¹ See the discussions in Masters, Roger D., “A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System,” American Political Science Review, 12 1961 (Vol. 10, No. 4), pp. 780–789Google Scholar; Hoffmann, Stanley, Organisations Internationales et Pouvoirs Politiques des Etats (Paris: Colin, 1954), especially pp. 416–417Google Scholar; Herz, John, International Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 96–108Google Scholar; Herz, John, “The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 80–86Google Scholar; and London, Kurt, The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1965)Google Scholar. For commentary see Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), especially pp. 19–24Google Scholar.

² Latin America, or the western hemisphere, is a borderline case that deserves examination as a subsystem.

³ Binder, Leonard, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 254–278Google Scholar; Brecher, Michael, The New States of Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; and Modelski, George, “International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South-East Asia,” International Relations (London), 04 1961 (Vol. 2, No. 2), pp. 143–155Google Scholar. See also Hodgkin, Thomas, “The New West Africa State System,” University of Toronto Quarterly, 10 1961 (Vol. 31, No. 1), pp. 74–82Google Scholar; and Hoffmann, Stanley, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” International Organization, Summer 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 521–549Google Scholar.

⁴ More specifically, what is to prevent an analyst from describing a subregion as a system, as in Hodgkin, , University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 74–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar (although Hodgkin was writing before the continentality of the system was totally apparent)? Essentially nothing, except the ineffectiveness of the argument, suggesting that a subordinate system may be more a tool of analysis than a reality. However, it seems difficult to avoid key elements of autonomy and limits of the system; yet these are underemphasized in Brecher. In fact, subregions such as West or North or East Africa are relatively autonomous on some levels of relations and will be referred to here as subregional constellations (see below). Their integral membership in the African subordinate system, however, seems undeniable.

⁵ The phrase “regional system” may be less likely to raise political connotations to people sensitive of a colonial past, but “subordinate system” is retained here because of its established use; see Binder, and Brecher. Binder calls his system an “international system” and Brecher a “state system”; both terms are adequate.

⁶ See the excellent discussion by Mazrui, Ali A., “On the Concept of ‘We Are All Africans,’” American Political Science Review, 03 1963 (Vol. 57, No. 1), pp. 88–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 42–58.

⁷ Dependent territories such as the Spanish Sahara and Portuguese Guinea play an important buffer role in intra-African relations, an indication that fringe areas—particularly those outside of the southern redoubt—may have some of the characteristics of membership in the system.

⁸ On the two types of nationalisms see Thiam, Doudou, The Foreign Policy of African States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar; on the state-nation see Zartman, I. William, “Characteristics of Developing Foreign Policies,” in Lewis, William H. (ed.), French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), pp. 179–193Google Scholar.

⁹ Articles IV and VI of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The text of the Charter can be found in Mazrui, , Towards a Pax Africana, Appendix I, pp. 219–229Google Scholar.

¹⁰ On the Congo conflict as an “attempt to keep the Cold War out of Africa” see Good, Robert C., “The Congo Crisis: A Study of Postcolonial Politics,” in Martin, Laurence W. (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 34–63Google Scholar.

¹¹ Nasser, Gamal Abdel, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 66–67Google Scholar.

¹² The conflict between these two functions also has important ideological ramifications in internal politics. See Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell, University Press, 1962)Google Scholar, on problem solvers and solidarity makers; see also Zartman, I. William, “Ideology and National Interest,” in McKay, Vernon (ed.), African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966)Google Scholar.

¹³ See Zartman in McKay; and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ See Neilsen, Waldemar, African Battleline (New York: Harper & Row, 1965)Google Scholar; Leiss, Amelia C. (ed.), Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965)Google Scholar; and Segal, Ronald (ed.), Sanctions Against South Africa (Baltimore, Md: Penguin Books, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Some examples to substantiate this gross generalization, “the African world view,” are found in Thiam; Touré, Sékou, The International Policy and Diplomatic Action of the Democratic Party of Guinea (Conakry: P.D.G., n.d. [1962])Google Scholar; Nkrumah, Kwame, Consciencism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963)Google Scholar; Dia, Mamadou, The African Nations and World Solidarity (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Postal and telecommunications would also tell something of intra-African relations, were the raw data available. See Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953)Google Scholar. The few independent African countries for which statistics are reported (five plus South Africa) provide a basis only for observations, not conclusions. Generally, correspondence within Africa is numerically inferior to correspondence with the former metropole and is largely shaped by linguistic lines. Specifically, Senegal has frequent exchanges with the Entente and only secondarily with its four neighbors; Togo shows frequent exchanges with the Entente and Senegal and only secondarily with Ghana and Nigeria; Egypt corresponds first with Northeast Africa and second with Northwest Africa (Maghreb), far more than with Black Africa but far less than with the Middle East; Morocco corresponds with the Maghreb, Egypt, Mali, Senegal, and the Entente, in that order, while Nigeria shows an equally broad scattering, with its coastal neighbors, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo high. Further information would be instructive, for mail exchange in the countries noted does tend to confirm some political patterns. (Data taken from Statistiques des Expeditions dans le Service Postal International, 1961 [Berne: Universal Postal Union, 1963]Google Scholar.) A chart of commercial relations on which the following conclusions are based was made from data given in the Yearbook, of International Trade Statistics 1963 (New York: United Nations, 1965Google Scholar). The expression “East-Horn” is used because the region is composed of two subgroups: East (three East African Common Services Organization [EASCO] states plus three ex-Belgian states) and Northeast (Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia) Africa. Northern Africa comprises the five Mediterranean states; Central Africa refers to the five ex-French equatorial states plus the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria. Separate data is not available for the states of the former Central African Federation; the Republic of South Africa and colonial territories are not included in the conclusions. For analytical use of transaction flows in intra-African relations see Foltz, William J., From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; and Green, L. P. and Fair, T. J. D., Development in Africa (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See de Sola Pool, Ithiel, Symbols of Internationalism (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1951)Google Scholar; Boulding, Kenneth, “National Images and International Systems,” in Rosenau, pp. 391–398Google Scholar. On the need for such “maps” see McClelland, Charles A., Theory and the International System (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 106Google Scholar.

¹⁸ “Pattern” is used here where most analyses have used “system.” The change in term seems necessary; a pattern is only one element in the operation of a system, and a system can continue to exist in transition between two patterns of relations. Masters, (American Political Science Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 780–789)Google Scholar uses the term “structures.”

¹⁹ Kautilya, , Arthasastra, trans. Shamasastry, R. (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1960), especially pp. 289–293Google Scholar; and Modelski, George, “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World,” in American Political Science Review, 09 1964 (Vol. 58, No. 3), pp. 549–560Google Scholar.

²⁰ It is remarkable that a checkerboard pattern did not appear in North Africa, i.e., that Morocco and Tunisia never united against the Algerian revolution and sporadic interference. To the contrary, the period between 1958 and 1962 was filled with alternate Tunisian and Moroccan attempts to win the National Liberation Front (FLN) to their side, to the exclusion of the other neighbor. The only checkerboard that has appeared was die Algerian-Egyptian “entente” under Ahmed Ben Bella, with Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in various positions of enmity but never allied in a counterentente.

²¹ For a more detailed analysis of these events see the author's International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

²² The concert system (pattern) is described in Rosecrance, Richard, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 156–159Google Scholar.

²³ On norm making at Addis Ababa see Elias, T. O., “The Charter of the Organization of African Unity,” American Journal of International Law, 04 1965 (Vol. 59, No. 2), pp. 243–264CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ See the discussion in Crabb, Cecil V. Jr, The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), especially pp. 96–99Google Scholar. On neutralism see also Low-Beer, Francis, “The Concept of Neutralism,” American Political Science Review, 06 1964 (Vol. 58, No. 2), pp. 383–391Google Scholar; and Martin (ed.).

²⁵ See Article III of the OAU Charter and, more specifically, the resolutions of the first Assembly of Heads of State, Cairo, July 1964, reprinted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (2nd ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 303–304.

²⁸ In other language, what is in formation is an integrated security community which rejects attempts at amalgamation. See Deutsch, Karl W. and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

²⁷ See Zartman, , International Relations in the New Africa, p. 88Google Scholar.

²⁸ See Zartman, , International Relations in the New Africa, pp. 87–119, 165–166Google Scholar; and Kapil, Ravi L., “On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa,” World Politics, 07 1966 (Vol. 18, No. 4), pp. 656–673Google Scholar.