The Colombo Plan has been defined as “a cooperative plan to enable members to help one another through bilateral arrangements for assistance, both capital and technical. Its objective is to raise the standard of living by accelerating the pace and extending the scope of economic development in the countries of South and South-East Asia with special emphasis on the production of food.” Frederick Benham, British economist and student of the Plan, has called it “one of those voluntary and flexible arrangements based on goodwill which are not subject to any formal rules—it is not really a plan at all. It may be regarded as an envelope covering the development programs of member countries in South and South-East Asia.”

The special provision in Article 109, paragraph 3, on review of the United Nations Charter resulted from the concern of many states that the five great powers, working in harness, would excessively dominate the organization. Most of the conference members at San Francisco resented the implication of permanent inferiority reflected in the great powers' special voting position in the Security Council. Although they feared that the Charter permitted too wide an application of the veto power, they nevertheless accepted it as necessary within limits.

On August 30, 1954, a close vote on a motion to prevent debate in the French National Assembly consigned to history a spectacular scheme for the unification; of western Europe. The defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) precipitated a seven-week crisis in the western world that only adroit diplomacy, spurred by a sense of desperation, could overcome. In the ensuing conferences of London (September 28— October 3) and Paris (October 20–23), the foreign ministers accomplished two vital purposes. They salvaged the Atlantic alliance and they brought Adenauer's; Germany into the family of free nations.

One of the major premises of United States policy in Southeast Asia, as it has evolved during the past few years, appears to be that effective regional organization is a practical political possibility. To an increasing extent we have sought to implement policy objectives in the area through the development of regional institutions. Thus the United States took the lead in the negotiation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (the Manila Pact), which is a mutual security arrangement for the defense of Southeast Asia against aggression by means of armed attack or subversion. In the economic field we joined, after an initial period of hesitation, in the British Commonwealth-sponsored Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. While American economic assistance to Asian countries has always been, and still is, extended primarily on a bilateral basis, the government let it be known early in 1955 that it would be prepared to establish a special regional fund of about $200 million to be used for projects benefiting more than one country, if the nations concerned could themselves devise a satisfactory program. The fact that the Simla Conference, called soon thereafter by India to discuss the American proposal, failed to reach agreement on regional use of the fund does not negate the general impression of American concern for a regional approach.

The increasing manifestations of Soviet interest in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program and in the establishment of a Soviet “Point Four” program for the under-developed, non-Communist countries of southeast Asia are of crucial importance to the west. In great measure the ultimate defense of western civilization lies in its ability to guide the surging flow of Asian nationalism into constructive, stable and satisfying channels of economic, social and political reforms. Soviet interest in under-developed areas is not new, but since the death of Stalin, a precipitant and ingenious reversal of tactics has occurred. Nowhere has this interest been more evident than in the Economic and Social Council and in its subsidiary bodies. Though the changed Soviet tactics in no way signify a modification of the long term objectives of Soviet strategy, they do demand a corresponding flexibility and imaginativeness on the part of western diplomacy. By understanding past Soviet behavior, acquiring an accurate knowledge of early postwar Soviet policy toward underdeveloped areas, and investigating the rationale behind that policy, the direction and intensity of present Soviet policy may be better analyzed and viewed in its proper perspective.

An economist in an international organization has certain obligations as a member of his profession, as a citizen of his country, and as an international civil servant. These are not always readily harmonized in the individual. For economists from different backgrounds (i.e., economies which are capitalistic, welfare-oriented, underdeveloped, etc.), of different nationalities, and working in different capacities with organizations of differing international functions, there can surely be no single prototype. There may nonetheless be some generalizations which can be made about the role of this sort of professional in this occupational setting. Where may the lines be drawn between the pursuit of truth, however relative it may be, and the advocacy of policies? To what extent must the economist align himself with the practical when that is the enemy of the desirable? Does an economist withdraw from the heady atmosphere of academic recognition into bureaucratic anonymity when he fills out the twenty-page employment form of an international organization; or does he escape from the pallid world of equilibrating models into the invigorating arena of problems, pressure and power? Is an economist trained in a particular school of thought—whether Marxist, Keynesian, Chicago or institutionalist—under any obligation to suppress or dilute the distinctive point of view he initially brings to bear on economic problems?

It has become so common to refer to the domestic jurisdiction clause as one of the most controversial provisions of the UN Charter that it may reasonably be expected that a revision conference will be confronted with proposals for its amendment.

Though the United Nations has succeeded to only a limited extent in bringing about the actual settlement or adjustment of disputes and threatening situations that have been brought to its attention, it has achieved a considerable measure of success in its efforts to bring fighting to an end and to assist the parties in maintaining the cessation of hostilities to which they have agreed. In Indonesia, the United Nations was able to follow up its success in inducing the parties to agree to a cease-fire with a valuable assist in the negotiation of a final political settlement. In Palestine, however, the United Nations contribution has been largely limited to getting the states directly involved in the fighting to agree to a cease-fire, and then to armistice agreements. The political issues involved seem as far from resolution as ever. In dealing with the dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations has likewise found itself unable to get the parties to agree on a political settlement. Nevertheless, fighting has been brought to an end, and the United; Nations has played an important part in achieving that result.

Ten years have passed since the initial publication of Emery Reves's international best-seller, The Anatomy of Peace, and the rapid growth of numerous organizations which took up the cry for world government at the dawn of the Atomic Era. Open conflict in Korea in 1950, following several years of severe international tension, seemed to lend some grim support to early world federalist warnings that the world would either “federate or disintegrate” within the span of a few years. But the international atmosphere has improved somewhat in recent years, and the world has not conformed with the early federalist prediction. Indeed, world federalists themselves are still very much alive and active on this still unfederated planet—not only in the United States, but in more than a score of other non-communist countries as well.

Nearly thirty-five years have gone by since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles brought into existence a new international entity, the territory under mandate or trusteeship. Histories of the peace negotiation, depending on the prejudices or the personalities of their authors, represented the system as the creation of a group of impractical idealists or as the ultimate Surrender to militant colonialism. Only recently has it proved feasible to examine much of the evidence, to discover the effects of the system on the territories themselves, and to draw a few conclusions.

This article is devoted to a consideration of the role (during the period 1946–54) of the International Court of Justice within the general context of international institutions existing to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes. For the development of international judicial techniques, this period is dominated by a novel, and unwelcome, phenomenon, that of the non-implementation of several of the Court's decisions. In this respect the position of the Court, as a principal organ of the United Nations, is not unique, for, in all its work, the United Nations has had to face the problem of the non-implementation of the resolutions of the principal organs. In making the following observations, the possibility that a decision will be taken in 1955 to convene a General Review Conference, in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 3, of the Charter and Article 69 of the Statute is kept in mind. However, it is not our intention to put forward any specific suggestions for amending either Chapter XIV of the Charter or the Statute. Until a careful and comprehensive review has been made of the working of the provisions of the Charter relating to the Court, and of the Statute, it would be premature to do so.

When the North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated in the critical days of 1948–1949, it was hoped that this arrangement might be helpful in assisting the contracting parties to build up sufficient strength to deter aggression in Europe and to augment their diplomatic influence so that they could negotiate with the U.S.S.R. from a more advantageous position than they had held since 1945.

The author's first connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came on the 16th of December, 1950. It was at a time when the world situation seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. The Chinese had just entered the war in Korea and the Council of NATO was to meet in Brussels on December 18th to consider urgent action to strengthen and organize defenses against aggression, should it occur in Europe.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa: The report of the Committee on South West Africa to the tenth session of the General Assembly stated that the Committee had again invited the government of the Union of South Africa to confer with it, but that the Union government had refused the invitation, stating that it still maintained that the mandate in respect of South West Africa had lapsed and that the government had no other international commitments as a result of the demise of the League of Nations. Provisional rules of procedure for the Committee had been adopted on February 11, 1954; at its meeting on June 1, 1955, the Committee, having received no comment from South Africa, decided that these provisional rules of procedure should become its rules of procedure. In 1955, the Union government had again refused to submit an annual report in regard to the Territory of South West Africa to the Committee; therefore, the Committee decided to apply the alternate procedure contained in its rules of procedure with respect to examination of reports.

I. The Rationale of the Veto

At the time of San Francisco, and intermittently since, five separate but interrelated arguments have been advanced to support the veto privilege: I) that the terms of Article 27 (3) of the Charter, by requiring big power negotiations before a vote is taken, in fact guarantee preservation of international peace; 2) that, since big powers cannot and will not submit to being voted into a war by small and medium states, the chain of events theory is valid and a big power should be permitted to exercise a veto on a subject which might eventually lead to enforcement action by the United Nations; 3) that the veto acts as a kind of safety valve preserving the status quo and preventing controversial changes which might cause conflict among the Big Five; 4) that the veto enables states in a minority position to protect their vital interests against infringement by the majority; and finally, 5) that the veto has, in fact, been used as a bargaining weapon by small states or by a minority.

Fifth United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: At the Fifth United Nations Technical Assistance Conference, which met at Headquarters on November 26, 1954, under the presidency of Mr. Hans Engen (Norway), 56 governments pledged the equivalent of $12,264,000 to the 1955 expanded program of technical assistance; this amount represented an increase of 16 percent over the amount pledged by the same governments to the 1954 program. Of the countries which had contributed to the 1954 program, 19 did not announce their contributions to the 1955 program during the Conference, although several delegations, among them those of the United States, Japan, German Federal Republic, New Zealand and the Dominican Republic, assured the Conference that their governments were planning to make further contributions and that pledges would subsequently be announced.

At its 700th meeting on September 8, 1955, the Council considered a report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, General E. L. M. Burns, on an outbreak of violence in the Gaza area which had begun with an incident on August 22 in which an Egyptian post near the demarcation line was occupied by Israel forces; according to General Burns, this incident, in which one Egyptian officer and two soldiers had been killed and three others wounded, had started a chain of violence. While it was not possible to affix responsibility for the episode of August 22, he stated, it had been followed by an organized series of attacks on vehicles, installations and persons, carried out by gangs of marauders in Israel territory and resulting in the deaths of eleven military and civilian personnel and the injury of nine. The number and nature of these attacks, in the view of General Burns, suggested that they were the work of organized and well trained groups, and he stated that investigations by the United Nations military observers tended to support this view. There had also been numerous incidents of firing across the demarcation line, accompanied in some instances by incursions of small parties of troops of either side, and sometimes resulting in heavy casualties. In view of the deterioration in the situation, General Burns reported, he had requested on August 26 that responsible Israel authorities in the area be instructed to act with restraint, and had informed the Egyptians that in his view it would be advisable to post United Nations military observers on the Egyptian side in accordance with arrangements previously in force, but subsequently discontinued.

The eighth session of the General Assembly, which had recessed on December 9, 1953, to be reconvened if necessary by the President of the Assembly with the concurrence of a majority of United Nations Members to consider the problem of Korea, was formally adjourned at a brief meeting on September 20, 1954.

Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development: Pursuant to a resolution approved at the ninth session of the General Assembly, Mr. Raymond Scheyven submitted for consideration at the tenth session of the Assembly a further report on the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The report, prepared by Mr. Scheyven in cooperation with a panel of experts appointed by the Secretary-General, dealt with the form or forms, functions and responsibilities which SUNFED might have, and especially with the methods by which its operations might be integrated with the development plans of the countries receiving assistance from it. Mr. Scheyven felt that SUNFED should not confine itself to financing or assisting in the financing of nonself-liquidating projects exclusively; he felt that SUNFED should be able to contribute to any project which was related to economic development but which for some reason, such as balance of payments difficulties, was unable to attract investment capital. He likened the proposed fund to the European Recovery Program, although he pointed out that the analogy was not complete. On the question of the financing of the fund and the size of its initial resources, Mr. Scheyven emphasized the necessity of long-term commitments and felt that the $250 million initial capitalization which had been put forward as the minimum amount on which SUNFED could begin operation should not be considered an absolute; he felt that the limited capacity of underdeveloped countries to absorb capital and the inevitable slowness with which the operation of SUNFED would begin would make it practicable to begin with a smaller amount. He therefore suggested that the General Assembly bear these considerations in mind in reaching decisions and suggested that the fund might be established provisionally for a five year period during which its operations could be assessed. Mr. Scheyven and the experts with whom he consulted felt that SUNFED should be empowered to provide under-developed countries with grants or with loans repayable in local currency but should not be empowered to grant low-interest loans on indeterminate and extremely liberal terms; a combination of grants from SUNFED and loans from such an agency as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was suggested as a possible procedure.