This article considers the development in several Commonwealth jurisdictions of the law relating to “horizontal subdivisions”2, or subdivided buildings. The latter expression describes the situation where title to land can relate to a slice of defined area or cubic space, which is not grounded on the surface layer of the earth, and is divided not only horizontally, but vertically as well.

In 2015, frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations in the International Maritime Organisation, the EU issued Regulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport. Echoing the controversial Aviation Directive, the Regulation is intended to support a unilateral market-based measure, and includes emissions from outside EU territory. This raises the question whether, according to international law, the EU has jurisdiction to regulate such ‘extraterritorial’ circumstances. In exploring the appropriate jurisdictional bases, we argue that neither the Law of the Sea Convention, nor world trade law definitively decide this issue. We therefore devote more detailed attention to the customary international law of State jurisdiction supplementing these regimes. We seek to build on the existing analysis by examining climate change as a ‘common concern of mankind’. We argue that this emerging concept has distinct legal implications that can and should be accommodated within the interest-balancing exercise underlying the jurisdictional analysis.

Although a few States ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court1 soon after it was promulgated, the UK decided to prepare and pass implementing legislation prior to submitting its ratification. In England and Wales (and Northern Ireland),2 the ICC Statute is implemented by the International Criminal Court Act 2001,3 which came fully into force on 1 September 2001.4 The UK ratified the ICC Statute on 4 October 2001, fulfilling its aim of being amongst the first sixty States to do so.5 The Act has two major purposes, to ensure that the UK is able to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC), and to enact into domestic law the substantive offences the ICC may assert jurisdiction over when it comes into being.6 It is the purpose of this note to introduce the Act and point to some interesting issues that may arise in the future.

Human rights are one of the great ideas of the twentieth century. After World War II, first Eleanor Roosevelt in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘the Universal Declaration’), and then later the drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the European Convention’) saw human rights as the way to make the world fairer and safer.

On 29 November 1996 Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“the ICTY”) handed down its sentence in the case of Dražen Erdemović. This was a decision of historie significance for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being that it was the first sentence passed by an international war crimes tribunals, applying international law, since the International Military Tribunals which sat at Nuremberg and Tokyo between 1945 and 1948; it was also the first time a truly international tribunal bas concluded the trial of a minor war criminal, as opposed to a senior military commander or political leader. In addition, it was the first sentence handed down by the ICTY, which has been plagued sincc its first days of operation by problems in securing evidence and witnesses, not to mention the presence of the accused. Now the ICTY has shown, in the face of widespread criticism and accusations of impotence, that it can actually perform the task assigned to it. The doubt about such a judgment is that the Erdemović case is not perhaps the best basis on which to assess the ICTY's performance, so singular were the accused's conduct and, indeed, the circumstances in which he found himself before the Tribunal. Essentially, had it not been for the accused's voluntary surrender and his extensive co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor, and the co-operation of the judirial authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in transferring Erdemović to The Hague, the case would probably never have happened at all.

The issue of women's under-representation in politics continues to be controversial and pressing in countries all over the world. According to the Inter Parliamentary Union, only 14.7 per cent of the world's legislators are women.1 In no country do women achieve parity with men in terms of parliamentary representation. The record of many of the world's most developed countries is particularly poor. Looking at lower houses of the legislature, in the US women's representation is only 14 per cent, in the UK 18 per cent, France 12 per cent and Italy 10 per cent. These countries are considerably out-performed by others such as South Africa and Argentina, both at 30 per cent.2

The law applicable to arbitration is not the law applicable in arbitration. The latter determines arbitrators' decisions. The former refers to the source of their authority: the legal order that governs arbitration. According to the territorialist thesis, an arbitration can have no foundation other than that of the legal order of the particular State in which the arbitration takes place. This outdated conception is disproved by the simple factual observation that a plurality of legal orders may give effect to arbitration. Some French scholars promote the notion of an autonomous arbitral order. Inasmuch as they ultimately seek to establish this order by positing its recognition by the very State orders from which they claim autonomy, their idea is circular and in effect no more than a dressed-up variant of ordinary horizontal pluralism. But the model of horizontal pluralism fails to account for important orderings of arbitral activity. Arbitration in modern society is accurately perceived as a complex, three-dimensional form of pluralism, in which legal orders (i) are not exclusively those of States and (ii) frequently overlap.

The paper offers the first comprehensive treatment of the applicability and regulation of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts. It introduces three approaches to the topic (‘extralegal’, ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches) which all enjoy some support among States and scholars. The paper shows that international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, IHL customs and other legal sources do not make it possible to decide between these approaches, as they are either silent on the topic or allow for several interpretations. It is the assessment of extralegal considerations and of the general framework of IHL which allows us to conclude that belligerent reprisals are inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (‘extralegal’ approach). Yet, there are signs indicating that a gradual shift toward the ‘restrictive’ approach could be under way. The paper cautions against a premature acceptance of this approach drawing attention to its limits.

On 17 January 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.1 Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric once described as ‘Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe’, was convicted in absentia in Jordan for various terrorist offences.2 He alleges, however, that part of the evidence against him had been obtained under torture. In 1994 he was granted refugee status and permitted to remain in the United Kingdom (UK) temporarily. Qatada later applied for indefinite leave to stay. While his application was pending, he was arrested in October 2002 and detained without charge or trial under the now-repealed Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In March 2005 he was released from detention and put under a ‘control order’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A few months later, the UK government sought to deport Qatada to his native Jordan, having first concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Jordanian government that he would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The deportation order was challenged before English courts, but ultimately upheld by the House of Lords in RB (FC) and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department and OO v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2009.3 In contrast, the ECtHR ruled unanimously that the UK could not lawfully deport Qatada to Jordan. The decision was criticized by Home Secretary Theresa May as ‘unacceptable’ and predictably led to several Conservative backbenchers in the House of Commons calling on the government to withdraw from the ECHR.4

On 4 August 1995 the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, at its sixth session, adopted without a vote the text of the Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.1 The title is often shortened to “the Straddling Stocks Agreement”. To date, the Agreement has been signed by 29 States.2 It marks a significant clarification and development in the rules of international law relating to fishing on the high seas, within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is generally perceived to be of a rather ‘specialist and technical nature’. However, for the many UK and EU citizens, families and businesses who work, live, travel and do business abroad, the current European framework for choice of law, jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement is of paramount importance. The article, therefore, explores how that framework might look like after Brexit and explores the merits and demerits of the various ways forward. It argues that the best option for both the UK and the EU would be to agree on the continued application of the existing EU instruments or to strive for conclusion of a new agreement that closely replicates these instruments. If no such agreement can be reached the UK should decide to apply the Rome I and Rome II Regulations unilaterally and sign the Lugano Convention of 2007 as well as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 2005.