Attributing a great deal of attention to global and local knowledge, this paper is focused on law and society scholarship that has been published by Israelis, both Jewish and Arab-Palestinians. It attempts to unveil and to map some of the major issues that have characterised the scholarly debates and intellectual discourse, primarily critical questions on law and political power, the nation-state, legal rights discourse and equality. More specifically, the paper analyses socio-legal research on various local issues, such as multiculturalism and national rifts on the backdrop of the 1967 military occupation alongside the emergence of a neoliberal capitalist economy. The protracted Arab-Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the fragmentation of the political partisan map in Israel have incited more emphasis on the place of the Israeli Supreme Court, primarily sitting as a High Court of Justice, in public life as an important regulatory institution. This focus on the judicial power of the Court has resulted in an even more frantic controversy on whether the Court has become too engaged in political affairs. In all the law and society debates, local concepts and global knowledge have been intertwined. Hence, the paper enables scholars around the world to closely examine law and society scholarship on the convergence of local and global knowledge.

The impact of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law on modern legal thinking is undisputed. But does it reflect the reality of the way British institutions work? In Concept, Hart argued, amongst other things, that one of two ‘minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system’ was that ‘its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials’. In this paper, we begin the process of testing that statement empirically. Specifically, we ask whether non-judicial UK officials have a uniform view of what the rules of recognition, change and adjudication are, and whether they uniformly take an internal point of view towards them (i.e. whether they accept the rules and do not merely obey them). By way of a pilot study, thirty non-judicial UK officials were interviewed. Those officials comprised currently serving and retired senior civil servants, senior military officials, chief constables and local authority chief executives. The findings of the pilot study are presented in this paper. They allow us to deduce that Hart's statement might well be an inaccurate and incomplete description of the modern British constitution, and to comment on the implications of that conclusion.

States’ bordering practices force individuals to undertake dangerous migratory journeys and put them at risk of severe human rights violations. Yet, irregular arrivals who are found not to be at risk of serious harm in their countries of origin are perceived as voluntary migrants and are therefore assumed not to be in need of protection. This article employs the concept of vulnerability to challenge the idea that both the initial and subsequent dangerous migratory journeys are undertaken voluntarily. Based on an analysis of trafficking-based asylum claims from the UK and Germany, the article shows that both re-trafficking and irregular re-migration result from vulnerabilities which converge to preclude reintegration in the country of origin and access to livelihood options. While some of these vulnerabilities are likely to be present at the time of the initial dangerous journey already, the article pays particular attention to ‘consequential vulnerabilities’ brought about by previous migration experiences. It then introduces the concept of ‘route causes’ of irregular re-migration to describe factors which heighten the risk of re-migrating irregularly and therefore establish a risk on return related to harm experienced during irregular migration, rather than in the country of origin. Thus, the article shows that the vulnerability concept informs the future risk analysis in refugee law and argues that, just like a risk of re-trafficking, a risk of irregular re-migration could form the basis of an asylum claim.

The traditional drafting and subsequent implementation of international refugee law have been criticised for relying on a male-centric understanding of persecution. Whilst this framework has recently shifted to include a more gender-sensitive interpretation, I argue that this introduction of gender within refugee status determination has traditionally relied on narratives infused with gendered and racialised stereotypes. In particular, it relies on a ‘white saviour’ colonial narrative that perceives refugee women as vulnerable victims in need of saving. Drawing on a decolonial and critical epistemological analysis that includes both a race and gender dimension, I unpack the epistemic violence and hidden colonial legacies in the representation of refugee women in case-law. Ultimately, this article concludes with a call for reframing the legal narrative around refugee women by approaching them as political actors rather than oppressed and vulnerable subjects.

I want to thank Roger Cotterrell for his stimulating lecture, and thank especially Carrie Menkel-Meadow and the International Journal of Law in Context for the opportunity to participate in this important conversation. I admire Professor Cotterrell’s choice of topic; he has taken up a really hard and pressing question for many pluralist societies right now, which is how law and legal theory might make sense of the legal demands of cultural pluralism. Kwame Anthony Appiah has nicely articulated a similar version of this problem: ‘The challenge, then, is to take minds and hearts formed over the long millennia of living in local troops and equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become’ (Appiah, 2006, p. xiii). Even if you do not share Appiah’s exuberant cosmopolitanism, the issue remains that conflict between human groups based on small differences often unrecognisable to outsiders is probably the norm in human history, and each society (however defined) continues to negotiate that problem of boundaries, membership and codes of conduct, of who can be included and whose practices can and cannot be tolerated.

In his latest book, the renowned political philosopher Michael Sandel asks what has become a pressing question for our age: Is there anything money can't buy? Sandel shows that there are certainly very few. If you've got the money, you can: hunt and kill endangered species like the black rhino; have 24/7 access to a doctor; give your child an elite education; gain a right to pollute the atmosphere; get people to stand in queues for you; place a bet that a particular celebrity will die next year; gain the life insurance policies of people who are seriously ill in the hope of cashing in when they die; and you can even get someone to make an apology on your behalf.

This paper discusses the promises and limits of a Peircean semiotic approach to the concept of style in law. It does so in two steps: first (1) by identifying the place of style within the structure of law as a system of signs, then (2) by conceptualising the link between law and style in the thought of C.S. Peirce and highlighting some of the insights from a Peircean take on legal semiotics that may contribute to our understanding of the role of style in making meaning in law. It is argued that, for a Peircean analysis of law, three levels can be distinguished, from the ‘surface structure’ down to the ‘deep structure’. It is at the middle level (that of the ‘basic structure’) that a semiotic approach can yield coherent insights in terms of style, by examining the symbols and metaphors that make for the expressibility of ‘habits’, namely experience-based patterns of action and interpretation.

This paper explores the relationship between style and epistemology as regards the discipline of law – especially in the Romanistic tradition – and, more specifically, its resistance to interdisciplinarity. Drawing on literary theory and discourse analysis literature, the first part of this paper examines the notion of ‘style’ in relation to academic disciplines. It argues that the variety of writing styles reflects the various epistemologies underlying the different disciplinary discourses and makes interdisciplinarity difficult to implement in general. The second part of this study borrows Roland Barthes's distinction between ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ texts in order to show that lawyers’ writing manners hinder the ability of law to connect with other disciplines. Against the background of the two sections, this contribution will finally include a discussion on what could be done to enhance law(yers)’s capability for interdisciplinary thinking, concluding that style might be not so insignificant a place to start with.

The 1987 film RoboCop is not just a science fiction action story; it is also a critique of the neoliberal resurgence in law and politics at the end of the twentieth century. In particular it critiques the privatisation of police services, and the expansion of private property claims to cover a cyborg policeman, notwithstanding its human components. I connect the critique in the film with the broader academic literature dealing with the privatisation of police forces and the expansion of private property claims, particularly copyright and patents. Finally, I consider whether, as a result of the neoliberal expansion of private property rights over the last few decades, the law could now justify a private property claim over a cyborg like the one in the film.

In contemporary law, genetic technologies of the body have provided a new layer of complexity to legal determinations of racial identity. Indigenous peoples in particular are often forced to present themselves before law as invisible peoples requesting embodiment, possessing no set identity and requiring a legal determination of their status. In return for their participation in genetic research indigenous peoples have been promised, amongst other things, a reliable identification that would make them visible as indigenous before the law. This article examines genetic and non-genetic approaches to identifying indigenous peoples through a case study of Australian law and argues that while genetic technologies may have little to offer indigenous populations they do hold out the possibility of making visible to whites and white institutions their own obscured racial identity.

Introducing our Special Issue on marginalisation, this paper considers some of the challenges that this topic poses for legal scholars. The paper identifies that these challenges arise principally from the ambivalence of ‘marginalisation’ itself: at once an idea so broad that it arguably underpins the bulk of legal research (and socio-legal research in particular), but at the same time an idea that in practice too often quickly gives way to various other neighbouring ones: disadvantage, discrimination, disempowerment, exclusion, inequality, silencing, stigmatisation, victimisation and so on. This paper considers this ambivalence and traces etymological roots (and routes) by which we understand the margin, the marginalised and marginalisation.

The recognition of individual identity as multilayered and circumstance based leads to a shift from a theory of general rights to a theory of specific rights connected to structural social change. General rights, such as the right to health and the right to work, must be interpreted according to the circumstance of differently situated women, so that rights are specific enough to ensure that they are actually enforced for different groups, including groups that, due to discrimination, are made invisible to the law. In this sense, the different circumstances that help develop the identity of women, Black women or poor Black women in Brazil will be studied to give specific content to general rights recognised by Brazilian law and by International human rights law.

Since the late nineteenth century, ideas about law, both Albanian and ‘other’, have played significant parts in the development of a sense of ‘Albanian-ness’ and remain central to the ongoing construction of the nation. In this paper, I examine how comparative thinking about ‘Albanian law’ in northern Albania and predominantly Albanian Kosovo has contributed to nation-building aims, with particular reference to comparative thinking around the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjin, an early-twentieth-century legal code rooted in northern-Albanian customary practices. I look at this from two perspectives: comparative thinking by the law-writer in the Kanun and comparative thinking by a contemporaneous writer about the Kanun. Through these perspectives, we gain a more nuanced understanding of the intellectual context of the Kanun’s production than is reflected in the existing literature, and a glimpse of its continued relevance today to ideas of nation.

This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's ‘positivist’ and Whitman's ‘cultural’ comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’ cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.