Transnational business collaboration is a phenomenon that can be observed in many parts of the world. It may assume special significance when it is carried out on an extensive scale within an international region where an economic integration scheme is being implemented, as is die case in the European Economic Community (EEC). And indeed, a rising trend of transnational business collaboration within the EEC has become manifest during the last decade. Focusing on certain political aspects of this collaboration, this article will I) examine the principal objectives pursued by collaborating enterprises 'that require for their attainment action by the national authorities of the EEC member countries or by the community institutions and 2) make a preliminary assessment of the effect that trans-national business collaboration within the Common Market might have on political integration.

To the contemporary liberal humanitarian the acceptance of the League Mandate System by the world's chief colonial powers signified the advent of a New Deal for dependent areas in which the older and baser motives of empire were defeated even if not completely eliminated. To the con-temporary mind impressed with the prevalence of power politics, how-ever, the acceptance of the Mandate System signified nothing of the kind. It merely represented a new form of compromise between clashing imperial powers who sought to remove one source of friction by recourse to “internationalization”

In the literature which focuses on the participation of individuals in an international organization, two hypotheses are stated. The first rs that the longer a person serves an organization, the more favorable his attitude toward the organization becomes. It is hypothesized that the duration of the diplomatic assignment constitutes a factor influencing the evaluation of the organization.

On October 4, 1957, when Sputnik I was successfully orbited, it was popular to say that mankind had entered a new age—the Age of Space. If this was not just hyperbole, perhaps we are entitled to make a few judgments about the Space Age as it moves toward the end of its first decade. For, even from this short a perspective, the Space Age sharply illustrates the portentous conflict in our time between the forces of neonationalism and, for want of a better word, internationalism.

Several generations of scholarship have identified the medieval development of urban self-government as crucial for European patterns of state formation. However, extant theories, emphasizing structural factors such as initial endowments and warfare, do little to explain the initial emergence of institutions of urban self-government before CE 1200 or why similar institutions did not emerge outside of Europe. We argue that a large-scale collapse of public authority in the ninth and tenth centuries allowed a bottom-up reform movement in West Francia (the Cluniac movement), directed by clergy but with popular backing, to push for ecclesiastical autonomy and asceticism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These social realignments, facilitated by new norms about ecclesiastical office holding, stimulated the urban associationalism that led to the initial emergence of autonomous town councils. Using a panel data set of 643 towns in the period between 800 and 1800, we show that medieval towns were substantially more likely to establish autonomous town councils in the period between 1000 and 1200 if they were situated in the vicinity of Cluniac monasteries. These findings are corroborated by regressions that use distance from Cluny—the movement's place of origin—to instrument for proximity to Cluniac monasteries.

The Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States was held on May 22–25, 1963, and was attended by the heads of state of 30 African countries. The Conference adopted six resolutions and a Charter to establish an organization to be known as the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The International Health Conference, convened by the United Nations in New York in the summer of 1946, adopted a Constitution for a World Health Organization. It set up an Interim Commission of persons designated by eighteen named states to prepare for the First World Health Assembly and to carry on tasks inherited from previous international organizations. Unexpected delays in ratifications of the Constitution obliged the Interim Commission to operate for two years. WHO has thus been free to shape its destiny only from the time of the First World Health Assembly in the summer of 1948; it began its work formally as of September 1, 1948. The activities from 1946 to 1948 were largely determined by heritages from earner organizations; these, indeed, dominated the first program of WHO. The intervening three years have witnessed new trends, which some observers applaud and others view with doubt, if not alarm. It may be fruitful at this time to record some of these trends, to note the pressures which caused them and their implications for WHO's program and work-plan.

The United Nations Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources was held in August and September 1949. More than seven hundred scientists, technicians and administrators from fifty countries came together at Lake Success. They had before them for discussion some five hundred and fifty papers applying science and technology to the problem of resource use. How–they asked–could waste of vital resources be prevented? Would critical shortages of essential materials lead inevitably to a lowering of the standard of life? By what methods could a wise use of natural resources make possible the support of the world's increasing population on a higher standard of living?

This article examines the emergence of early international organizations and efforts to export European institutional models to the periphery as part of the global expansion of a European international order. In particular, it focuses on the 1884–85 Berlin Conference as a pivotal moment in that expansion and the failed attempt to transplant the Treaty of Vienna model for transboundary river governance to the Congo River. Scholarship on the spread of institutions has highlighted the dangers of applying institutional models from one context to another, but there has been limited attention on why European institutional models are so compelling in the first place. Based on primary historical material, I show that despite some awareness among the diplomats at Berlin that the African context differed from the European one, this knowledge did not disrupt their underlying confidence in the Vienna model. I contend that the reason this model was so compelling was that it was built on two interrelated geographical imaginaries that constituted the diplomats’ understanding of the global and the political possibilities available to them. The first imaginary constituted the periphery as conceptually empty and ready to be remade by European models; the second constituted Europe as the generative site of universal models. Together, these taken-for-granted imaginaries made the diplomats’ practices of adopting the Vienna model seem natural and self-evident. These imaginaries continue to have implications for international politics today as we consider one-size-fits-all technocratic solutions and benchmarks for global progress.

The existence of an Atlantic Community with important economic aspects is revealed in the past and present relations among the countries of western Europe and North America. This Community is something less than the fusion of the nations of the Atlantic area advocated by some; it is something more comprehensive and more pervasive than the organizational alternative to “partnership” that others mean by the word. The Atlantic Community dealt with in this article is a state of affairs more than a concept; it does not have to be precisely delineated so long as we can discern its solid central mass. This Atlantic Community—such as it is, and whatever exactly it is—is the child of history and policy. Both genealogies are clearly established and well-known; to recall them helps pose the major questions of the present and future

Analysis of the United States’ shift to support of trade preferences for developing countries in 1967 provides evidence for the value of a “bureaucratic politics” model that pays attention to the importance of transgovernmental relations in influencing national policy making. Between 1964 and 1967, international organizations affected, United States policy making on trade preferences, and officials within the US government who favored preferences used such organizations-particularly the OECD-to help change American policy. Intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and national levels of policy making were closely linked to one another. This case study suggests the need for a broadened conception of “bureaucratic politics”; but it also supports the view that the “bureaucratic politics” and “rational actor” approaches are fundamentally complementary rather than antithetical.

The construction of explanatory theory about the determinants of regional integration is contingent upon our prior ability to measure integration in a typology or set of dimensions as a description and classification of that dependent variable. Previous attempts to conceptually differentiate the types of regional integration are reviewed and found to be contradictory. In order to generate empirically informed estimates about which typifications of integrative behavior are the most powerful and reasonable for theory construction, Joseph Nye's framework was selected for analysis. Construct validation was performed by operationalizing Nye's variables and confronting his scheme with data drawn from the Southeast Asian regional subsystem in order to ascertain the scheme's region-specific applicability. Factor analysis provided partial support for Nye's construct. The evidence derived here suggests that regional integration is a multidimensional phenomenon and that efforts to construct a single, multipurpose index of integration are not warranted. The major dimensions of regional integration emergent were (a) societal interdependence, (b) attitudinal integration, and (c) intergovernmental cooperation. The findings suggest that it is most meaningful to formulate theories in terms of the sources of each distinct type of integration; moreover, it appears that the dimensionality of integration may vary across regions and/or types of national actors.

The 1970s were a period of turmoil as governments in both developed and less developed countries tried to take the lead in national oil development. While governments shifted from the role of landlord to that of entrepreneur, forming state oil companies, multinational corporate and private domestic industry groups blocked the way by switching from renters to political opponents. By the close of the decade, state oil companies had carved themselves a niche in multinational oil company operations but had been forced to make room there for other national industry groups as well. This article compares the process in Norway, Britain, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and tries to explain evidence that states in less developed countries (LDCs) gained more from multinational oil companies than did those in developed countries. Contrasting hypotheses concerning the ability of LDCs to harness multinational companies are explored. An alternative hypothesis is generated that relies on domestic rather than just international factors to explain the relatively greater gains of LDCs; it holds implications for the state's roles as landlord or entrepreneur. This explanation is contrasted with arguments that the coherence or strength of domestic structures explains relative state gains in the international economy.

This study deals with the opening phase of the UN negotiations concerning the future international regime for ocean space. It seeks to establish how the technological and economic capabilities of member nations condition the manner and style of negotiation, the definition of national objectives, and the growth of attitudes and expectations with regard to such a regime. By the end of the 1968–70 period expectations about the future international regime had narrowed noticeably. Yet, for long-range tactical reasons many delegations were still holding out in anticipation of a new Law of the Sea Conference. The original Maltese seabed proposal envisaged a comprehensive international regime. In general, developing countries favored such a solution in the beginning, while industrialized countries preferred an intermediate solution. Eventually the Maltese proposal and the negotiating situation inadvertently set off a wave of claims for various forms of national jurisdiction. This meant that the emphasis at the end was more on the rights of the coastal states and less on the capacity of the world community to deal collectively with the future of ocean space.

Students of international organization have been increasingly concerned with analyzing and measuring international integration and disintegration. In fact, the emphasis on international integration is the major focus of the contemporary study of international organization. One area of inquiry which has been overlooked until recently, however, is the role of multinational corporations in undermining and/or maintaining the functions of nation-states. The paucity of studies in this area by students of international organization can be explained by I) a preference for analyzing intergovernmental rather than nongovernmental entities and 2) the difficulty of acquiring data concerning worldwide firms.

Regional development banks can serve as focal points for regional and subregional cooperation, thus promoting economic integration. They are institutions whose objectives are neither national nor global and whose leadership and staffs have a regional outlook.

The first and immediate challenge confronting these regional development banks is the financing of regional projects which are beyond the reach of national development banks. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has devoted only limited resources to such project, with a few spectacular exceptions, especially the Indus River project. A purely national approach to planning and financing development does not make sense in most of Latin America and Africa because many nations on these continents are “minicountries,” too small to form economic units of development. Many national borders have been determined by political and diplomatic history rather than by economic factors; frequently, they cut across natural development units such as river basins or mineral deposits. Moreover, except in Europe, the very dearth of strong national institutions makes regional development banks important; they provide additional financial intermediaries to be interposed between the developing regions and the world financial centers, as well as between various national financial institutions of the member countries of the regions concerned.

In early 1972 Canada participated in an international uranium cartel designed to control the world price and supply of uranium through a complex scheme of pricefixing and bid-rigging. This study focuses on Canada's role in the formation and operation of that cartel, the domestic political reaction when its existence was discovered, and the implications of this for Canadian-American relations. Domestic economic considerations were a major factor that led to a break with traditional Canadian foreign policy. Related to this are the close corporate connections between the Canadian and American uranium industry and the enormous impact of American domestic policies on Canada. The uranium case also offers support to the theory that transnational relations and other multinational processes threaten democratic control of foreign policy.