Do citizens care whether their government breaches international law, or are other imperatives more influential? We consider this question in the human rights arena, asking whether and how it matters how abuses are framed. In a novel survey experiment, we ask Australians about their attitudes toward restrictive immigration policy, holding the underlying breaches constant but varying how they are framed. We find that people most strongly oppose policy that violates international law. Emphasizing moral considerations has smaller but still notable impacts on attitudes, whereas reputational frames have the weakest effects. We also find that translating attitudes into political action is challenging: most who learn of current policy's legal, moral, or reputational dimensions and in turn become more critical do not subsequently express greater interest in trying to do something about it. Nonetheless, there are interesting differences across frames. Appealing to international law or moral considerations is more effective at spurring mobilization than emphasizing reputational harm, though via different mechanisms. Framing this debate in international reputational terms consistently has the weakest impacts on interest in political action, and may be worse than saying nothing at all.

Next to oil, coffee is the most valuable commodity traded in world markets; it is produced in the developing world and consumed within the developed nations. Moreover, the International Coffee Agreement is the major successful international commodity agreement. In this research note we analyze the allocation of quotas to export coffee in 1982 under the terms of the agreement. The way in which entitlements to export are allocated offers insights into significant features of the international political economy.

Data collected from a survey of corporate managers in the Federal Republic of Germany are used, first, to describe the level and pattern of attachment of this critical elite as regards regional integration in Western Europe and, second, to assess two alternative hypotheses purporting to explain different integration support levels among members of this elite. While not entirely satisfactory, the concept we introduce, “external interest” (defined as an individual's perception of the “effect” and “valence” of regional integration on one's own well-being), is more highly correlated with integration attitude than is its rival, Inglehart's concept of “values,” with respect to both the German managerial data we collected and also the European Community (EC) survey data upon which Inglehart's original analysis was based. The investigation drew attention to operationalizations of the concept “regional integration”; what in fact is being measured and explained when alternative (often analyst-specific) approaches yield conflicting findings.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution—or the Acheson Plan, as it was once popularly called—was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 3, 1950. It is commonly conceded that its procedures were designed to help surmount an apparently major obstacle to the operation of the UN: the Soviet veto or its alleged abuse, and the concomitant stagnation of the Security Council. Its particulars were the product, at least in part, of both the accidents and the demands of the Korean War—for example, that the Security Council could and did adopt resolutions of substance pertaining to Korea up until the time (August 1, 1950) the Soviet delegate returned, after which it adopted no other; or that there was a UN commission already stationed in Korea which could and did report to the Security Council immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in June of 1950. The resolution belonged to a longer evolutionary history, too: the general shift in emphasis away from the Security Council was manifested even before the Korean War by the creation in 1947 of an “Interim Committee” of the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was more or less a reflection of the immediate environment of the Korean crisis, but it was also part of the main stream of basic institutional change to which it at the same time contributed.

International organizations are involved in the development process in several ways: They transfer real resources, offer technical assistance, give advice on development strategy, and collect and collate information. The specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies do not have a tax base of their own; they must rely on the donations of their members for resources. Most of their subscriptions come from the wealthy nations of the world, and most of their grants benefit the poor nations. The UN system acts as a financial intermediary distributing resources between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. Human, as well as financial, capital is transferred to the less developed nations (LDC's) by the specialized agencies, which provide skilled personnel or training programs for nationals of the LDC's.

The key role of trade in the development process is widely accepted today. Two recent events, both relating to international organizations, underscore this acceptance. One was the convening in 1964 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and its establishment as a permanent organ of the UN system. Under UNCTAD's aegis a continuing examination is being conducted as to ways of reshaping world trade policies in the interests of the developing countries. The other event was the adoption early the following year of a new set of articles on trade and development in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the new articles recognition of the role of exports in economic development was established for the first time in the text of the GATT itself, and a constitutional basis was provided for GATT's many activities designed to promote the exports of developing countries. Elsewhere in this volume are essays evaluating the contributions of UNCTAD and GATT toward the promotion of development in the world's poor countries. In this essay I will rather explore more generally the relation between international trade and economic development and discuss some of the problems that have arisen in the effort to make trade a more effective instrument of development.

In the last decade a number of scholars concerned with patterns of change in the international system have turned to international law for indications of systemic trends. They have assumed that key rules and principles of international law reflect broad characteristics of the system while controversies over and changes in their content and status reflect the rate, extent, and direction of change in the system. For example, Stanley Hoffmann in an early contribution illustrated the transition from the stable international system of the nineteenth century to the revolutionary system of today by reference to changes in the principle of sovereignty. Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach discussed the same transition—in their terms from a balance of power to a loose bipolar system—by reference to the principle of nonintervention. Somewhat later Wolfgang Friedmann treated the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention together in light of systemic trends over the last century, while Richard A. Falk associated the substantive law relating to civil war with the changing position of the principle of nonintervention. More systematically, an article by William D. Coplin ranged over several critical areas of international law in describing the evolution of the traditional international system to its present form. Finally, in recent but cursory essays, Andrew M. Scott and Oran R. Young have broadened the context in which the principle of nonintervention is related to systemic trends.

When Africa emerged with unexpected haste as an independent political force in the world, the Commonwealth was still adjusting itself to revolutionary transformations in Asia. There was no doubt that it had entered on a new phase, but the phase was hard to define. Because the nature of the Commonwealth is implicit, there is always considerable diversity of view on its significance even among its own citizens. There is always a time lag as well. Many people, particularly in the “Old Commonwealth,” had just begun to grasp the significance of “The Commonwealth,” no longer “The British Commonwealth,” no longer a blood relationship; and now they had to cope with its rapid expansion and the imminent prospect that white members would be in a minority. Neither citizens nor foreigners had even made up their minds whether they were viewing the decline and fall of the British Empire or the finest hour of the Commonwealth. The doctrine that the new multiracial Commonwealth was the blessed culmination of the virtues of the Empire, the triumph of its good instincts over its errors, had certainly become the official view celebrated in speeches and communiqués, but public opinion lagged behind—not so much resistant to the new idea as captive of traditional attitudes. Not only the white people's view was anachronistic; Asians and Africans were themselves slow to recognize and accept their new position of equality and of responsibility.

Variations in domestic contention on foreign policy, particularly variations of a cyclical nature within the United States, have been often identified but not explained. Changes in international interactions on global issues affect domestic contention. Such external events as the rise of new global issues, the emergence of crises, moves toward accommodation and resolution, war, and foreign-policy failure are related to the diverse forms that domestic contention can take. U.S. domestic contention, both in the recent past and in the short-term future, illustrates particularly well how hard-liners and accommodationists battle over the lessons of history.

Venezuela's entry into the Andean Common Market (ACM) represents a case of systems transformation. Venezuelan membership has led both to major changes in economic provisions of the Common Market, and to significant alterations in political relations among members. Analysis of these changes depends on an understanding of the political debate in Venezuela, which was prolonged, and which led to membership under favorable terms earned through hard negotiations. Any assessment of the ultimate impact of Venezuelan participation in the ACM must remain guarded. As a wealthy and dynamic member, Venezuela could become an important catalyst for integration in the region. But with its superior economic capacity, Venezuela could also come to dominate the integrative effort, accruing most of the benefits to itself and in the process creating disruptions and dissatisfaction among the other members.

As part of the Marshall Plan, the United States Government developed a state-sponsored program of insurance against currency inconvertibility in Western Europe, which grew slowly into a worldwide program insuring US-based multinational corporations against expropriation, war and revolution as well as inconvertibility. Two hypotheses—one based on corporate preferences, the other on state initiatives—can be used to predict the program's development between 1948 and 1974. While there is some independent scope for state policy, corporate preferences appear to be crucial: state policy on this issue has served corporate interests, and state initiatives on expropriation insurance are constrained by private investment decisions. The basic harmony between private investors and the state on expropriation insurance issues is explained by their shared goal of private capital accumulation.

The tenth joint meeting of the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was held on September 17 and 18, 1963, under the joint presidency of Mr. Pierre Pflimin (French Popular Republican Movement [MRP]), President of the Consultative Assembly, and Mr. Gaetano Martino (Italian Liberal), President of the European Parliament. Mr. Hans Furler (German Christian Democrat) presented the report on the work of the European Parliament and Mr. E. Sassen, member of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Commission, reported on Euratom. Mr. Albert Coppé, Vice President of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority, reviewed ECSC's recent achievements, particularly in social affairs for coal and steel workers.

The nature of political relationships in the United Nations is of considerable interest to students of international organization and, to a lesser degree, to students of international politics. One important aspect of this question concerns the extent to which Western states as a group and the United States in particular dominate the organization. In their examination of this issue many authors contend that the United States prevailed over the United Nations General Assembly during the assembly's earliest years but progressively lost its control as the membership of the organization increased. Their findings, with some variations in detail, indicate that prior to the first significant membership increase in 1955 the United States, with an automatic two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, was dominant. In their view the United States position from 1955 through 1959 was considerably weakened but remained strong enough to ensure favorable decisions by the organization. With further increases in membership during and after 1960, however, they suggest that United States predominance came to an end. Now the newer, less developed, and nonaligned states determine the character and concerns of the UN.

One would not ordinarily think of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as of particular importance to the less developed countries. Nevertheless, in recent years the less developed coun-tries have come to have a very high regard for the IMF; and the IMF, in turn, has become the great defender of the interests of the less developed countries. This entente has evolved out of the course of events. In the current discussions on international monetary reform the IMF has be-come the spokesman for universal participation in reserve creation. This suits the institutional interests of the IMF. At the same time it makes the IMF the advocate of the interests of the less developed countries

The United Nations has patendy not fulfilled the high hopes which some of its sponsors had for it. A major share of responsibility for this failure has commonly been assigned to the Soviet Union, and not widiout reason. Yet the Soviet view and Soviet conduct have not been products of perversity or malice. They follow logically, first, from the world view held by the communist leadership, which sees the United Nations as another arena in the struggle between the two “world systems” of our age, and, second, from the Soviet experience as a minority power seeking to frustrate the efforts of the hostile majority “in control” of the UN.

In any discussion of transnational relations the nuclear energy field can best be studied within the framework of the statecentered model of international politics. Although in most fields private activities precede governmental regulation (which follows in response to social and other considerations), the opposite is true in the nuclear energy field. Because the first development of nuclear energy so intimately involved national security, government immediately assumed a preeminent role. This role is now being modified—but still only slightly—by nascent private undertakings of an occasionally transnational nature. Nevertheless, there is already sufficient evidence of growing transnational trends to make an exploration eminently worthwhile in the context of this volume.

The uninstructed expert has in recent years lost ground to the governmental representative in international organization. One of the most striking indications of this trend is to be found in the decision of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to establish the principle that its commissions should be composed of persons representing, and instructed by, their governments.

A new kind of “DP” plagued the conscience of the west after the Displaced Person of World War II had become an historical phenomenon. It was the “Disinherited Person”, the national of overcrowded western Europe who was surplus to the economy in which he lived but who, with international planning and assistance, might become a “plus” person in less densely settled areas overseas. In an effort to alleviate this problem of over-population in western Europe a new agency, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), was created and began operations on February I, 1952. Since that time, more than 570,000 Europeans who needed assistance in migrating have been moved to new homelands by the 27-nation ICEM, representing 36 percent of the total emigration from the main European emigration countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands). Apart from numbers moved directly, the Committee's efforts have stimulated spontaneous emigration by opening or widening new areas of resettlement.