrontational style of the 1955 regime gave way to a new political era of discussion and compromise through the Diet deliberation. The Koizumi cabinet demonstrated strong leadership over the government parties, and the cabinet made many substantial policy decisions.