The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will probably be remembered in history as an outstanding example of relatively successful intergovernmental cooperation among developing countries. OPEC's achievements in raising the oil export income of members appear remarkable in view of the deep sociopolitical divisions among them—occasionally verging on armed conflicts. Nevertheless, OPEC countries have managed not to let these conflicts wreck their common interest in obtaining substantially better terms from the international companies and from consumer countries. That OPEC countries could obtain better terms is not only the result of member solidarity but also of the relatively inelastic demand for petroleum. Another crucial factor favoring OPEC is that major consumer countries have been moderate in their drive to collectively countervail OPEC, except indirectly by allowing their international oil companies to join forces ostensibly in defense of consumers' interests. Major consumer countries have also declined so far to split forcefully the OPEC coalition. The continued existence of OPEC largely depends on (1) members' perception of gain outweighing sacrifices or frustrations of working together, and (2) the tolerance of major industrial importing countries.

The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Irish Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have put forward a Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those five nations which currently possess them: France, the People's Republic of China (Communist China), the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty requires that signatories already possessing such weapons not give them to other countries and that signatories not yet posses-sing nuclear weapons forego accepting them or manufacturing them indigenously. To reinforce the latter restraint the treaty obligates states renouncing weapons to accept inspection safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities, inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

US food policy is a product of four legitimate but competing concerns: (1)farm policy; (2) domestic economic policy; (3) foreign policy; and (4) global welfare and development policy. Five major policy episodes in 1972–76 illustrate their interplay: the Soviet grain sales of 1972; the soybean embargo of 1973; the food aid debate of 1974; the food reserves proposal of 1975; and the Soviet grain sales of 1974 and 1975. Competing policy concerns were more explicitly and effectively balanced in 1974 and 1975 than in 1972 and 1973, and policy tended to shift toward protecting domestic food prices in 1973, and meeting world food needs in 1974. But it shifted too late to salvage important policy concerns. The 1972–75 experience suggests that the State Department cannot be the lead international food policy agency because domestic farm and economic concerns are too deeply engaged. But interagency committees based in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) lost their effectiveness as crises waned and their members' attention turned to other things. The best organizational strategy for food would therefore be to accept the day-to-day predominance of the Department of Agriculture and seek to broaden the orientation of the secretary and his staff. Reciprocal State sensitivity to non-foreign policy concerns can help protect international economic and political interests; so can monitoring and intermittent intervention by EOP staffs.

The experience of participating in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in several different capacities, has acquainted me with the many management problems that faced the Organization in its first dozen years. The present article deals with some of these problems under four headings of unequal importance: UNESCO's functions, 2) the organization of its secretariat, 3) the relations of the Director-General with the legislative organs, and 4) personnel administration.

The development of parliamentary constraints on the executive was critical in Western European political history. Previous scholarship identifies external wars as a key factor, but with varying effects. Sometimes, willing monarchs granted parliamentary rights in return for revenues to fight wars. Yet at other times, war threats empowered rulers over other elites or caused states to fragment. We analyze a formal model to understand how external wars can either stimulate or undermine prospects for a contractual relationship between a ruler and elite actors. We recover the standard intuition that war threats make the ruler more willing to grant parliamentary rights in return for revenue. Our key insight is that war threats also affect the bargaining position of elites. A previously unrecognized tension yields our new findings: stronger outsider threats increase pressure either on elites to fund the ruler or on the ruler to accept constraints—but not both simultaneously. Elites with immobile wealth depend on the ruler for security. War threats undercut their credibility to refuse funding for an unconstrained ruler. By contrast, war threats make elites with mobile wealth and a viable exit option unwilling to fund a hopeless war effort. Only under circumscribed conditions do war threats align three conditions needed for parliament to arise in equilibrium: ruler willingness, elite credibility, and elite willingness. We apply our theory to posit strategic foundations for waves and reversals of historical European parliaments.

Despite the widespread assumption that tariffs reduce trade volume in the short term, it is conceivable that long-term expansion and contractions in trade actually drive tariff levels. A Granger causality analysis performed on British, U.S., French, German, Japanese, and a systematic aggregate data on GDP-tariff levels encompassing the 1854–1990 period finds mixed support for both the short- and long-term interpretations. In general, the antecedence of trade on protectionism predominates over the antecedence of protectionism on trade. One implication is that the long-term context should not be ignored in analyzing short-term dynamics.

The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were established and have passed their infancy under a barrage of criticism. There were originally grave doubts as to the wisdom of creating the institutions at all. Four years of operations have been attended by a wide range of adverse comment, varying from attacks on the salary and allowance scale on the one hand, to accusations of perversion and misuse by the United States on the other. The main criticism has been, however, that the institutions were inadequate to meet the economic problems of the postwar world. Evidence for this may be found positively in the proposals for drastic revision of the articles and practice of both institutions put forward by an international group of experts in a United Nations report, and negatively by the recommendations of the Gray report, which calls for stabilization-fund loans to European countries to meet the problem once solved by the establishment of the Fund, and an expanded Point IV program, with additional funds for the Export-Import Bank, to assist the Bank in the discharge of its long-run task.

The new politics of modernization in post-Mao China raises a variety of intriguing questions to ask and hypotheses to test in international relations research. This paper examines the normative and policy changes brought about by the impetus of the modernization drive at home and how these changes have affected Chinese foreign policy in general and Chinese global policy in particular. In pursuit of this line of inquiry, the institutional setting of international organizations, especially those concerned with global political, military, developmental, and functional issues, is chosen as a testing ground of Chinese global policy. The scope of the paper is largely limited to the Chinese global policy of the post-Mao period of 1977 - 1980. The paper attempts a normative-behavioral analysis concentrating on global geopolitical, developmental, and functional domains. By way of conclusion, the paper broadly assesses the implications of post-Mao Chinese global policy for the Third World's elusive pursuit of a new world order.

Among the features that distinguish the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) from other international organizations concerned with the trade of less developed countries are two that are especially significant. GATT is the only interregional organization in which the undertakings by members take the form of contractual commitments. It is also an organization that is concerned with trade not only between developed and less developed countries but within these two groups as well. The question can be raised, however, as to whether an organization so constituted and oriented is suited to the task of facilitating the export earnings of the less developed countries or whether, on the contrary, a more specialized body, devoted exclusively to that task, is likely to achieve better results.

For the purposes of this discussion, the political role of the Secretary General is defined in somewhat narrow terms. It is not intended to discuss his role in the development of policy generally, which would be a possible way of viewing the subject. Rather, attention will be given to the role of the Secretary-General in the discharge of one of the major responsibilities of the United Nations—the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, the role of the Secretary-General in developing and executing policies and programs of economic and social development, which has come to be one of the major fields of activity of the Organization, will not be touched upon, except incidentally.

The purpose of this article is to examine some aspects of the institutional structure which has been or is being developed within the United Nations to achieve, through international agreement and action and for the benefit of mankind as a whole, the most effective utilization of the earth's resources consistent with the minimum of disturbance of the environment in directions harmful to man and other living organisms.

Unctad I, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva in the spring of 1964, marked a major milestone in international concern with and approaches to the problems of less developed countries. The principal achievements of this mammoth, contentious, allegedly economic gathering, however, were in the political realm. Economic issues of great importance were raised but not resolved. Instead they were consigned for study and consideration to the elaborate continuing machinery born at Geneva, as well as to various previously established agencies, and eventually to the agenda for UNCTAD II, convened in New Delhi in early 1968.

The Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee of the General Assembly has always devoted a considerable amount of time and attention to the problem of the tenure of appointment in the Secretariat of the United Nations. At the 21st (1966) session, however, it went deeper than usual into the question whether and to what extent the international civil service should continue to be organized on a career basis. More specifically, it discussed the ratio of career as compared with noncareer appointments. In the debate the Western countries followed their habitual course: They upheld the career principle and opposed any extension of the practice of using permanent positions for temporary appointments. The Eastern European group similarly took its traditional line against the career system. The Afro-Asian delegates for their part were as usual mainly concerned with pushing their claims for a greater share of posts in the Secretariat; to that end they pressed for an increasing number of fixed-term appointments.

When the 47th session of the International Labor Conference was held in Geneva from June 5 to June 26, 1963, the membership had risen to 108 countries as a result of the recent entry of Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. Mr. Joseph Modupe Johnson (Federal Minister of Labor, Nigeria) was unanimously elected President, but, following his resignation on June 18, the Conference elected Mr. Erik Dreyer (government delegate, Denmark) to the Presidency for the remainder of the session.

One of the significant structural differences between the organization of economic and social work under the League and under the United Nations is the extent to which non-governmental organizations (NGO's) have been allowed to participate. NGO's have been granted far greater privileges in the UN than they enjoyed in the League. Initially, they were formally recognized in Article 71 of the Charter, which gives the Economic and Social Council the right to make “suitable arrangements” for consultation with them. While defined in differing ways during different periods, consultative status under this article has, subject to various conditions, always included the right to participate in the debates of ECOSOC, its commissions and committees, and to propose items for inclusion in their provisional agenda. NGO's have made extensive use of these privileges. Their use, however, as well as the entire record of NGO action in the UN, has been inseparably linked with the cold war. Russian demands at San Francisco for privileges for the newly created, communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) were a contributing factor in the decision to include Article 71 in the Charter. The initial definition of this article resulted primarily from the interaction of pressures by the Soviet Union and the WFTU and the western response.

‘Multilateral diplomacy’, like many other terms current in the literature of international relations, tends to serve less as a topic for careful study than as a symbol, evoking generalized reactions of approval or disapproval, confidence or anxiety. In the mind of the public, the mention of those two words today calls up a picture of a big, noisy international conference, complete with committees and chairmen, agenda and rules of procedure, debates and votes, rostrum and gallery, earphones for simultaneous translation and microphones and cameras for world-wide transmission of the proceedings.

The second meeting of the Caribbean Council was held in March 1962 in British Guiana. The Coulcil approved the immediate establishment within the secretariat of a clearinghouse for the exchange of information on trade and tourism between member countries.

What determines public support for trade liberalization? Scholars of international political economy have generally focused on the effects of openness on employment via individuals’ skill level, sector, or occupation. Recent developments in trade economics suggest that the characteristics of individual citizens’ employing firms may also shape their attitudes on trade policy. In this paper, using under-explored survey data combining trade opinion with measures of employer productivity (from the 2008 Japanese General Social Survey), we present evidence that employees of more productive, more globalized firms are much more supportive of trade openness than employees of less productive, domestically oriented firms, even when accounting for skill level and sectoral and occupational characteristics. Moreover, we find evidence that the effects of these characteristics described in the literature are conditioned by globalized firm employment. Last, we find that the effect of globalized firm employment is conditioned by employees’ relative position within their firms. Those who are more likely to benefit directly from firm success—such as permanent employees and managers—hold the most pro-trade preferences. These findings suggest that economic interests affect individual policy preferences in more nuanced ways than previously recognized.