The rise of capitalism in Western Europe was based on rising mass incomes and a political power relationship favorable to the lower classes, which created opportunities for profitable investment. Nowhere in today's underdeveloped world did such conditions exist before the European expansion; nowhere were they created by the mere fact of integration into the capitalist world system. Thus the periphery has been ever more disadvantaged by its connection with the capitalist center. But the center could and can dispense withthe contribution of the periphery and, indeed, on occasion has done so. A planned restructuring of the productive apparatus and social reform in the Third World are both complex and contradictory processes. The working class in the North has to realize its interest in defending the masses of the Third World. It can do so by linking economic concessions in the North-South dialogue (raw material prices or access to markets) to social reform and the creation of a productive apparatus that permits the rise of mass incomes in the Third World.

An inventory of the objectives and instruments which characterize the differing political strategies of six advanced industrial states in the international economy yields three groups of states: the two Anglo-Saxon countries, mercantilist Japan, and the states of the European continent. Corresponding differences exist in the distinctive elements of domestic structure: the coalition between business and the state and the policy networks linking public and private sectors. An historical explanation of these differences is most appropriate. In the future, stresses in the relations between business and the state and contradictions between ruling coalitions and organized labor may lead to changes in political strategies.

IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to stabilize crisis countries by providing additional liquidity, particularly if the crisis country is economically or politically important to them, but they are constrained by domestic politics. Politicians aim to balance these countervailing pressures. They provide bailouts when their own economy is exposed to negative spillover effects and when the crisis country is important for geostrategic, military, or political reasons. Domestic economic and political constraints, on the other hand, limit their ability to bail out other countries. We test our hypotheses using an original data set on bilateral bailouts by the G7 countries to countries that experienced financial crises between 1975 and 2010. The findings of our statistical analysis support our theoretical argument and contribute to a deeper understanding of international cooperation's complex structure during financial crises.

Existing scholarship attributes various political and economic advantages to democratic governance. These advantages may make more democratic countries prone to financial crises. Democracy is characterized by constraints on executive authority, accountability through free and fair elections, protections for civil liberties, and large winning coalitions. These characteristics bring important benefits, but they can also have unintended consequences that increase the likelihood of financial instability and crises. Using data covering the past two centuries, I demonstrate a strong relationship between democracy and financial crisis onset: on average, democracies are about twice as likely to experience a crisis as autocracies. This is an empirical regularity that is robust across a wide range of model specifications and time periods.

Transnational relations and other multional process seriously threaten democratic control of foreign policy, particularly in advanced industrial societies. The intermeshing of decisionmaking across national frontiers and the growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues are inherently incompatible with the traditional framework of democratic control. The threat is all the more serious because it is sustained not by enemies of democracy but unknowingly by people who consider themselves to be acting within Western democratic traditions and because it results in part from the very forces of internationalism, interdependence, and economic advancement that have come to be regarded as indispensable. The consequences of these developments and the ongoing erosion of control over military and foreign policy, dramatically demonstrated by the debate on the Vietnam War, amount to a fundamental challenge to the democratic structure of Western societies. This essay analyzes the threat of transnational relations by reexamining the arguments for limited democratic control of foreign policy in light of recent structural changes in world politics and the consequences of transnational relations for the democratic process and its institutions. It concludes by indicating some approaches that could strengthen the democratic dimension which is being eroded.

The current scholarly literature on the international mediation of civil wars draws predominantly on a rationalist-materialist perspective. This perspective suggests that the ticket to mediation success is the material manipulation of the bargaining environment by third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources. I argue that legitimacy also determines outcomes of mediation because if a mediator has legitimacy, it can continue to look for a mutually satisfactory outcome and try to pull the conflict parties toward compliance. I show that legitimacy matters by systematically comparing the effectiveness of African and non-African third parties. African third parties are typically considered ineffective because of a low degree of economic and military capacity. However, they effectively mediate civil wars in Africa because of a high degree of legitimacy, which is a result of a strong conviction within the African society of states that African mediation is the most desirable type in conflicts there. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program supplemented with unique data, which together cover all mediation efforts in Africa between 1960 and 2017, I find quantitative evidence supporting the effectiveness of African third parties. Compared to non-African ones, African third parties are far more likely to conclude negotiated settlements that are more likely to be durable. African third parties are especially effective if the conflict parties are highly committed to the African solutions norm. Theoretically, this study deviates from much of the literature that puts forward solely rationalist-materialist explanations of mediation success. By bringing legitimacy to the forefront, this article supplements the current mediation literature that emphasizes material sources of power and ignores social structures.

A principal theme of international relations scholarship following the Cold War was the apparent erosion of state sovereignty caused by globalization's integrative effects and the proliferation of international institutions and networks. In recent years, however, scholars have noted a reverse trend: the reassertion of traditional, or Westphalian, state sovereignty. By contrast, I highlight another recent trend that has gone largely overlooked: the reaffirmation of older “extralegal” and “organic” versions of sovereignty by three of the world's most powerful states—Russia, China, and the United States. After tracing the genealogy of these older concepts, I consider how and why they have gained prominence in the official discourse of all three countries. I also explore the implications of this shift, which not only illustrates the importance of “norm retrieval” in international affairs, but also raises questions about the foundations of international order. Contrary to Westphalian sovereignty, which emphasizes the legal equality of states and the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs, the extralegal and organic versions offer few constraints on state action. If anything, they appear to license powerful states to dominate others.

This article is a critique of Kelemen and Sibbitt's “The Globalization of American Law” (International Organization, Winter 2004). I first deal with the inconsistency of their treatment of their dependent variable, suggesting that they should have examined the interaction of three different diffusion processes. I then suggest that the explanations that they provide for the globalization of the American style are inadequate, and that the explanations that they reject require a second look. Consequently, their article conveys at best a partial picture of the process of change, its sources, and its outcomes. I highlight their inadequate treatment of the World Society Approach (WSA), the notion of regulatory competition, and the reduction of the role of ideas and agency, particularly the role of neoliberal ideas and big American and European business, to mere reflections of economic processes of globalization and liberalization. I also suggest that Kelemen and Sibbitt's did not lift their gaze beyond the boundaries of the political science discipline. In particular I argue that they do not examine the interaction of juridification, legalization, and judicialization on the one hand and adversarial legalism and responsive regulation on the other. I conclude with some suggestions for an interdisciplinary perspective on the study of global legal and regulatory change.I am grateful for intriguing comments from and discussions with John Braithwaite, Peter Cane, Peter Drahos, Peter Grabosky, and Frans van Waarden. All responsibility is, of course, mine.

There are many ways in which one could study what is frequently called the Atlantic Community. First, one could trace the history of proposals made in order to strengthen the bond between the United States and nations situated on the other side of the Atlantic. Such suggestions, whether they aimed at federal union or at a close alliance, came either from Britain or from the United States, were always centered on the “British-American connection,” and aimed at making the two great English-speaking peoples the magnet that would attract lesser breeds, the force whose strength and virtues would preserve law, order, and peace in the world. Although such blue-prints rarely left visible traces on official policy in the United States, they are significant, both because British policy since the war often appeared inspired by the hope, or the nostalgia, for a world of this hue, and because overtones of these earlier appeals may have crept into recent American tactics in support of Britain's application to the Common Market.

This article provides foundations to Polanyi's famed argument that monopoly power in the global capital market served as an instrument of peace during the Pax Britannica (1815–1914). Our perspective is novel—we focus on the role of intermediaries and certification. We show that when information and enforcement are imperfect, there is scope for the endogenous emergence of “prestigious” intermediaries who enjoy a monopoly position and as a result, control government actions. They can implement conditional lending: they subject the distribution of credit to the adoption of peaceful policies. Prestigious intermediaries act that way because of their concern with maintaining an unblemished track record when wars increased risks of default. Our analysis, which brings together insights from different disciplines, provides a significant extension to, and departure from, recent research on how countries accumulate reputational capital.

Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategically important countries comply with conditions and strategically unimportant countries fail to do so. We argue that to explain compliance, we must also understand how the desire to maximize revenue from major income sources, such as FDI and natural resource rents, changes the recipient's incentive to comply. Using data on World Bank records of compliance from 1964 to 2010, we find strong support for our hypotheses even after accounting for different model specifications and potential endogeneity. Paradoxically, donors can secure compliance from recipients for reasons unrelated to the promise of additional aid.

We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as “at peace,” we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows us to analyze factors that relate to conflict origination (onset of incompatibilities) and factors that predict conflict militarization (onset of armed violence). Using new data on incompatibilities and armed conflict, we replicate and extend three prior studies of violent civil conflict, reformulated as a two-stage process, considering different estimation procedures and potential selection problems. We find that the group-based horizontal political inequalities highlighted in research on violent civil conflict clearly relate to conflict origination but have no clear association with militarization, whereas other features emphasized as shaping the risk of civil war, such as refugee flows and soft state power, predict militarization but not incompatibilities. A two-stage approach to conflict analysis can help advance theories of civil conflict, assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables are thought to influence conflict, and guide new data-collection efforts.

Why have states created international laws to regulate internal armed conflicts? This article is the first to theorize the emergence and design of these international rules, focusing on Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Drawing on original multicountry archival research, I develop the mechanism of forum isolation to explain the origins of Common Article 3, demonstrating the importance of social opprobrium pressure to explain why Britain and France switched from staunch opposition to support and leadership in 1949. Specifically, forum isolation pressured these European empires to concede and to react strategically behind the scenes, saving face and safeguarding their security interests by deliberately inserting ambiguous language in the text of Common Article 3. This move later facilitated states' avoidance of this rule in many conflict cases.

Selection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

A specter haunts the world's bureaucrats: the specter of small government. Skepticism about the expanding role of government in most industrial nations has encouraged political economists to go back to some fundamental questions about what we really need government to do for us, whether it be for reasons of efficiency or equity. The aim of this paper is to suggest that some of the theories attacking “big” government are equally applicable in the realm of international organization (IO).

What causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows government concessions? Given this pattern, why do governments ever conciliate terrorists? I propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them, leaving extremists in control. Governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their counterterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists. Former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises. The model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror, when moderates accept concessions, the terms of negotiated settlements, the duration of terrorist conflicts, incentives for moderate terrorists to radicalize their followers, and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders. The model is illustrated with an application to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.Professor Ehud Sprinzak, who died an untimely death on November 8, 2002, first introduced me to the study of terrorism. He is greatly missed. I received valuable comments from Scott Ashworth, Bob Bates, Mia Bloom, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Charles Cohen, Eric Dickson, Amanda Friedenberg, Orit Kedar, David Lake, Macartan Humphreys, Matthew Price, Todd Sandler, Ken Shepsle, David Andrew Singer, Alastair Smith, and Matthew Stephenson.

Two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors. A theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony; a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector. The history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes. However, a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory. Hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change. Surplus capacity, in the absence of a hegemon, creates the conditions necessary for change.

The governments of the Schuman Plan countries – Belgium, France, west Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – are now examining plans for a European Political Community. The basis of the present discussions is a draft constitution which would consolidate the institutions of the Coal-Steel Community and the European Defense Community, once the latter is ratified, and would provide a framework within which further unification might take place. Its major innovations would be a provision – already approved in principle by the governments – for popular elections to a European Assembly, and a more controversial proposal looking toward gradual extension of the common market.

A large literature has established that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is heavily politicized. We argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises. The IMF generates moral hazard asymmetrically, reducing the expected costs of risky lending and policies for states that are politically influential vis-à-vis the institution. Using a panel data set covering 1980 to 2010, we show that proxies for political influence over the IMF are associated with outcomes indicative of moral hazard: lower international reserves and more frequent financial crises. We support our causal claims by applying the synthetic control method to Taiwan, which was expelled from the IMF in 1980. Consistent with our predictions, Taiwan's expulsion led to a sharp increase in precautionary international reserves and exceptionally conservative financial policies.