This article argues that critical and emerging technologies, evolving geopolitical dynamics and the urgent need to pursue the green agenda are changing the traditional approach of the European Union (EU) and its Member States towards their trade and security strategies, and this is particularly evident in the domain of export controls. In search of a balance between green energy, security and technological progress, this article explores the potential for a more cohesive and comprehensive regulatory framework for export controls at the EU level. It takes the debate beyond a technical level of export control lists to discuss geopolitical and strategic assumptions surrounding inter-State cooperation on the regulation of critical and emerging technologies and their components. The article underscores, in particular, the potential unintended repercussions of controls for the EU's technological future and the prospects of the green transition in Europe and beyond. Finally, it advocates for what is often overlooked in discussions: the necessity for the EU to set clear, long-term objectives for its export controls and to align them with the purposes and objectives of other EU economic instruments.

The recent rise of ‘qualified neutrality’ has proven highly controversial. Some have suggested that the separation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello under international law may prevent the reform of ‘traditional neutrality’ into qualified neutrality. This article will seek to resolve academic debate on this topic, arguing that the principle of separation is of limited relevance to perpetuation and reform within the law of neutrality. Although the principle of separation is prima facie incompatible with qualified neutrality, it does not have the required characteristics as a legal rule to inhibit reform of the law of neutrality and the recognition of qualified neutrality as a positive rule under international law.

This article examines how the war in Ukraine has had an impact upon the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and transnational cooperation in Europe. It explains how, in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU has relaunched its enlargement process (notably, by opening accession negotiations with Ukraine), promoted the establishment of a new European Political Community and deepened its ties with other regional organisations, like the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Kingdom. It is argued that the return of large-scale warfare to the European continent for the first time since the end of World War II has contributed to reaffirming the role of the EU as a beacon of liberty, peace, security and prosperity, and highlighted the dynamism of the European integration project. Nevertheless, a number of challenges lie ahead, especially regarding enlargement, including both the candidates’ preparation and the EU's own readiness. The article therefore proceeds to map the debate about EU reform, the ongoing stalemate and the open questions concerning the future of Europe in order to illustrate fully the impact of the war in Ukraine on the enlargement project.

The widespread use of artificial intelligence technologies in border management throughout the European Union has significant human rights implications that extend beyond the commonly examined issues of privacy, non-discrimination and data protection. This article explores these overlooked impacts through three critical frameworks: the erosion of freedom of thought, the disempowerment of individuals and the politicization of human dignity. In uncovering these dynamics, the article argues for a broader conception of human rights to prevent their gradual erosion and safeguard the core principle of protecting human dignity.

Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains a provision which allows for the involuntary withdrawal, or expulsion, of a State from the ECHR if it has been expelled from, or ceased to be a member of, the Council of Europe (CoE). By comparing Russia's exit from the ECHR in 2022 with that of Greece in 1969, this article demonstrates that involuntary withdrawal poses a number of legal problems—partly as a result of it not having been considered during the drafting of the ECHR or the Statute of the CoE, and partly because of the highly unclear basis on which involuntary withdrawal operates. The article then conducts a comparative analysis of other regional human rights systems and public international law principles on treaty withdrawal in order to suggest a more comprehensive legal foundation for expulsion.

The discourse on State immunity has traditionally focused on its application in judicial proceedings. However, in recent years scholars have begun to address whether the law on State immunity also protects foreign States against measures taken against their property by the territorial State's executive and/or legislative organs. This question has been raised following unilateral sanctions regimes freezing property of foreign States. It has gained renewed attention in the context of the ‘immobilization’ of around €300 billion of the Central Bank of Russia's assets as a reaction to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. In addition, there are recent suggestions to subject these sovereign assets to further steps, including confiscation, the generation of investment returns or taxing windfall profits accruing to the entities holding the assets. This article revisits the various conceptions of the law on State immunity to address the question of whether a principle of State immunity against non-judicial measures of constraint exists. Based on a review of existing State practice and opinio juris, it argues that customary international law does provide for State immunity in this context. However, the article further contends that the content of the norm should be construed differently than in relation to judicial proceedings, recognizing the weight of public policy concerns of the territorial State.