¹ This is a theme that runs through much of the early literature on European integration written by European scholars. See, for example, Sidjanski, Dusan, “Aspects fédératifs de la Communauté Européenne,” paper presented before the Sixth World Congress of Political Science, Geneva, 21–25 09 1964.Google Scholar

² See, for example, Alker, Hayward Jr, and Puchala, Donald, “Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928–1963,” in Singer, J. David (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 287–316Google Scholar.

³ For the two leading exponents of this approach, see Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar, and Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).Google Scholar For an extension of this kind of argument to relations among nations in general, see Angell, Robert C., Peace on the March: Transnational Participation (New York: van Nostrand Rheinhold, 1969).Google Scholar

⁴ For recent discussions of problems in operational definitions and measurement of regional integration, see Nye, Joseph S., “Comparative Regional Organization: Concept and Measurement,” International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855–880Google Scholar, and Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Regional Integration: Theoretical Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 45–127.Google Scholar

⁵ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 16Google Scholar.

⁶ Deutsch, Karl W. et al. , Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).Google Scholar

⁷ Etzioni, Amitai, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 16–34.Google Scholar

⁸ Herbert C. Kelman suggested this formulation in a seminar at the University of Michigan in the fall of 1965.

⁹ Puchala, Donald J., “The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration,” International Studies Quarterly, 03 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 1), pp. 51–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Kelman, Herbert C. (ed.), International Behavior: A Social–Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 573.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Inglehart, Ronald, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,” International Organization, Autumn 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 4), pp. 764–795.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² See, for example, the work of Meynaud, Jean and Sidjanski, Dusan, L'Europe des Affaires: Rôle et Structure des Groupes (Paris: Payot, 1967)Google Scholar, and Les Groupes de pression dans la Communauté Europjéenne (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1971).Google Scholar

¹³ See Puchala, Donald J., European Political Integration: Progress and Prospects, Appendix 6, Arms Control in the European Political Environment, (New Haven: Political Science Research Library, Yale University, 01, 1966), pp. 68–69.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The few published works usually have to do with the effects of travel on attitudes toward European questions. See, for example, Anderson, Nels and Reigrotski, Erich, “National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1959 (Vol. 23, No. 4), pp. 515–529.Google Scholar There are, of course, several studies on elite attitudes toward European integration, but none of them explicitly investigated the impact of participation in international activities. Among the more notable studies of elite attitudes per se are Deutsch, Karl et al. , France, Germany and the Western Alliances: A study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967)Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967)Google Scholar; and, Lerner, Daniel and Gorden, Morten, Eurat–lantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969).Google Scholar The sole study I know of that deals directly with the attitudinal effects of international participation is Bonham's research on Scandinavian legislators: Bonham, G. Matthew, “Participation in Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Effects on Attitudes of Scandinavian Parliamentarians,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 06 1970 (Vol. 8, No. 4), pp. 325–336.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, passim.

¹⁶ See Haas, Ernst B., “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” International Organization. Autumn 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 4), p. 643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Haas, , Beyond the Nation–State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 13.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Manzanarés, Henri, Le Parlement Européen (Paris: Editions Berger–Lev–rault, 1964)Google Scholar, and Stein, Eric, “The European Parliamentary Assembly: Emerging Techniques of ‘Political Control’,” International Organization, Spring 1959 (Vol. 13, No. 2), pp. 233–254.Google Scholar For a comparative study of international parliamentary assemblies in Western Europe, see Kenneth, Lindsay (ed.), European Assemblies: The Experimental Period, 1949–1959 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).Google Scholar

¹⁹ One investigator devoted an entire manuscript to validate this thesis. See Schwarz, John E., “Power, Persuasion, and the Influence of the European Parliament,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1967).Google Scholar

²⁰ Lindberg, Leon N., “The Role of the European Parliament in an Emerging European Community,” in Elke, Frank (ed.), Lawyers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice–Hall, 1966), pp. 101–128.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid, p. 120.

²² For a general statement of these hypotheses, see Kelman, Herbert C., “Changing Attitudes through International Activities,” Journal of Social Issues, 1962 (Vol. 18, No. 1), pp. 67–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems of International Organization, 3rd Ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 104–105Google Scholar, italics in the original.

²⁴ See Scott, William A., “Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images,” in Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, p. 72.Google Scholar

²⁵ Alger, Chadwick F., “United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1963 (Vol. 27, No. 3), pp. 425–426.Google Scholar For a broad summary of his research on the effects of personal contact in the United Nations, see Alger, , “Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organizations,” in Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, pp. 523–547.Google Scholar

²⁶ Fens, Colonel J. J., The Future of Western Defence on the Executive and Parliamentary Levels, Western European Union, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 231, 05 3, 1962, p. 29Google Scholar, cited in Hovet, J. Allan Jr, The Super–Parliaments: Inter–Parliamentary Consultation and Atlantic Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 81.Google Scholar

²⁷ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 438.Google Scholar

²⁸ Lindsay, , European Assemblies, p. 94.Google Scholar

²⁹ Katz, Daniel, “The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1960 (Vol. 24, No. 2), p. 193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Mishler, Anita L., “Personal Contact in International Exchanges,” in Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, p. 522.Google Scholar

³¹ The term “non–national role” is taken from Alger's insightful discussion of the learning experiences associated with participation in the UN General Assembly. See Alger, in ibid, pp. 532–540.

³² Article 36 of the Rules of Procedure. The political groups organized under this rule are the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Liberals, and the European Democratic Union (UDE), which is composed solely of French Gaullists. The number of non–inscrits, those members who belong to no political group, is very small. In January, 1969, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was finally allowed to send representatives to the European Parliament; these delegates are among the handful of non–inscrits.

³³ Committee assignments are made on the basis of a “fair representation” of the political groups; nominations for election to the parliament's elected offices are made by the political groups; the order of speakers in plenary sessions gives priority to group spokesmen—in short, the four political groups are instrumental in determining the roles that delegates may play in the parliament. See Forsyth, Murray, The Parliament of the European Communities (London: Political and Economic Planning, 03 9, 1964), pp. 27–37Google Scholar, and Van Oudenhove, Guy, The Political Parties in the European Parliament: The First Ten Years (September, 1952–September, 1962) (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1965), pp. 139–148.Google Scholar

³⁴ Lindberg, in Frank, (ed.), Lawyers in a Changing World, p. 116Google Scholar, and Zellentin, Gerda, “Form and Function of the Opposition in the European Communities,” Government and Opposition, 04–07 1967 (Vol. 2, No. 3), p. 420.Google Scholar

³⁵ Kapteyn, P. J. G., “The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community,” in Lindsay (ed.), European Assemblies p. 241.Google Scholar Also see Oudenhove, Van, The Political Parties in the European Parliament, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

³⁶ This formulation is taken from social psychological studies of the effects of role playing on attitudes. The general finding is that “public expressions of opinion tend to represent some compromise between the individual's ‘real’ attitude and that which he perceives to be the dominant attitude or norm of the group. Although it is easy to think of these public expression as superficial and ‘expedient,’ they may have some of the real attitudinal effects of role–playing, for the individual is indeed constrained to play a role located somewhere between his own position and that of the group. If this is so, then repeated role playings vis–à–vis a given group would lead us to expect a slow but real drift in underlying attitude toward the norm group over time.” Newcomb, Theodore M., Turner, Ralph H., and Converse, Philip E., Social–Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 108–109.Google Scholar For a review of the literature on the effects of role playing and its relevance to altering the attitudes of elites toward one another, see Rosenberg, Milton J., “Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 138–139.Google Scholar

³⁷ See, for example, Lindberg, , The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, pp. 86–91.Google Scholar

³⁸ Oudenhove, Van, The Political Parties in the European Parliament, p. 220.Google Scholar

³⁹ See, inter alia, Furler Report, Parlement Européen, Report on the Powers of the European Parliament, Document 31, 1963–64; Vredeling Report, Parlement Européen, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l’agriculture relative à un réglement concernant les conditions du Fonds européen d’orientation et de guarantie aqricole, Document 81, 1963–64; and, the two Vals reports, Parlement Européen, Rapport sur le renforcement des pouvoirs budgétaires du Parlement Européen, Document 28, 1964–65, and Rapport sur les propositions de la Commission de la Communaute Européenne au Conseil, Document 34, 1965–66.

⁴⁰ For a full presentation of the research design and questionnaire used, see Henry Kerr, H. Jr, “The European Parliament and European Integration: The Effects of Participation in an International Parliamentary Assembly,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Of the 36 delegates sent to Strasbourg from the Bundestag, 29 were interviewed, and of the 24 delegates from the French National Assembly, all were interviewed. The reasons for failure to interview seven of the deputies in the German delegation were as follows: four refused, two were hospitalized throughout the conduct of the survey, and one died.

⁴² Campbell, Donald T. and Stanley, Julian C., Experimental and Quasi–Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 12.Google Scholar

⁴³ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 437.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Bonham, , Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 334–335.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Hyman, Herbert, “Problems in Treating Relationships between Two Variables,” in Hyman, (ed.), Survey Designs and Analysis, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 199.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ It is possible that the length of membership may merely reflect a more general process of maturation, but this possibility would hold only if all members entered the parliament at the same age, and this is not the case. There is, however, a slight increase in the age of the respondents by length of membership, but the differences in mean age between categories of length of membership used in later analysis are not pronounced. Furthermore, since attitudes toward European integration tend to be negatively correlated with age, a finding that the members’ attitudes are positively related to length of membership would mean that this relationship is running against the expectation of a decline in the degree of support for integration by age. Thus, the use of length of membership as an independent variable is a stronger test for the presence of attitudinal effects than first meets the eye. On the relationship between age and attitudes toward European integration, see Inglehart, Ronald, “And End to European Integration?” The American Political Science Review, 03 1967 (Vol. 61, No. 1), pp. 91–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁷ Scott, , in Kelman, (ed.), International Behavior, p. 72.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ For a comprehensive review of these findings, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Effects of Cross–National Contact on National and International Images,” in ibid, pp. 113–119.

⁴⁹ Scott, in ibid., p. 94.

⁵⁰ Newcomb, , Turner, and Converse, , Social–Psychology, pp. 58. 65.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For purposes of brevity and clarity, the multiple categories reported in table 5 have been collapsed under the two general headings of domestic and international sources of information. By carefully rechecking the responses of those parliamentarians who cited personal sources of information to this and similar questions, it was possible to determine the domestic or international character of their personal sources and thus to reassign these parliamentarians to one or the other of the two general categories. For a detailed explanation, see Kerr, , “The European Parliament and European Integration,” pp. 105–106.Google Scholar

⁵² The question was: “What are, in your opinion, the principal differences among … (the major political parties were named) … with respect to political unification of the six member states of the EEC?”

⁵³ See Kerr, , “The European Parliament and European Integration,” pp. 114–119.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Newcomb, , Turner, , and Converse, , Social–Psychology, pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The differences in responses to these questions between self–recruits and party–recruits are not reported in table 7 since they were, in all cases, nearly identical.

⁵⁶ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, pp. 439–440Google Scholar, italics in the original.

⁵⁷ Lindberg, , The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p. 84.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Haas, , Beyond the Nation–State, p. 112 and pp. 132–133.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Oudenhove, Van, The Political Parties in the European Parliament, p. 21Google Scholar. Also Forsyth, see, The Parliament of the European Communities, pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ To uncover these dimensions, 25 questions were factor analyzed. The factors were first defined by a varimax solution and subsequently rotated orthogonally. Finally, an oblique solution was used to obtain the attitude clusters presented here. See Kerr, , “The European Parliament and European Integration,” pp. 140–143.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Hoffman, Stanley, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” International Organization, Summer 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 521–549Google Scholar, and “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation–State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, Summer 1966 (Vol. 95, Nos. 3–4), pp. 862–916.Google Scholar

⁶² The eta coefficient, a variant of Yule's Q developed by Donald E. Stokes to measure the “nesting” or discriminatory power of items in a scale, was the criterion used to select items from a given factor for construction of Guttman scales. High coefficients of reproducability were obtained for all these scales. For details on how the scales were constructed, see Kerr, , “The European Parliament and European Integration,” pp. 146–149.Google Scholar A scale for economic integration was not constructed since members and non–members did not differ at all in their attitudes on this issue. It is noteworthy that, once constructed, these scales proved to be almost entirely independent one from the other, a finding that underscores Hoffmann's distinction between high and low politics referred to above.

⁶³ In the subsequent analysis, Gaullist deputies—both members and non–members—have been excluded because these delegates do not belong to a cross–national political group and, consequently, are not subject to the group pressures to which it is believed members of the other three groups are exposed. Comparison of the attitudes of Gaullist members and non–members revealed that though few differences existed between them, the UNR delegates sent to Strasbroug tended to be more hostile on these four issue dimensions than their national colleagues. It looked as though the Gaullist parliamentary group in the National Assembly made a special effort to appoint hard–liners on these issues to the European Parliament. See ibid, pp. 64–65.

⁶⁴ On the issue of creating an European atomic strike force, table 9 reports these differences only for the German Christian Democrats, since this was the only group of members and non–members that showed any differences in their attitudes toward this issue. See ibid, pp. 160–161.

⁶⁵ See footnote no. 21 above, and Feld, Werner, “The French and Italian Communists and the Common Market: The Request for Representation in the Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 03 1968 (Vol. 6, No. 3), p. 264.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The method of analysis used was multiple classification analysis (MCA), which is a means of estimating partial correlation coefficients for nominal level data. The measure of association is called eta (not to be confused with Stake's eta referred to above). See Andrews, Fred M., Morgan, James N., and Sonquist, John A., Multiple Classification Analysis (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1967).Google Scholar The categories used for the independent variables in this analysis were as follows: (1) national party affiliation by the seven national parties represented in the French and German samples; (2) age by the brackets of (a) 40 years old or less, (b) 41 to 49, (c) 50 to 59, (d) 60 to 69, and (e) 70 years or older; (3) length of membership by (a) non–member (zero years), (b) less than one to two years, (c) three to six years, and (d) seven years or longer; and, (4) recruitment by the four categories of potential volunteers, non–volunteers, self–recruits, and party–recruits.

⁶⁷ See Inglehart, , The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, passim.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For a comparison of field and laboratory methods, see Hovland, Carl I, “Reconciling Conflicting Results Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies of Attitude Change,” American Psychologist, 1959 (Vol. 14, No. 1), pp. 8–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁹ Personal communication from Professor Daniel Katz.

⁷⁰ See Russett, Bruce M., “International Communication and Legislative Behavior: The Senate and the House of Commons,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962 (Vol. 6, No. 2), pp. 291–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁷² In a different context, Lieberman has demonstrated the link between role assumption and attitude change. See Lieberman, Seymour, “The Effects of Changes in Roles on the Attitudes of Role Occupants,” Human Relations, 1956 (Vol. 9, No. 4), pp. 385–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷³ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, pp. 390–440.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Observers of the parliament are at one in this conclusion. See, inter alia, Forsyth, Murray, The Parliament of the European Communities, pp. 94–97Google Scholar; Schwarz, , “Power, Persuasion and the Influence of the European Parliament,” pp. 248–257Google Scholar; Lindberg, , in Frank (ed.), Lawyers in a Changing World, pp. 101–128Google Scholar; and, Houdbine, Anne–Marie and Verges, Jean–Raymond, Le Parlement Europeen dans la Construction de l’Europe des Six, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968).Google Scholar