Except for the subfield of comparative regional integration, international organization as an area of study is notorious for its lack of systematic and testable theory. This situation has been created less by a deficiency of techniques for quantitative analysis than by the absence of attention to theoretical conceptualization and its necessary accompaniment, the imaginative use of data to test hypotheses. There is little shortage of case studies, abstract theorizing, or sophisticated quantitative techniques, but systematic testing of important concepts is rare. Much of the literature in the field fails even to ask relevant and important theoretical questions. The “Mount Everest Syndrome”–studying international organizations “because they are there”–has afflicted the field for too long.

Many agencies of the United States Government with nominally “domestic” mandates play important roles in international affairs, and collaborate extensively with other governments and international organizations in the performance of their tasks. In some areas, these agencies rather than intergovernmental organizations play key management roles. Data gathered from a variety of sources indicate the extensiveness of this involvement, and suggest that it continues to expand, although not in linear fashion. Certain trends in governmental reorganization, such as those in the Agriculture Department, suggest similar patterns to those observed in business firms as they become more heavily involved abroad. More attention needs to be paid to international networks involving “domestic” governmental bureaucracies and governmental agencies traditionally oriented toward international affairs. From a conceptual point of view, we should think of “international organization” as including not only formally intergovernmental organizations, but all officials who participate significantly in these networks.

Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. … Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy.

In recent years, a new international actor—the pariah state—has mounted the global stage. Although rough historical precedents may be discerned, the present international system appears to have produced a novel phenomenon, whereby some isolated small states, lacking assured and credible outside security support, find themselves unable to take advantage of traditional balance-of-power mechanisms. Taiwan, South Africa, and Israel fit this description best, South Korea less so; Pakistan and Chile are also candidates.

Insecurities about conventional arms sources and big-power support in crises involving national survival have driven pariahs to consideration of nuclear “equalizers,” notwithstanding dilemmas involving the viability of applicable nuclear strategic doctrines. There are also some indications of nascent interpariah security ties, perhaps nuclear ones. Although there are some prospects for amelioration of the situations of some pariahs—in part because of threats to go nuclear—serious impasses remain for U.S. and other major powers' policies.

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.

Until August 1971, the United States categorically rejected any notion of devaluing the dollar and championed an international monetary system based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates. From August 1971 through February 1973, the United States aggressively sought massive devaluation of the dollar, and since early 1973, it has actively promoted the adoption of highly flexible exchange rates.

Dependency theory is a set of ideas with a strong potential for influencing policy actions in the Third World. Originally developed during the late 1960s to explain the problems of development in Latin America by scholars working in that region, the theory has attracted a great deal of attention both in the literature and in Third World countries. Though the logical consistency and empirical validity of the theory have been questioned, evidence about the influence of dependency theory on the economic policies of specific countries has been scant. In this article I provide some such evidence. I also evaluate the potential for devising viable economic policies within the theory.

I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also because they influence the resolution of a set of disputed issues. States can cooperate on the issues by limiting military competition, but only as far as an endogenous “war constraint” allows. Factors determining the tightness of the war constraint imply hypotheses about the international determinants of military effort and thus the costs of anarchy. The strategic logic differs from standard security-dilemma arguments, in which the costs of anarchy are associated with conflict between status quo states that are uncertain about others' territorial revisionism. Here, inefficiency arises because arming to deter lowers a state's value for living with the status quo, which creates a security externality and a feedback loop. The model both synthesizes and revises a range of theoretical arguments about the determinants of interstate cooperation and conflict.

We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states where one can invest in a program to develop nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time. In the absence of a nonproliferation deal, the observing state watches the former's program, waiting until proliferation seems imminent to attack. Chance elements—when the program will make progress and when the other state will discover this—determine outcomes. Surprise proliferation, crises over the suspected progress of a nuclear program, and possibly “mistaken” preventive wars arise endogenously from these chance elements. Consistent with the model's predictions and contrary to previous studies, the empirical evidence shows that the progress of a nuclear program and intelligence estimates of it explain the character and outcomes of most interactions between a proliferant and a potential preventive attacker. Counterintuitively, policies intended to reduce proliferation by delaying nuclear programs or improving monitoring capabilities may instead encourage it.

In this paper I examine what constructivist approaches to IR tell us about how states should act when confronted by atrocity crimes in the context of a politically pluralist international society. Building on the work of theorists who responded to Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit's call to substantiate the constructivist's claim to explain “moral progress,” and to better inform normative assessments, I claim that the constructivist emphasis on historical and social contingency does not rule out ethical standpoints, suggesting instead a “pragmatic” ethic. Norms are hypotheses rather than absolute values. The task of the pragmatic constructivist is not to establish beyond doubt the normativity of a norm—the task is to test the norm for how well its “meaning-in-use” supports action that ameliorates lived social problems. Pragmatic constructivists can commit to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an idea that might reconcile various communities of normative practice and ameliorate vulnerability without upsetting international order. To the extent particular practices (e.g., prevention) have proven (and continue to prove) useful in doing this, pragmatic constructivists can equate the institutionalization of those practices with normative progress. However, R2P is a “complex” norm. It recognizes that knowledge of how to respond to ongoing atrocity is context specific and cannot therefore be fixed. The task of the pragmatic constructivist here is to assess the practical judgment of those that claim to speak for the norm by weighing the consequences of acting out their prescription in the specific context of a particular crisis. I test the meanings of R2P in use during the Syria crisis from 2011 to 2012. R2P was problematic to the extent certain meanings reinforced policy ends (e.g., protection through political/criminal accountability) that were impractical and pursued at the expense of non-ideal but realizable goals (e.g., protection through peace/aid).

Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support international organizations generating the benefits. I test my argument using data on aid allocated to the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the Global Environment Facility, and international trade by commodity. I find robust empirical support for the argument that when donors' domestic economic groups are likely to gain from opportunities created by international environmental organizations' programs, donor governments increase aid allocations to these organizations.

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

International organizations (IOs) increasingly pool resources and expertise. Under what conditions do they pool rather than compete when their activities overlap? Drawing on elite interviews, I argue that even though many cooperation decisions are made by staff possessing high degrees of autonomy from member state principals, IOs are more likely to pool resources when their leading stakeholders are geopolitically aligned. Regardless of whether member states directly oversee the negotiation of these arrangements, staff design policies that are amenable to major stakeholders. I test this argument with regression analysis of an original data set that documents patterns of co-financing and information sharing among IOs in the development issue area. I further supplement these tests with an elite survey experiment deployed via LinkedIn to bureaucrats from various development IOs. Across the board, I find evidence consistent with my theory.

An open question in nuclear deterrence theory is whether and how the balance of military power affects the dynamics of escalation. The balance of military strength plays virtually no role in standard accounts of brinkmanship. But this is largely by assumption and seems incompatible with an apparent trade-off between power and risk that decision makers have faced in some actual crises. This paper incorporates this trade-off in a modified model of nuclear brinkmanship. A main result is that the more likely the balance of resolve is to favor a defender, the less military power a challenger brings to bear. The model also formalizes the stability-instability paradox, showing that a less stable strategic balance, that is, a sharper trade-off between power and risk, makes conflict at high levels of violence less likely but conflict at lower levels more likely. The analysis also helps explain the incentives different states have to adopt different nuclear doctrines and force postures.

Central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy. While it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution, it is less obvious that a real-world incumbent facing short-term partisan or electoral pressures would do so. In this article, I model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival-maximizing incumbent. It turns out that a wide range of survival-maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy. While political pressures do not, in general, discourage monetary commitments, they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence. I highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival-maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes. In so doing, I provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume.

This paper provides data on long-term changes in international interdependence. Transactions exchanged between societies and states are one possible means of interdependence. Two decades ago Karl Deutsch collected a substantial amount of data which illustrated a long-term decline in transactions since the beginning of the twentieth century. An extension of his time series data points to a possibly important reversal of that trend in recent years. This conclusion is in agreement with other empirical measures of international interdependence.

Formal racial equality is a key aspect of the current Liberal International Order (LIO). It is subject to two main challenges: resurgent racial nationalism and substantive racial inequality. Combining work in International Relations with interdisciplinary studies on race, I submit that these challenges are the latest iteration of struggles between two transnational coalitions over the LIO's central racial provisions, which I call racial diversity regimes (RDRs). The traditional coalition has historically favored RDRs based on racial inequality and racial nationalism. The transformative coalition has favored RDRs based on racial equality and nonracial nationalism. I illustrate the argument by tracing the development of the liberal order's RDR as a function of intercoalitional struggles from one based on racial nationalism and inequality in 1919 to the current regime based on nonracial nationalism and limited equality. Today, racial nationalists belong to the traditional coalition and critics of racial inequality are part of the transformative coalition. The stakes of their struggles are high because they will determine whether we will live in a more racist or a more antiracist world. This article articulates a comprehensive framework that places race at the heart of the liberal order, offers the novel concept of “embedded racism” to capture how sovereignty shields domestic racism from foreign interference, and proposes an agenda for mainstream International Relations that takes race seriously.

The customary prescription for handling “problems without passports” is to work through international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), act collectively for humanity's future, and build up specialized knowledge. But around the world, patterns from the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic defied the prescription. IGOs were blamed, narrow or short-term interests were prioritized, and divided reactions to experts were on display. International Relations (IR) scholarship helps explain why: (1) research on bureaucracy and institutional design examines the challenge of making IGOs accountable to member-states but also insulated from them; (2) research on delegation and socialization explores commonplace problems involving time-inconsistency and credible commitments; and (3) research on epistemic communities and anti-elitism describes the rationale and fears of permitting public policy to be guided by unelected experts. The initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic reflect how the world can look when it lacks resolute leadership to overcome commonplace aversions to IGOs, to broader or longer-term interests, and to experts. Yet while IR scholarship makes sense of these patterns, it does not say enough about why resolute leadership wanes, or what to do about IGO performance when it does. Answers to such questions are crucial not only for recovering from the COVID-19 crisis, but for dealing with whatever global crises lie ahead.

This article compares European Union (EU) burden-sharing in security governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence policies. We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggregation technologies in each policy domain. Joint-product models predict equal burden-sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs. Prevention is also characterized by the technology of summation, but asymmetry of costs implies uneven burden-sharing. Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence because it has the largest asymmetry of costs and a best-shot aggregation technology. Evaluating burden-sharing relative to a country's ability to contribute, Kendall tau-tests examine the rank-correlation between security burden and the capacity of EU member states. These tests show that the smaller EU members disproportionately shoulder the costs of assurance and protection; wealthier EU members carry a somewhat disproportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and larger EU members in the provision of compellence. When analyzing contributions relative to expected benefits, asymmetric marginal costs can largely explain uneven burden-sharing. The main conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the EU is shared quite evenly.