At the end of 2008, the number of people internally displaced by conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations across the world stood at 26 million, a record high since the IDMC started to monitor internal displacement in 1998. This high figure remains in spite of the growing recognition and implementation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This article presents the findings of the latest IDMC survey on trends in internal displacement, challenges faced by displaced populations, and the measures taken to address these.

This report presents the instruments and strategies used by non-state actors to respect international humanitarian law during intra-state conflicts in Africa and highlights the recognition by these non-state actors of the role of humanitarian organizations. It examines the impact of such recognition on the development of international humanitarian law and the activities of humanitarian organizations, and shows the problems encountered by non-state actors with respect to their commitments. It concludes with some suggestions as to a way forward.

The proliferation of crises around the world has led to a sharp increase in the scale of humanitarian aid required to meet the vital needs of the people affected by them for food, water, medical care and shelter. Humanitarian organizations can either meet those needs directly or support local services engaged in the same work. In most cases, both approaches are used.

The Libyan crisis of 2011 has again raised the crucial problem of the choice of means in protecting civilians. Authorized by the international community as part of military operations in Libya, the use of force in protecting civilians has revived the concept of ‘humanitarian war’ and has raised a number of issues for humanitarian organizations, in particular concerning the notion of neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian action.1 The article focuses on these humanitarian issues and, inter alia, on the possible impact on humanitarian action of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was at the basis of the intervention in Libya.

“What is an ICRC delegate?” Here, in a sentence, is the focus of this article. Going through the in-house perception, which highlights the extraordinary and singular nature of this humanitarian player, and through the view of the public, which oscillates between the missionary of humanity and the mere holder of a temporary job, the authors attempt to give the reader the key to unveil and discover this peculiar profession.

• International humanitarian law cannot serve as a basis for armed intervention in response to grave violations of its provisions; the use of force is governed by the United Nations Charter.

• It is not for the ICRC to pronounce on the legality or legitimacy of such intervention.

• International humanitarian law applies when intervention forces are engaged in hostilities with one or more of the parties to the conflict.

• The ICRC seeks to promote the term “armed intervention in response to grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law”.

The trauma of coming face to face with the horrors of a battlefield and witnessing first-hand the abandonment of the war-wounded led Henry Dunant to two ingenious concepts: the creation of permanent volunteer relief societies and the adoption of a treaty to protect wounded soldiers and all who endeavour to come to their aid. On the initiative of Gustave Moynier, a committee was established in Geneva to implement Dunant's proposals. That committee – which soon took the name ‘International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) – convened two international conferences, the first of which laid the foundation for the future relief societies while the second adopted the initial Geneva Convention. This article considers the circumstances that led to the founding of the ICRC and then to that of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, starting with Solferino and culminating in the adoption of the Geneva Convention.

The Responsibility to Protect is being touted as a new approach to protecting populations from mass atrocities. Certainly it would be encouraging to believe that an end to genocides, large scale ethnic cleansing and large scale loss of life were within humanity's reach. However, whilst the holistic approach of the doctrine is to be commended, the legality of the proposal requires further analysis. This paper specifically addresses the evolution of the legality of humanitarian intervention and looks at whether the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advances the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends.

Little attention is paid to the obligation of ‘care’ in Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I. Beyond a general principle of upholding environmental value in times of armed conflict, what is the scope and content of the obligation? If it is worthless, what makes it so? Since the care provision includes the same high threshold of harm found elsewhere in the environmental provisions, has this stumbling block now been removed by state practice? Rule 44 of the Customary Law Study might appear to suggest that this is so, or does it? Ultimately then, is the care obligation worth caring about?

This article assesses the causes of the crisis of detention in Latin America. It is argued that this crisis, which manifests itself in overpopulation of the region's prison systems, deficient infrastructure, prison informality and violence propelled ultimately by political processes, is mostly related to, on the one hand, disastrous human rights conditions inside Latin American prisons, and on other, the political denial of these conditions. This denial produces a state of institutional abandonment that is preserved by the interests of politicians and bureaucrats, who are engaged in denying prison violence and human rights abuses while simultaneously calling for more punishment and imprisonment.

The risks of the use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical (NRBC) weapons are heterogeneous. Each risk has its own implications for developing and deploying any capacity to assist victims of an NRBC event and, in parallel, for the health and security of the people bringing this assistance. At an international level, there are no plans for assisting the victims of an NRBC event which are both adequate and safe. Recognizing the realities of the contexts associated with each risk throws up numerous challenges; such recognition is also a prerequisite for addressing these challenges. The realities that have to be considered relate to:

1. 1. developing, acquiring, training for and planning an NRBC response capacity;

2. 2. deploying a response capacity in an NRBC event;

3. 3. the mandates and policies of international organizations pertaining to NRBC events.

The challenges that will pose the greatest difficulty for a humanitarian organization are those for which the solutions are ‘non-buyable’ and which involve making extremely difficult decisions. Attempting to assist victims of an NRBC event without a reality-based approach might generate ineffective and unacceptably dangerous situations for those involved.

It has rightly been said that the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement does not stand for any specific philosophy or moral doctrine. Neither the fundamental principles nor international humanitarian law (IHL) provide a methodical interpretation of human nature or an inventory of the moral rights and obligations of the Movement's members. The Movement adheres to no particular ideology or political system. On the contrary, its universality enables it, with varying degrees of success, to adapt to or even influence various political regimes or tendencies in order to promote humanitarian aims. This ability can be attributed in particular to its respect for the principle of neutrality.

Cash transfers have changed the way the humanitarian sector delivers assistance, and at the same time, digitalization is changing the way our world works in fundamental ways. The digitalization of cash means that the simple click of a button can put money in the hands of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people within minutes. Digital payments have been a game changer, opening the door to faster and more efficient delivery of life-saving assistance. Although physical currency will not disappear with the rise of digital payments, it is essential to balance the benefits of these digital processes with the risks. As humanitarians, we need to articulate what “do no harm” means in the digital age, applying this equally to the way we use digital payments to support people affected by armed conflicts and other situations of violence.

Si la population civile est trop souvent la cible principale des hostilités, notamment lors des conflits armés non internationaux, les femmes, elles, sont régulièrement les victimes les plus durement affectées. Les traités de droit international humanitaire contiennent des dispositions spéciales destinées à protéger les femmes dans la guerre, en particulier contre les actes de violence sexuelle. L'auteur de cet article élargit le débat pour examiner également la situation de la femme en sa qualité de mère ou de chef de famille, car, lorsque les hommes sont au combat, ce sont les femmes qui assurent la survie de la famille et de la communauté. Les dispositions des Conventions de Genève et de leurs Protocoles additionnels sont passées en revue, tant pour les conflits armés internationaux que non internationaux. Pour conclure, l'auteur donne une information intermédiate sur l'étude y relative, en cours d'élaboration au CICR, à la demande de la XXVIIe Conférence Internationale de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge.

In terms of its disruptive impact and intensity of violence, banditry is the gravest security threat that Nigeria currently faces, and it is driving her worst national humanitarian crisis in decades. There are contests about the origin, nature and the drivers of banditry and how well bandits by their modus operandi fit into the various definitional frameworks of an organized criminal group. The article examines what is known about bandits and banditry in light of existing definitional and conceptual paradigms of organized crime and criminal groups, and interrogates the applicability of international humanitarian law to this security crisis that characterizes the current face of conflict in the West African Sahel.

Transitional justice is a conspicuous feature of responses to mass atrocities. Rooted in accountability and redress for victims, transitional justice mechanisms influence and are influenced by collective memory of conflicts. This article looks at the dynamics between memory, trauma and forgiveness in Cambodia. Thirty years after the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodians expressed limited knowledge of the past, a strong desire for the truth, and lingering feelings of hatred. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) created or renewed demand for truth, along with some desire for harm to come to the wrongdoers. Although the ECCC was set up several decades after the mass atrocities, the data suggest that the ECCC and the civil society movement associated with it may have had positive outcomes on addressing the legacy of the violence.

Three main arguments may explain why few cases in international (and national) criminal law include charges for attacks against civilians or civilian objects. The law may be not sufficiently clear, there may be a lack of evidence or the selection of military targets may be based on mainly subjective considerations, which make it very hard to establish individual culpability. This article examines some legal and practical reasons for the difficulties the prosecutor faces when trying to charge individuals with such crimes. Although there are few examples, the ICTY has shown that it is generally possible to hold individuals responsible for such crimes.

This article draws on my book Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage,1 which incorporates ground-breaking fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina and extensive research, and on my subsequent research and fieldwork in the post-conflict country. In the article, I explore the meaning that restoration and reconstruction of cultural heritage intentionally destroyed during conflict can have, particularly to the forcibly displaced. With the protection of cultural heritage increasingly being treated as an important human right and with the impact that forcible displacement during armed conflict has on cultural identity now in the spotlight, the importance of cultural heritage for those ethnically cleansed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992–95 war (both those who returned and those who did not) has relevance for considerations of contemporary post-conflict populations.