In France, judicial expertise operates within a specific institutional framework at the same time as it covers a distinctive community of practitioners called upon for their technical or scientific knowledge to serve justice. Indeed, while experts in the US are selected by the litigants, the French model features judge-appointed experts. This model could offer better guarantee of independence and neutrality, to the point that recent developments in the US suggest the emergence of a new court-appointed expert. What does such an institutional model involve in terms of evidence production? To answer this question, this paper looks at two areas of expertise in France: economic experts and forensic pathologists. Through an ethnography of the co-production of legal evidence, it analyses the black box of the French practices of legal expertise and allows the way in which the institutional context influences the producing of legal evidence, beyond differences between a scalpel and a calculator, to be understood.

Existing policies on HIV testing were developed decades ago when HIV infection led nearly inevitably to AIDS and death. Since then rapid clinical progress has occurred. HIV infected people with access to life-preserving care and treatment no longer experience an existential threat to their life and wellbeing. HIV infection today, at least in North America and Western Europe, represents a chronic but manageable illness. Moreover, with treatment most infected people are rendered, to all intents and purposes, non-infectious. In this paper, we discuss the ethical, policy and legal implications of the changing clinical picture of HIV/AIDS. In particular, we propose significant changes to existing HIV testing policies as well as to policies pertaining to the criminalisation of infected people's sexual behaviour in North America and Western Europe.

Across scholarship and legal practice, family law is widely recognised as a subject that is inextricable from the social and cultural forces that shape our understanding of how families work and how they are positioned within society. This paper argues that it is now time to build upon this by integrating an explicit awareness of political context into how we teach family law. This is because teachers of family law are now faced with an urgent challenge: the encroachment of neoliberal governance into all corners of family justice. Neoliberal ideas are far from new, but they are increasingly shaping dominant ideas about what family law is for, who should be entitled to use it and, even in some circumstances, questioning the very legitimacy of family law or legal processes as means for supporting families experiencing breakdown. In response to this challenge, this paper advocates the importance of guiding students to look beyond family law doctrine in order to consider how political initiatives, trends and debates have the power to shape the procedures and processes through which family disputes are resolved. It will argue that drawing this contextual awareness into family law studies is crucially important to ensure that the future development of family law as both a scholarly discipline and an area of practice is centred on the needs and lived experiences of families who need it.

Many different indicators are used to monitor poverty and poverty-related deprivations. Two kinds of legitimacy worries may arise about any such indicator: one regarding its reliability as a measure of progress and another regarding the uses to which it is being put. This essay will touch upon both worries, beginning with the latter.

Legalised accountability – the definition of torture as an illicit behaviour and the mobilisation of law-enforcement agencies, prosecutorial offices and courts to gather evidence, prosecute and convict torture perpetrators – has become central to anti-torture policies around the world, including Brazil. Based on legal-consciousness scholarship and in-depth interviews, this paper investigates the place and meaning of law in the everyday lives of Brazilian anti-torture activists. Counter-intuitive as it may sound, interviewees articulated an account in which law's authority is largely rejected, while non-legal tools against torture look much more preferable – even if they residually and cynically engage with the law. While exploring the discursive roots of such account, this paper highlights the role of law and justice institutions, particularly those in the criminal justice system, in the of building social support for – or rejection of – the law. These findings add to our knowledge of law's hegemony, while providing valuable insights for future legal-consciousness studies.

While private corporations have become increasingly influential in the global economy, a comprehensive legal framework for their activities is missing. Although international and regional legal instruments may govern some aspects of, for instance, international investments and the supply of goods and services, there is no overarching structure for assessing the impact of large-scale private projects. In the absence of such a comprehensive framework, specific rules of private law allow profit-seeking companies to expand their activities on an economic basis, mostly without having to heed social concerns (Pistor, 2019). This is particularly problematic insofar as multinational companies have obtained power to set the rules for their engagement with states, organisations and individuals, for instance in the form of transnational investment contracts. Given the fragmented nature of the legal sphere in which such contracts are elaborated and performed, those who face the harmful consequences of such investments may not be able to participate in decision-making processes. The contracts remain in ‘wild zones’ of globalisation (Fraser, 2014, p. 150), where powerful private companies rule.

There is a growing international emphasis on the importance of diversity in the judiciary and the impact of the individual in decision-making. However, it can be a challenge to gain insight into the individuals who sit on the bench. For instance, there is limited official information about the individuals who sit on the High Court of Australia. One of the rare glimpses provided by the justices themselves is their judicial swearing-in speech. Drawing on a case-study of the swearing-in speeches of High Court justices sitting between 2008 and 2016, this paper illustrates how these speeches can illuminate key demographic information about the judiciary, as well as facets of the individual rarely explored in studies of judicial diversity: personality and values. This study demonstrates how swearing-in speeches can assist with filling information gaps about judicial diversity, and so extend debates about judicial selection.

In his latest book, the renowned political philosopher Michael Sandel asks what has become a pressing question for our age: Is there anything money can't buy? Sandel shows that there are certainly very few. If you've got the money, you can: hunt and kill endangered species like the black rhino; have 24/7 access to a doctor; give your child an elite education; gain a right to pollute the atmosphere; get people to stand in queues for you; place a bet that a particular celebrity will die next year; gain the life insurance policies of people who are seriously ill in the hope of cashing in when they die; and you can even get someone to make an apology on your behalf.

I want to thank Roger Cotterrell for his stimulating lecture, and thank especially Carrie Menkel-Meadow and the International Journal of Law in Context for the opportunity to participate in this important conversation. I admire Professor Cotterrell’s choice of topic; he has taken up a really hard and pressing question for many pluralist societies right now, which is how law and legal theory might make sense of the legal demands of cultural pluralism. Kwame Anthony Appiah has nicely articulated a similar version of this problem: ‘The challenge, then, is to take minds and hearts formed over the long millennia of living in local troops and equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become’ (Appiah, 2006, p. xiii). Even if you do not share Appiah’s exuberant cosmopolitanism, the issue remains that conflict between human groups based on small differences often unrecognisable to outsiders is probably the norm in human history, and each society (however defined) continues to negotiate that problem of boundaries, membership and codes of conduct, of who can be included and whose practices can and cannot be tolerated.

The recognition of individual identity as multilayered and circumstance based leads to a shift from a theory of general rights to a theory of specific rights connected to structural social change. General rights, such as the right to health and the right to work, must be interpreted according to the circumstance of differently situated women, so that rights are specific enough to ensure that they are actually enforced for different groups, including groups that, due to discrimination, are made invisible to the law. In this sense, the different circumstances that help develop the identity of women, Black women or poor Black women in Brazil will be studied to give specific content to general rights recognised by Brazilian law and by International human rights law.

This paper discusses the promises and limits of a Peircean semiotic approach to the concept of style in law. It does so in two steps: first (1) by identifying the place of style within the structure of law as a system of signs, then (2) by conceptualising the link between law and style in the thought of C.S. Peirce and highlighting some of the insights from a Peircean take on legal semiotics that may contribute to our understanding of the role of style in making meaning in law. It is argued that, for a Peircean analysis of law, three levels can be distinguished, from the ‘surface structure’ down to the ‘deep structure’. It is at the middle level (that of the ‘basic structure’) that a semiotic approach can yield coherent insights in terms of style, by examining the symbols and metaphors that make for the expressibility of ‘habits’, namely experience-based patterns of action and interpretation.

This paper explores the relationship between style and epistemology as regards the discipline of law – especially in the Romanistic tradition – and, more specifically, its resistance to interdisciplinarity. Drawing on literary theory and discourse analysis literature, the first part of this paper examines the notion of ‘style’ in relation to academic disciplines. It argues that the variety of writing styles reflects the various epistemologies underlying the different disciplinary discourses and makes interdisciplinarity difficult to implement in general. The second part of this study borrows Roland Barthes's distinction between ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ texts in order to show that lawyers’ writing manners hinder the ability of law to connect with other disciplines. Against the background of the two sections, this contribution will finally include a discussion on what could be done to enhance law(yers)’s capability for interdisciplinary thinking, concluding that style might be not so insignificant a place to start with.