¹ For a general review of AEC regulatory activity see Berman, William H. and Hydeman, Lee M., The Atomic Energy Commission and Regulating Nuclear Facilities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1961)Google Scholar.

² United States Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Industrial Participation, Report on the Nuclear Industry, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 59Google Scholar.

³ Although regulatory responsibility is lodged in the AEC, agreements have been reached with a number of states in the Union regarding assumption by the states of regulatory authority over certain materials; see Report on the Nuclear Industry, 1970, pp. 347–348.

⁴ See Hodgetts, J. E., Administering the Atom for Peace (International Political Science Association Series) (New York: Atherton Press, 1964)Google Scholar. This book contains excellent reviews of the structure of nuclear programs in Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁵ India News, March 8, 1968, p. 5, quoted in Williams, Shelton L., The U.S., India, and the Bomb (Studies in International Affairs, No. 12) (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press [for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University], 1969), p. 59Google Scholar.

⁶ Quoted in Barnaby, C. F., ed., Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Pugwash Monograph I) (London: Souvenir Press, 1969), p. 58Google Scholar.

⁷ Layton, Christopher, European Advanced Technology; A Programme for Integration (London: George Allen & Unvvin [for Political and Economic Planning], 1969), p. 28Google Scholar.

⁸ See Report on the Nuclear Industry, 1970, pp. 182–188.

⁹ The AEC, however, through a variety of direct and indirect actions including subsidies, material procurement policies, fuel pricing arrangements, etc., can markedly influence the direction that power production takes. For an excellent review of the problems and the instruments available to the AEC see Hilberry, Norman, “Nuclear Power in the U.S.,” Nuclear Industry, 08 1964 (Vol. 11, No. 8), pp. 5–12Google Scholar.

¹⁰ “Westinghouse: Moving in,” Agenor, 01–12 1970 (No. 15), pp. 55–57Google Scholar.

¹¹ United States, Congress, An Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 85–256Google Scholar, 85th Cong., 1st sess., United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 81, pp. 576–579.

¹² A general review of the developments associated with nuclear insurance and nuclear power may be found in Novick, Sheldon, The Careless Atom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969)Google Scholar.

¹³ The term “American-type reactor” refers to the enriched uranium reactors typical of the American nuclear industry.

¹⁴ Quester, George H., “Sweden and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Cooperation and Conflict, 1970 (Vol. 5, No. 1), pp. 52–64, quotation on p. 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ It is important to emphasize that the symbiosis relates principally to international transactions and in that context is weighted heavily toward the conditions of those transactions. In the domestic arena government and private enterprise sometimes entertain significantly different goals. This is especially true for the utilities which are mosdy private and whose objective is the profitable production of elecric power, not the promotion of atomic energy for its own sake. It is also true of reactor and component manufacturers whose commercial interests do not always coincide with governmental classification and dissemination policies.

¹⁶ The IAEA annually sponsors a number of conferences, symposia, and seminars. In fiscal year 1968–1969, for example, fourteen such meetings were held with over 2,800 participants and approximately 1,000 papers were presented. See IAEA Document GC(XHI)/404 (Annual Report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference, July 1, 1968– June 30, 1969), Annex D, pp. 54–55. Whatever else these meetings may accomplish, they have served to help better coordinate ongoing international research and to avoid duplication by virtue of the information transmitted and exchanged at the sessions. In the field of thermodynamics, for example, IAEA meetings revealed duplicative work in the Soviet Union and the United States and facilitated the exchange of information and the development of scientific contacts as well as the elimination of duplication and the pursuit of false paths of research. I am indebted to Edgar Westrum of the Department of Chemistry of the University of Michigan for bringing this sequence of events to my attention.

¹⁷ Kramish, Arnold, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1963), p. 7Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Goldschmidt, Bertrand, Les Rivalités atomiques, 1939–1966 (Les Grandes Etudes contemporaines) (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1967), pp. 139–140Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Goldschmidt, Bertrand, “Le Probléme du contrôle international de l'utilisation de l'énergie atomique,” Révue de defense nationale, 08–09 1968 (24th Year), pp. 1167–1189Google Scholar.

²⁰ Quoted in Foch, René, Europe and Technology: A Political View (Atlantic Papers, No. 2) (Paris: Atlantic Institute, 1970), p. 8Google Scholar. The units are megawatts electric (MWe).

²¹ Agence Europe, February 10, 1970, p. 6.

²² Report on the Nuclear Industry, 1970, pp. 58ff. According to the AEC “a separative work unit is not a quantity of material, but is a measure of the effort expended in the plant to separate a quantity of uranium of a given assay into two components, one having a higher percentage of uranium-235 and one having a lower percentage. Separative work is generally expressed in kilogram units to give it the same dimensions as material quantities, i.e., kilograms or metric tons of uranium. It is common practice to refer to a kilogram separative work unit simply as a separative work unit or as SWU.” Ibid.,

²³ Ibid., p. 68.

²⁴ Spinrad, Bernard, “The Role of Nuclear Power in Meeting World Energy Needs” (Paper presented at the Symposium on Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power Stations sponsored by the IAEA and the AEC, New York, 08 10–14, 1970)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Critics argue that the true competitive nature of atomic energy cannot be known until enriched uranium is placed on a purely commercial basis, i.e., totally and completely separated from military participation, governmental subsidies, and industrial secrecy.

²⁶ See Goldschmidt, , Revue de defense nationaie, 24th Year, pp. 1177–1178Google Scholar.

²⁷ For an accessible review of this joint program see Foch, René, “European Fusion and Atomic Fission,” Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1966 (Vol. 1, No. 2), pp. 87–96Google Scholar.

²⁸ See Spinrad, “The Role of Nuclear Power in Meeting World Energy Needs,” passim.

²⁹ On this event see Goldschmidt, , Revue de defense nationale, 24th Year, pp. 1178–1179Google Scholar.

³⁰ The best continuing treatment of the centrifuge problem is to be found in Report on the Nuclear Industry, published annually by the AEC, and in Agence Europe.

³¹ The following discussion does not give consideration to diplomatic negotiations, to situations in which it might plausibly be argued that governmental actors are not playing strictly official roles, or to the possible effects of “world public opinion” on national arms control policies. These phenomena stretch the concept on “transnational activity” to a point where it risks losing its analytic power. For a treatment of these issues see Joseph, Antoinette, “Some Observations beyond Scheinman's Article on Transnational Processes and Nuclear Energy” (Paper prepared for the seminar, “Problems of Supranational Integration,” Harvard University, spring 1971)Google Scholar.

³² The best history of the Pugwash conferences is to be found in Rotblat, J[oseph], Pugwash—TheFirst Ten Years: History of the Conferences on Science and World Affairs (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1967)Google Scholar.

³³ See, for example, Angell, Robert Cooley, Peace on the March: Transnational Participation (New Perspectives in Political Science, No. 19) (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969)Google Scholar; and Thorin, Duane, The Pugwash Movement and U.S. Arms Policy (New York: Monte Cristo Press, 1965)Google Scholar. Although the Thorin book strongly reflects the biases prevalent in the McCarthy period of the early 1950s, it does offer a useful introduction to some of the orientations, activities, and personalities involved in the Pugwash phenomenon.

³⁴ This is the opinion of Bernard T. Feld, cited in Thorin, p. 53.

³⁵ One future possibility is the linkage of industrial enterprises across national boundaries with reference to the intrusiveness or cost of safeguards systems. Should these systems and their operation prove onerous or discriminatory between enterprises in nuclear-weapon states and those in nonnudcar-weapon states, it is entirely possible that private actors might join forces to simplify or minimize safeguards operations. One thinks primarily of linkages between West German, Japanese, Swedish, and Italian industry in this regard. The suggestion of transnational linkages does not, of course, mean that vertical pressures by industries on their governments to achieve the same results would not take place.