I am happy to respond to the invitation to comment on Bruce Russett's and John Sullivan's most useful and sensible article. The concept of collective goods must play a starring role in any adequate theory of international organization and cooperation so there is every reason to encourage work of this kind. Russett's and Sullivan's article is, moreover, worthy of extension and criticism on many specific points. On some of these points I have minor technical (or in some cases expositional) criticisms. But relevant as such technical issues can be, they attract only a specialized interest and are of far less practical importance than Russett's and Sullivan's central concern with the conditions under which more international collective goods can be obtained. They ask, in effect, how patterns of international organization and cooperation that could help to improve the inefficient, and at times even chaotic and violent, international system could in practice be attained.

Interpretations of patterns and trends in postwar international relations have frequently noted the outmoded position of the nation-state, the shrinking nature of the world, the extension of a single international relations system to global limits, and the rising importance of superpowers and regional organizations. It was then often concluded that the coming unit of international politics was likely to be not the territorial state, as in the past, but new regional groupings of states, where the component members would collectively acquire greater power by individually giving up some of their sovereignty to a bloc or group.

The international community, in its efforts to overcome the security dilemmas that inhibit conflict resolution, need not always offer forceful security guarantees to combatants in civil wars. We argue that noncoercive, liberal international intervention can end civil wars. As suggested by a constructivist perspective and the insights of the democratic peace, the promotion of liberal democracy can successfully resolve civil wars by transforming the identities and institutions of the combatants. We develop this argument by examining the resolution of civil wars in Central America during the 1990s. Of the Central American cases, Nicaragua, the country subject to the strongest security guarantees, has been the least stable of the three. El Salvador and Guatemala, in contrast, have experienced more successful conflict resolution despite the lack of any forceful security guarantees by the international community. The termination of these civil wars can be best explained by the adherence of local actors to liberal democratic norms and institutions in response to a variety of international pressures and opportunities.

How do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used—are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states’ perspective. Whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality, or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power, govern voting and representation rights at the IO. Focusing on the domain of climate finance, we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions (ICFIs) associated with multilateral development banks, but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at ICFIs within the United Nations system where egalitarian norms are strong. In this way, powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies. In addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at IOs, our framework offers insight into forum-shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas.

This article evaluates different theories of hierarchy in international relations through a case study of the treaty system that the British constructed in the early nineteenth century in an effort to abolish the slave trade. The treaty system was extraordinarily wide-ranging: it embraced European maritime powers, new republics in the Americas, Muslim rulers in northern and eastern Africa, and “Native Chiefs” on the western coast of Africa. It therefore allows for a comparative analysis of the various types of treaty that the British made, depending on the identity of their contracting partners. The article argues that a broadly constructivist approach provides the best explanation of why these variations emerged. Although British treaty-making was influenced by the relative strength or weakness of the states with which they were dealing, the decisive factor that shaped the treaty system was a new legal doctrine that had emerged in the late eighteenth century, which combined a positivist theory of the importance of treaties as a source of international law with a distinction between the “family of civilized nations” and “barbarous peoples.”Some of the arguments in this article were presented to a seminar at the University of Chicago, and I am grateful to members of the Political Science Department there for several valuable constructive criticisms. I would also like to thank Duncan Bell, Molly Cochran, Steve Hopgood, Andy Hurrell, Katja Weber, and the journal's two anonymous readers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article.

As more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.

What are the effects of international intervention on the rule of law after civil war? Rule of law requires not only that state authorities abide by legal limits on their power, but also that citizens rely on state laws and institutions to adjudicate disputes. Using an original survey and list experiment in Liberia, I show that exposure to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) increased citizens’ reliance on state over nonstate authorities to resolve the most serious incidents of crime and violence, and increased nonstate authorities’ reliance on legal over illegal mechanisms of dispute resolution. I use multiple identification strategies to support a causal interpretation of these results, including an instrumental variables strategy that leverages plausibly exogenous variation in the distribution of UNMIL personnel induced by the killing of seven peacekeepers in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. My results are still detectable two years later, even in communities that report no further exposure to peacekeepers. I also find that exposure to UNMIL did not mitigate and may in fact have exacerbated citizens’ perceptions of state corruption and bias in the short term, but that these apparently adverse effects dissipated over time. I conclude by discussing implications of these complex but overall beneficial effects.

Major decisions of the International Energy Agency (IEA), such as those that established the emergency management system or minimum selling price for imported oil, have been made through a process of interstate bargaining, in which the United States is the most influential actor. A core group, including the IEA secretariat and Germany as well as the United States, has dominated the politics of the organization. Policy implementation, however, has been carried out largely through the national review process of the IEA, which involves a good deal of transgovernmental politics: coalitions between the secretariat and national government agencies, or among those agencies, are frequently important. Transgovernmental networks in the IEA provide opportunities for the exercise of influence by the secretariat. Nevertheless, they are not an unmixed blessing for the organization, since its significance in world politics continues to depend on the support of powerful governments.

This article examines the key ethical questions in the design of labor immigration programs. We propose a two-dimensional matrix of ethical space that isolates a number of different ethical frameworks on the basis of the degree of consequentialism they allow and the moral standing they accord to noncitizens. We argue for the rejection of extreme ethical frameworks and propose criteria that should guide national policymakers in their choice and application of a framework within the ethical subspace of moderate consequentialism and moderate moral standing for noncitizens. To translate these “ethical guidelines” for the design of labor immigration programs into policy practice, we advocate new types of temporary foreign worker programs. In contrast to many existing and past guest worker policies, the programs that we propose would more actively promote the interests of migrant workers and sending countries by more clearly defining, and more effectively enforcing, certain core rights of migrant workers.For their helpful comments, we would like to thank Manolo Abella, Rainer Bauböck, Thomas Bräuninger, Wayne Cornelius, Clare Fox, David Heer, Jessica Heynis, Robert Holton, Eddie Hyland, Miles Kahler, Alan Kessler, Christian Klamler, Christoph Kuzmics, Phil Martin, Gail McElroy, Robert McLaughlin, Onora O'Neill, Nalini Persram, Thomas Pogge, Carlos Rodriguez, Robert Rowthorn, John Sender, Patrick Taran, Takeyuki Tsuda, Patrick Weil, two anonymous referees, and especially the editors of this journal. Martin Ruhs gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Cambridge European Trust, the Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust, the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California-San Diego, and the Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin. Most of this article was written while Martin Ruhs was a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, and a Visiting Research Fellow at both the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California-San Diego, and the Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin. Ha-Joon Chang wishes to thank the Korea Research Foundation for its research support through the BK21 program at the Department of Economics, Korea University, where he was a Visiting Research Professor when the manuscript was completed.

In his review of the Fifth General Report on the Activity of the European Community the Rapporteur for the European Parliament critically singled out certain aspects of the Commission's style in developing Community policy: the excessive importance it seemed to place on proposing only solutions which had the strongest chance of being adopted by the Council of Ministers instead of maximizing the potentiality of its power of initiative; and, as a corollary, the disturbing tendency toward increasing infusion and influence of national administrations in the policy orientations and decisions of the European Economic Community (EEC).

Literature on financial market liberalization focuses heavily on state activity in allocating preferential credit. I consider state activity in promoting nascent equity markets by asking why a state would create and promote a market in which the transaction costs are high, the potential rate of return is low, and firms are reluctant to list shares. I examine the case of the West African regional stock exchange and propose that the central bank for the West African Monetary Union created it to mediate the relationship between this region and the world economy. I propose that states and domestic markets act as complements rather than as rivals in some instances of bourse creation. Moreover, bourses in developing economies present a different set of relationships among states, public and private lending authorities, and market participants than their counterparts in more developed financial environments. This illuminates a need for further research in this area.

Truth-subversion practices, which populist leaders utilize for political domination, are a significant source of current pressure on the Liberal International Order (LIO). Truth-subversion practices include false speak (flagrant lying to subvert the concept of facts), double speak (intentional internal contradictions in speech to erode reason), and flooding (the emission of many messages into the public domain to create confusion). Aiming to destroy liberal truth ideals and practices, truth subversion weakens epistemological security; that is, the experience of orderliness and safety that results from people's and institutions’ shared understandings of their common-sense reality. It privileges baseless claims over fact-based opinions, thus creating communities of the like-minded between which communication becomes impossible. Truth subversion challenges the LIO's three key institutions: democracy, markets, and multilateralism. If truth-subversion practices prevail, societal polarization, inaccurate information, and emotional inflaming strain democracy and human rights protections. Markets that depend for their functioning on accurate information can falter, and multilateralism that relies on communication and reasoned consensus can decay. International relations (IR) scholarship has recognized knowledge production practices as a key feature underlying the LIO, but has not yet identified challenges to those practices as a threat for the LIO. We discuss what the discipline can do to alleviate its blind spots.

This study concerns the involvement of transnational, nongovernmental associations in the international decisions leading to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, at Stockholm, and the establishment of the UN Environment Program. It identifies those organizations that were involved, characterizes the political functions performed by them, and describes their points of access into the UN environmental policy process. A number of propositions about transnational associations are also examined in light of the Stockholm experience.

Japan's level of defense expenditure relative to the size of its economy has long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries. As of 1995, Japan's expenditures stood at 0.96 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Even adding to this the approximately 0.3 percent of GDP devoted to pensions for retired personnel, the level of spending is considerably less than that of major Western states such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as industrialized Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. Furthermore, these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over the past few decades.

The term “middle power” is a convenient one that has come into general use as a means of avoiding the unreality of a simple division of states into “great” and “small”. While attempts to find a yardstick for the measurement of states have been fruitless, there can be some agreement on the categories. For practical purposes the great powers at the present time are those which hold permanent seats on the Security Council, just as during the war they were those which participated in the meetings of heads of government on high policial and military policy. There are clearly also a number of smaller states which, because of limited resources or small population, or both, are commonly ranked as small powers. In between lie a number of countries which make no claim to the title of great power, but have been shown to be capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not found in the small powers. These are the middle powers. There is no agreed list because, while there is a fixed, if arbitrary, boundary between them and the great powers, there are, as it were, marginal powers which might be classified as “middle” or “small”. Probably, however, the following members of the United Nations would generally be recognized as middle powers: in Europe — Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland; in the Americas — Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico; in the Pacific — Australia, and India.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, the Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have acted to protect democracy in their member states from erosion or reversals, with CE policies more robust than those in the Americas. What explains this variation? I develop an argument focusing on institutional permeability, or the extent to which those organizations are accessible to nonstate actors. Permeability consists of three dimensions: range of third parties allowed access, level of decision making at which access is granted, and transparency of IO information to those third parties. Higher levels of permeability are likely to produce higher levels of constraint on state behavior through increasing levels of precision and obligation in international rules and practices. Alternative explanations, summarized as regional democracy norms, domestic democratic lock-in interests, and the power of stable democracies cannot explain the variation in multilateral democracy protection. More broadly, this article suggests that “democratizing” IOs by allowing ever-greater access to nonstate actors is likely to result in stronger, more constraining international rules, even in areas where states most jealously guard their sovereignty, such as the nature of their domestic political institutions.

Referendum votes on adoption of the euro in Denmark (2000) and Sweden (2003) provide unprecedented natural experiments through which to study the political economy of money. Using exit polling data and multinomial logit statistical models that allow us to separate preferences for the euro from preferences for the European Union (EU), we test economic “calculation” and political “community” as determinants of individual-level preferences over adoption of the euro. We find that “calculation” operates most clearly where, as in Sweden, the choice of a fixed versus a floating exchange rate regime is at stake, while “community” exerts strong effects across the two cases.We would like to thank Krister Andersson, Jerry Cohen, Robert Fishman, Jennifer Fitzgerald, Jeff Frieden, Eric Helleiner, Jacques Hymans, Lars Jonung, Kate McNamara, Jennifer Wolak, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, and Helga Sverrisdottir for outstanding research assistance. We are grateful to Jens Wagner of the Danish Data Archive and Torbjörn Berglund of the Swedish Social Science Dataservice for providing the data used in this note. Neither these individuals nor their respective agencies are responsible for the interpretations contained herein.

Regional integration theory emphasizes elite social learning and attitude change as concomitant processes of integration. Participation by national elites in EEC decision making may bring about these changes. To test these hypotheses, French and German delegates to the European Parliament were interviewed, and their attitudes compared with those of a control group sampled among their national colleagues. The general finding was that the delegates’ attitudes appear to undergo cognitive, but not affective, changes. Delegates develop more complex perceptions and become better informed and more interested in European matters, yet they become neither more favorable nor less hostile to these issues because of the self–recruitment of many legislators who were avowed Europeans before their nomination. Strong ties to national parties apparently diminish the attitudinal effects of this learning experience. Only when the parliament has full time legislators who exercise potent policy–making tasks will its role in European integration increase.

The rise of capitalism in Western Europe was based on rising mass incomes and a political power relationship favorable to the lower classes, which created opportunities for profitable investment. Nowhere in today's underdeveloped world did such conditions exist before the European expansion; nowhere were they created by the mere fact of integration into the capitalist world system. Thus the periphery has been ever more disadvantaged by its connection with the capitalist center. But the center could and can dispense withthe contribution of the periphery and, indeed, on occasion has done so. A planned restructuring of the productive apparatus and social reform in the Third World are both complex and contradictory processes. The working class in the North has to realize its interest in defending the masses of the Third World. It can do so by linking economic concessions in the North-South dialogue (raw material prices or access to markets) to social reform and the creation of a productive apparatus that permits the rise of mass incomes in the Third World.

Little theoretical or empirical work examines migration policy in the developing world. We develop and test a theory that distinguishes the drivers of policy reform and factors influencing the direction of reform. We introduce an original data set of de jure asylum and refugee policies covering more than ninety developing countries that are presently excluded from existing indices of migration policy. Examining descriptive trends in the data, we find that unlike in the global North, forced displacement policies in the global South have become more liberal over time. Empirically, we test the determinants of asylum policymaking, bolstering our quantitative results with qualitative evidence from interviews in Uganda. A number of key findings emerge. Intense, proximate civil wars are the primary impetus for asylum policy change in the global South. Liberalizing changes are made by regimes led by political elites whose ethnic kin confront discrimination or violence in neighboring countries. There is no generalizable evidence that developing countries liberalize asylum policy in exchange for economic assistance from Western actors. Distinct frameworks are needed to understand migration policymaking in developing versus developed countries.