A central theme in the study of international relations is that anarchy requires states to set aside moral concerns to attain security, rendering IR an autonomous sphere devoid of ethical considerations. Evolutionary and moral psychology, however, suggest that morality emerged to promote human success under such conditions. It is not despite anarchy but because of anarchy that humans have an ethical sense. Our argument has three empirical implications. First, it is almost impossible to talk about threat and harm without invoking morality. Second, state leaders and the public will use moral judgments as a basis, indeed the most important factor, for assessing international threat, just as research shows they do at the interpersonal level. Third, foreign policy driven by a conception of international relations as an amoral sphere will be quite rare. Word embeddings applied to large political and nonpolitical corpora, a survey experiment in Russia, and an in-depth analysis of Hitler's foreign policy thought suggest that individuals both condemn aggressive behavior by others and screen for threats on the basis of morality. The findings erode notions of IR as an autonomous sphere and upset traditional materialist–ideational dichotomies.

A common “interdependence problematique” can be found in recent literature on security interdependence, regional integration processes, ecological limits to growth, and global political economy. Six problematical aspects of interdependence relationships should therefore be given definitional significance: existing or proposed transnational or intergovernmental relationships in the post-Cold War era typically raise issues concerning the degree of public consumption interdependence, the extent to which situational interests are non-zero sum, the need for coordinated production relationships, the extent of cross-sector or inter-functional interdependence and the vulnerabilities involved in breaking with or doing without any such institutionalized relationships. Twenty methodological maxims are useful for appraising the design relevance of empirical research on partial, regime-like world order alternatives. Much but not all previous research has been severely deficient in addressing the efficiency, equity, conservation, and feasibility implications of contending interdependence alternatives.

Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary: The Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, at its last meeting, June 7, 1957, adopted its report to the General Assembly. The committee, composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, had been appointed by the General Assembly at its second emergency special session to provide information regarding the situation created by Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary as well as the developments relating to the Assembly's recommendations on this subject. The report, based on available documentation and the testimony of in witnesses, dealt with a brief history of the Hungarian uprising, the movement as seen by the Soviet Union and by the government of Janos Kadar, the Soviet military intervention and its political background, the effects of the use or threat of use of force on the political independence of Hungary, and specific acts violating other rights of the Hungarian people. The committee believed that the uprising in October and November 1956 had been a spontaneous, improvised national movement, stemming from resentments caused by longstanding grievances, particularly against the inferior status of Hungary in relation to the Soviet Union. The thesis put forth by the Soviet Union and the Kadar government that the uprising had been fomented by Hungarian reactionary circles and strengthened by western “imperialists” was unacceptable to the committee, which felt that the movement had been led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, who had demanded, inter alia, that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as land reform should be safeguarded. Reporting that Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as October 20 to make armed intervention possible, the committee felt that it could not say whether the Soviets had anticipated the occurrence. It stressed, however, that the Warsaw Treaty did not provide for Soviet armed intervention to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers.

The governments of Canada and the United States are playing very active roles in negotiations to define the law of the sea, which has been the subject of international conferences in 1958, 1960, and that beginning in December 1973. These provide the framework for a study of US-Canadian relations in the uses of the sea. Three perspectives may be adopted to understand the political processes involved in law of the sea relations: (1) the state-to-state model, (2) the bureaucratic politics approach, and (3) the transnational systems perspective.

At the beginning of its nineteenth session the General Assembly of the United Nations decided by acclamation that Alex Quaison-Sackey, the permanent representative of Ghana, should preside over the session. This was only the second time in eighteen years that this, the highest honor in the Organization, was accorded to a representative of an African state, and the first time that a Negro African was thus chosen.

The bare facts about the history and organization of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) are not difficult to relate. The commission was established in 1947 by the Economic and Social Council, along with two other regional economic commissions for Europe and Latin America, as a five-year experiment. Its terms of reference authorized it “acting within the framework of the policies of the United Nations and subject to the general supervision of the Council” and provided that it take “no action in respect to any country without the agreement of the Government of that country” to:

(a) initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East, for raising the level of economic activity … and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of these areas both among themselves and with other countries of the world;

Despite the efforts of the editor to cast the theoretical net as widely as possible—to include an eclectic mix of structural and behavioral dimensions of the concept of dependence—the bulk of the writings in this volume respond in some fashion to what I have elsewhere called “the dependency way of framing the question of development and underdevelopment.” It could hardly be otherwise, for the majority of authors represented here have had their primary research experience in or on Latin America. And it is out of the Latin American developmental experience—and its multiple failures and frustrations—that the main body of dependency ideas has grown.

The traditional concept of embassies and missions abroad as custodians of the national interest is a familiar one which applies also in the context of United Nations diplomacy. The responsibility for advancing national policy through the United Nations is borne by permanent missions and special delegations–representatives who, like their counterparts in bilateral diplomacy, act in close coordination with a state department or foreign office and under the instructions of their home governments. Because of the multilateral and “parliamentary” nature of United Nations diplomacy, however, the task of UN missions and delegations is in many ways more exacting than that of their traditional counterparts.

In the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the steadily growing feeling generated by the frustrating confusion of the interwar period that the world needed some kind of orderly institutionalization of international payments relations at last found a formal expression. As early as 1930 John Maynard Keynes suggested “the management of the value of gold by a Supernational Authority, with a number of national monetary systems clustering round it.…” Keynes was fully aware of the political implications of this suggestion. He realized the significance for international cooperation of “a cabinet of Central Banks who would hold the sovereign power.” The timid attempts toward establishing in the monetary sphere effective international collaboration in the interwar period were frustrated by political considerations.

This essay draws from the experience of Kenya and the East African Community to ascertain the impact of single–country or regional ownership on the commercial performance of public enterprises. The advantages of the larger resource base of a regional community are mooted by the problems of mobilizing those resources. A fledgling public corporation can secure assistance most readily when owned by one state. It is also clear that traits of a corporation independent of its regional or single–country status affect commercial success. The essay concludes with a discussion of the limited contribution public corporations make to further levels of regional integration.

The dispute between Britain and Iran relating to the nationalization and seizure of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concessions and refinery plants by the government of Premier Mossadegh aroused unusual interest when brought before the International Court of Justice by Britain in 1951. The Iranian Oil Nationalization Act, coming after long and bitter negotiations between the oil company and the Iranian Government over oil royalties and operational arrangements, carried with it important political and strategic considerations.

International Organization, no longer the exclusive preserve of dreamers and idealists, is now, for better or for worse, one of the palpable realities of world politics. Whether we choose to consider it our best hope or a snare and a delusion or something in between, we are compelled to reckon with its effects, one of which is the foreseeable cost of non-participation in it. Its characteristic features – public debate, parliamentary procedures and resolution, majorities and voting blocs – all have become instruments of undeniable and indeed often painful efficacy in international relations. A review conference for the purpose of evaluating the experience of the first ten years of Charter operations is scheduled for 1955. Meanwhile, institutional developments within the framework of the Charter occur constantly, and call for policy decisions based on a profound understanding of how this or that change is likely to affect the international scene. In this situation, the publication of the first comprehensive history of the League of Nations must be considered a significant event.

When do people care about relative gains in trade? Much of the international relations scholarship—and much of the political rhetoric on trade—would lead us to expect support for a trade policy that benefits ourselves more than it benefits others. Yet, a large interdisciplinary literature also points to the prevalence and importance of other-regarding preferences, rendering the conventional wisdom contestable. We investigate whether and how relative gains influence trade preferences through an original survey experiment in the midst of the China–US trade war. We find that in a win-win scenario, relative gains shape trade opinion: if both sides are gaining, people want to gain more than their foreign trade partner. However, these considerations are offset in a win-lose scenario where the other side is losing out. Relative-gains considerations causally affect opinion on trade, but not in a “beggar-thy-neighbor” or even a “beggar-thy-rival” situation. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of relative gains in international relations and provide the first experimental evidence that relative-gains considerations can be offset by other-regarding preferences in international trade.

Do normative arguments change what political actors do and if so, how? Rather than using the pure force of abstract moral reasoning, states often try to move the locus of contestation to an arena where they can make practical progress—the evidence or the empirical facts in support of their argument. This paper analyzes how states try to bolster their position first by constructing an argument in which an action represents part of their argument and then by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing. I call this mechanism rhetorical adduction. The paper challenges theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content of normative arguments and diverges from a leading view on argumentation that arguments have their effects through persuasion. Integrating strategic argumentation theory with theory from psychology about how people make choices based on compelling reasons rather than cost-benefit analysis, I also use theory from sociology on how people resolve morally complex situations through the performance of “reality tests.” I illustrate the mechanism using a case from the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when initial resistance to recognizing the putative state of Bangladesh after India's invasion of East Pakistan was reversed as a result of an argument that Indian troop withdrawal meant that international norms were not violated.

On October 4, 1957, when Sputnik I was successfully orbited, it was popular to say that mankind had entered a new age—the Age of Space. If this was not just hyperbole, perhaps we are entitled to make a few judgments about the Space Age as it moves toward the end of its first decade. For, even from this short a perspective, the Space Age sharply illustrates the portentous conflict in our time between the forces of neonationalism and, for want of a better word, internationalism.

To the contemporary liberal humanitarian the acceptance of the League Mandate System by the world's chief colonial powers signified the advent of a New Deal for dependent areas in which the older and baser motives of empire were defeated even if not completely eliminated. To the con-temporary mind impressed with the prevalence of power politics, how-ever, the acceptance of the Mandate System signified nothing of the kind. It merely represented a new form of compromise between clashing imperial powers who sought to remove one source of friction by recourse to “internationalization”

It is argued that the study of regional international politics is important (1) for empirical reasons having to do with the real world saliency of the region as a factor in international politics; (2) for theoretical reasons having to do with the subordinate system as being relatively neglected in scholarship with the exception of the integrationist approach; and (3) for policy reasons having to do with the importance of accurately understanding the dynamics of the region as part of the objective of stabilizing the international system. The dominant approach to regional international politics of the integrationists (neo–functionalists and transactionalists) is then discussed and criticized in terms of the two approaches' normative concerns, the nature of the model utilized, and the theoretical issues that are raised. A major conclusion is that the integrative model used is inappropriate as a vestige of the level of analysis problem, and such theoretical issues as the nature of the dependent variable remain unspecified. It is then argued that the authors' formulation of an empirical systems approach begins to meet these criticisms.

UNTEA served the important function of buffer between contending forces and in general accomplished a remarkably smooth transfer. In this regard the United Nations operation was a major success. The smooth transfer was achieved, however, at the cost of rights specifically guaranteed in the agreement—the rights of free speech and assembly. Furthermore, the United Nations preparatory task and responsibility in the future “act of self-determination” was minimized.

It may be argued that UNTEA policy in West Irian merely reflects the weakness of the United Nations in a nation-state world. Lack of UNTEA power certainly was an important aspect. The explanation, however, is more complex. It is significant to recall that the United Nations assumed its task under severe handicaps: It was given no time for adequate recruitment and preparation; from the start it was confronted with the legitimized presence of Indonesian troops; the status of the “Papuan flag” was never mentioned in the agreement; and general Papuan primitivity along with political naïveté and schisms among the small and newly created Papuan élite influenced UNTEA's approach.

UNTEA also met continuous Indonesian pressure aimed at shortening the period of its administration and weakening its authority in general. Statements by Indonesian officials cast doubt on Indonesia's willingness to adhere to the wording of the agreement. In trying to interpret Indonesian feelings it might be conceded that most Dutch-Indonesian agreements have imposed conditions which could be considered obnoxious to Indonesia. The rights of self-determination for the Papuan inhabitants—stipulated in the August 15 agreement—fall into this category.