After a careful analysis of the law regarding the use of force in international relations and the practice of States since 1945, the author concludes that the United Nations Charter leaves no room for a “humanitarian intervention” in the internal affairs of a State. In his opinion NATO's armed intervention in the Balkans in the spring of 1999 therefore has no legal basis under the UN Charter. He goes on to say, however, that the question whether NATO's action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may not be justified by an existing or an emerging rule of customary law should be examined. Such a discussion should take into account, on the one hand, the magnitude of the humanitarian disaster to be averted, and on the other hand the absence of objections by the Security Council or (with rare exceptions) by States. The author concludes with an appeal to the permanent members of the Security Council not to use their veto when deciding on action to be taken in the event of humanitarian disasters.

This paper deals with the provisions of contemporary international humanitarian law which prohibit “terrorist acts”, commonly referred to, simply, as “terrorism”.

Since the paper is mainly of a descriptive nature, experts in international humanitarian law will learn little that is new. But if it succeeds in highlighting one specific aspect of the well-known obligations and prohibitions set forth in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols—namely, the absolute and unconditional ban on terrorism—the objective will be attained. A few basic facts will then have been recalled which should make it somewhat easier to tackle the complex questions as to the essence and legal bounds of guerrilla warfare.

While most law on the conduct of hostilities has been heavily scrutinized in recent years, the law dealing with armed conflict at sea has been largely ignored. This is not surprising. There have been few naval conflicts since 1945, and those that have occurred have been limited in scale; none has involved combat between major maritime powers. Nevertheless, navies have tripled in number since then, and today there are growing tensions between significant naval powers. There is a risk of conflict at sea. Conditions have changed since 1945, but the law has not developed in that time. Elements of it, especially that regulating economic warfare at sea, seem outdated and it is not clear that the law is well placed to regulate so-called “hybrid” warfare at sea. It seems timely to review the law, to confirm that which is appropriate and to develop that which is not. Perhaps a new edition of the San Remo Manual would be timely.

The field of humanitarian action is far from static, and the ICRC has worked over the years to evolve and respond to changing needs and changing circumstances. The past several decades have seen a proliferation of humanitarian actors, protracted, complex conflicts, and the rapid rise of new technologies that have significantly impacted how humanitarian work is done. The ICRC has been continually challenged to adapt in this changing environment, and its core work of supporting separated families – through restoration of family links and through support to the families of the missing – provides insight into ways that it has met this challenge and areas in which it may still seek to improve.

Transitional justice encompasses a number of mechanisms that seek to allow post-conflict societies to deal with past atrocities in circumstances of radical change. However, two of these mechanisms – truth commissions and criminal processes – might clash if the former are combined with amnesties. This article examines the possibility of employing the Rome Statute's Article 53 so as to allow these two mechanisms to operate in a complementary manner. It considers three arguments – an interpretation of Article 53 in accordance with the relevant rules on treaty interpretation, states' obligations to prosecute certain crimes and the Rome Statute's approach to prosecutorial discretion – and concludes that Article 53 is ill-suited to accommodate truth commissions in conjunction with amnesties.

This article charts the rapid rise in the use of imprisonment in recent decades before considering some of the most pressing issues of concern in the use of imprisonment today. First among these is prison overcrowding, which continues to blight the record of many countries in their treatment of prisoners. To illustrate the potentially dire consequences of overcrowding – a problem common to many other countries and regions – an account is given of a recent visit to a prison in El Salvador. The article then provides an overview of the relevant regional and international standards on the treatment of prisoners, referring also to the role of judicial bodies in ensuring implementation.

Implementing the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) represents a real challenge if the protection of civilians in today's urban armed conflicts remains a priority for armed forces. The application of the principle of distinction comes up against the difficulties of obtaining intelligence, in particular in the absence of troops on the ground. The minimalization of collateral damage requires putting in place very precise targeting procedures, and even the adoption of tactics designed to draw out traditional combat from cities. In terms of precautionary measures in attack or against the effects of an attack, these must be adapted to the context of urban combat. Nevertheless, IHL remains an essential instrument that must be analyzed and translated into action in a practical manner in order to conduct military operations that are at the same time effective and legally permissible.

Insurgent groups are registering births in territories which they control, and yet States do not recognize insurgent birth registration, resulting in a legal vacuum with harsh consequences for children. Based on international human rights and humanitarian law provisions related to birth registration, this article argues that insurgent groups have an inherent power to register births in order to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law, and that State obligation to ensure the right to recognition as a person under the law should require States to recognize insurgent birth registration in order to prevent harm to children.

The French government and an armed insurrectionary movement – the National Liberation Front (FLN) – confronted each other for over seven years in the Algerian War, which would become the archetype of wars of national liberation. It brought the new conditions of struggle in revolutionary warfare to a convulsive climax characterized by terrorist attacks, underground warfare, and repression. On the humanitarian front, the challenge of ensuring respect for humanitarian rules in asymmetric warfare was posed more bluntly than in any previous conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) faced the triple challenge of offering its services to a government facing an armed insurgency that it claimed to be able to bring under control through police action alone, of entering into contact with a liberation movement, and of conducting a humanitarian action in the context of an insurrectionary war.

The Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons was a somewhat disappointing if not entirely unexpected decision. After the final paragraph, which constitutes the dispositif, all fourteen judges appended either personal declarations, separate opinions or dissenting opinions to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with specific findings and particular aspects of the reasoning behind the Opinion.

Having invaded Iraq without UN Security Council authorization, the United States was unable to convince many countries to take a meaningful role in helping Iraq deal with its violent past. Always insisting that it would “go it alone”, the United States implemented accountability measures without properly consulting the Iraqi people. Nor did the United States access assistance from the United Nations and international human rights organizations, all of which possess considerable knowledge and experience of a wide range of transitional justice mechanisms. In the end, the accountability measures introduced by the Americans either backfired or were hopelessly flawed. What are needed in Iraq are a secure environment and a legitimate authority to implement a comprehensive transitional justice strategy that reflects the needs and priorities of a wide range of Iraqis. Such a strategy should contain several measures, including prosecutions, reparations, a balanced approach to vetting, truth-seeking mechanisms and institutional reform.

This article examines the historical evolution of the law of occupation from two angles. First, it analyses scholarly discourse and practice with respect to the general prohibition on the Occupying Power making changes to the laws and administrative structure of the occupied country, as embodied in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Many Occupying Powers and scholars have endeavoured to rationalize exceptions to this ‘general principle’ governing the entire corpus of the law of occupation. Their studies support the contingent nature of the law of occupation, with its interpretation being dependent on different historical settings and social context. The second part of the article focuses on how the law of occupation that evolved as a European project has rationalized excluding the system of colonialism from the framework of that law. The historical assessment of this body of jus in bello would be incomplete and biased if it did not address the narratives of such structural exclusivity.

While detention by armed opposition groups in non-international armed conflict is a reality that is foreseen and not prohibited by international humanitarian law, the grounds upon which it may take place are not defined. This article looks more closely at the customary international humanitarian law prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and how it can apply to armed opposition groups in a manner that makes compliance realistic. It focuses on the legal bases upon which armed opposition groups may detain persons who are taken into custody in order to remove them from hostilities or for security purposes. An approach to detention by armed opposition groups based on the principles of international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts is explored and its limitations defined.

During the past twelve months, the issue of sexual violence in conflict and emergencies has received an unprecedented amount of attention at the highest political and institutional levels. In 2013, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) launched a Call to Action to mobilize donors, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders on protecting women and girls in humanitarian emergencies, culminating in the high-level event “Protecting Girls and Women in Emergencies” in November 2013. As of August 2014, over forty partners (including governments, United Nations (UN) agencies and NGOs) had made commitments to the Call to Action. Furthermore, in June 2014 the “Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict”, co-chaired by the UK Foreign Secretary and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), gathered 1,700 delegates and 129 country delegations. In his summary, the chair of the Global Summit states: “We must apply the lessons we have learned and move from condemnation to concrete action. We must all live up to the commitments we have made.”1 In September 2014, the United States organized a Call to Action event in New York during the UN General Assembly with the purpose of sharing progress on commitments made in November 2013. It thus seems that efforts to raise awareness about sexual violence in conflict and emergencies and advocate for a much stronger commitment to action are well under way. But is this enough? Is there enough evidence from lessons learned to allow us to increase and improve our response?

This article assesses the implications of six megatrends for humanitarian action in the future, including changes in demography, technology and science, economics, political power, climate, and patterns of conflict. The interaction of these trends suggests a particularly complex landscape for future humanitarian response. For example, conflict in the future is more likely to take place in cities that are growing as a result of economic and environmental factors. Social media are contributing to both political change and humanitarian response, while changes in global political and economic power are likely to influence the way in which the international humanitarian system is financed and supported.

Mr. Henri Coursier, of the Legal Department of the ICRC, published some time ago a study on “Francis Lieber and the Laws of War” in the International Review, together with a French translation of Orders No. 100 relative to the behaviour of the United States Armies in the field (the famous “Lieber Laws”), the object of which was to have the principles of international law applied during the American civil war (1861–1865). These orders which were immediately recognized and appreciated by the principal lawyers of the time, had a great influence on the future of the law of nations, since it can be said that the Hague Regulations, which sprang from the 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences, were very largely inspired by them, and several provisions of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, stem from the same source. It was to Lieber that the President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, appealed to establish this Code which was promulgated in 1863, thus preceding by one year the First Geneva Convention.

Humanitarian issues have hardly ever before been given so much publicity by debates over what some people have described as the “droit” or “devoir d'ingérence”, which is then linked with the notion of the right to assistance. At the various levels at which the problem is perceived, the public at large, the media and legal experts have become involved in lively and even heated debates.

A considerable number of countries have been the theatre of armed conflicts – whether international or non-international – with all the devastation and suffering that this entails, chiefly among the civilian population. Indeed, civilians continue to be the primary victims of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) committed by both State parties and non-State armed groups. Recurring violations in hostilities include deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, the destruction of infrastructure and goods indispensable to their survival, and the forcible displacement of the civilian population. All too frequently, civilians lack basic supplies and services, such as food, water and health care.

The word “neutral” comes from the Latin ne-uter and means: neither one thing nor the other. An institution or a movement is neutral when it refrains from participating in a conflict or altercation and abstains from any interference. Refraining from participation and abstaining from interference can be for various reasons: it may be a question of self-preservation and self-assertion, of the judgement that good and bad, true and false are to be found on both sides, of holding back in the interests of a higher purpose or a special task. Neutrality may however have its origin in indifference, fear and cowardice. Neutrality in itself is therefore not a virtue.