¹ For example, see Yalem, Ronald, “The Study of International Organization,” Background, 05 1966Google Scholar; and Alger, Chadwick, “Research on Research: A Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organization,” International Organization, SUMMER 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 3).Google Scholar

² Keohane, Robert O., “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Organization, Spring 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 2).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Alger, Chadwick, “Non–Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 06 1961 (Vol. 57, No. 2).Google Scholar

⁴ Alger, Chadwick, “Comparison of Intranational and International Politics,” American Political Science Review, June, 1963.Google Scholar

⁵ Alger, Chadwick, “Interaction In a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 1966 (Vol. 10, No. 4).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ For instance, see Ripley, Randall, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives (Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1967).Google Scholar

⁷ Keohane, op. cit.; see also his “Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly,” International Organization, Autumn 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 4).Google Scholar

⁸ It seems to me that the purpose of a “note” on theory, and/or research is (contrary to more definitive articles) to raise questions concerning formerly accepted approaches or methods, or to suggest potentially fruitful avenues for further lines of inquiry. It is in this vein that the following notions are brought to the attention of the reader.

⁹ The difference between legislative and quasi–legislative systems may not be as severe as one would normally assume. See in Appendix two diagrams which attempt to sketch the nature of variables influencing an individual legislator (in the American experience) and a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Although the influence of these variables is different in the two settings, they do seem to contain similar properties. A good example of such similarities is shown in the analogy between caucusing groups and the “party policy variable” in the first diagram. Obviously, the relationship between caucusing group activity and delegate behavior is neither as structured nor as continuous as between party and legislator, but some writing on this subject (Vincent, Jack, “Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations: A Description and Some Hypotheses,” prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 04 30–05 2, 1970)Google Scholar has alerted us to the importance and value of caucusing group activity for a fairly large group of delegates in the General Assembly. One may argue that since most of the variables in the two systems are similar, it would be better for our understanding of quasi–legislative system if we were to concentrate on the differences in the manner in which such variables influence representatives.

¹⁰ For an introduction to role theory, see Sabin, Theodore and Allen, Vernon, “Role Theory,” in Gardner, Lindzay (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume 1 (Reading: Addison–Wesley, 1968).Google Scholar

¹¹ See “The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role,” in Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1969).Google Scholar An alternative effort to conceptualize quasi–legislative system behavior in terms of legislative models is suggested by Alker's, “Computer Simulations, Conceptual Frameworks, and Coalition Behavior,” in Groennings, Sven et al. (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).Google Scholar However, unlike this attempt, Alker's framework does not explicitly deal with strategies of actors who reject the legislative setting as a functional bargaining arena.

¹² Volgy, Thomas, “Multipurpose International Organizations and the Reduction of International Conflict: The Impact of Some Organizational Mechanisms,” PhD dissertation, Minneapolis, 1971.Google Scholar

¹³ ibid., pp. 153–161.

¹⁴ Since after 1961 Albania was no longer a member of the Warsaw Pact, it was excluded from the sample.

¹⁵ Huitt, p. 177.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 169. Huitt provides an extensive bibliography of works which have dealt with most Outsiders in the American Congress.

¹⁷ Note Inis Claude's conception of legitimization in “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization, Summer 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 3).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Maurice East suggests another relationship of national attributes to the choice of roles: the level and type of involvement that nations have with international organizations may be attributed to their “level of stratification” in the system. See his “Rank–Dependent Interaction and Mobility: Two Aspects of International Stratification,” Peace Research Society Papers, Volume XIV, 1970.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Data were available on three of these characteristics: the degree to which there is interest in specialization, the degree to which the institution is utilized as a forum rather than a legislative mechanism, and the relative interest in a flexible approach suggested by the degree to which one utilizes “principles” as the basis of interactions with other actors.

²⁰ For example, see Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).Google Scholar

²¹ At least through 1965, which marked the terminal point of the study.

²² If one moves away from the American experience, an alternative explanation would be suggested by the literature on European parliamentary systems. If one can argue the case that communist and extreme rightist parties constitute the equivalent of outsiders in those systems, the proposition may be forwarded that in part their behavior is conditioned by the negative attitudes their constituencies hold toward the legislative institution. This could be an alternative explanation for the relationship between Albanian behavior and its Chinese constituency. Although this point is somewhat inconsistent with the model utilized here, it further underscores the explanatory payoffs of looking at alternative models of legislative systems.

²³ Hughes, Barry and Volgy, Thomas, “Distance in Foreign Policy Behavior: A Comparative Study of Eastern Europe,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 08 1970 (Vol. 14, No. 3).CrossRefGoogle Scholar