Internet communication has long been known to pose a challenge to private international law and its reliance on geographical connecting factors. This article looks at the problem from the perspective of EU private international law and argues that the way in which it has been accommodated by Regulations Brussels I, Rome I, and II conflicts with some of its central paradigms. It advances an alternative approach that would generally submit claims against information society service providers established in the EU to the jurisdiction and substantive laws of their ‘country of origin’ but make certain exceptions for private persons and consumers. The article argues that implementing such an approach would require little legislative change, be more faithful to the particularities of internet communication, and give greater effect to the central paradigms of EU private international law.

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of McElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK, and Fogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.

Although a few States ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court1 soon after it was promulgated, the UK decided to prepare and pass implementing legislation prior to submitting its ratification. In England and Wales (and Northern Ireland),2 the ICC Statute is implemented by the International Criminal Court Act 2001,3 which came fully into force on 1 September 2001.4 The UK ratified the ICC Statute on 4 October 2001, fulfilling its aim of being amongst the first sixty States to do so.5 The Act has two major purposes, to ensure that the UK is able to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC), and to enact into domestic law the substantive offences the ICC may assert jurisdiction over when it comes into being.6 It is the purpose of this note to introduce the Act and point to some interesting issues that may arise in the future.

The history of clashes over extraterritorial jurisdiction between the United States of America and other States in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere is a long one. That history is commonly traced back to the antitrust claims arising from the Alcoa case in 1945, in which the “effects” doctrine was advanced in the peculiar and objectionable form in which it is applied, not simply to acts which constitute elements of a single offence but which occur in different jurisdictions but, rather, to the economic repercussions of acts in one State which are felt in another. The conflict persisted into the 1950s, with the clashes over US regulation of the international shipping and paper industries. In the 1960s and 1970s there were further clashes in relation to the extraterritorial application of US competition laws, notably in disputes over shipping regulation and the notorious Uranium Antitrust litigation, in which US laws were applied to penalise the extraterritorial conduct of non-US companies, conducted with the approval of their national governments, at a time when those companies were barred by US law from trading in the United States. It was that litigation which was in large measure responsible for the adoption in the United Kingdom of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which significantly extended the powers which the British government had asserted in the 1952 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act to defend British interests against US extraterritorial claims.

This article considers the development in several Commonwealth jurisdictions of the law relating to “horizontal subdivisions”2, or subdivided buildings. The latter expression describes the situation where title to land can relate to a slice of defined area or cubic space, which is not grounded on the surface layer of the earth, and is divided not only horizontally, but vertically as well.

The raison d'être of ASEAN was a political one,1 to secure the region's peace, stability, and development. Against all odds, the founding members, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration on 8 August 1967. Brunei was admitted in January 1984, Vietnam in 1995, which was followed closely by Laos and Myanmar in 1997. Thirty-two years later, on 30 April 1999, ASEAN formally encompassed all ten countries of South-East Asia by admitting Cambodia.2

The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture entered into force on 22 June 2006. It establishes a Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture that has authority to visit places of detention and to assess the conditions of that detention as a way to reduce the incidence of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Additionally, States parties are required to set up complementary national preventive mechanisms. This article explores both how these mechanisms established under the Optional Protocol could operate in the context of the detention of refugees and/or asylum-seekers, which is an increasingly common occurrence in many parts of the world, as well as whether they add value to existing international mechanisms that are already available in this field. It examines the purported applicability of the Optional Protocol to four refugee/asylum situations, namely detention at airports and other border zones; immigration (or administrative) detention, including semi-open (or semi-closed) asylum centres; closed refugee camps; and extraterritorial processing or holding centres. Reviewing definitional, jurisdictional, and practical issues that may impact on the success or otherwise of these new preventive mechanisms, this article concludes by making a number of recommendations to aid their work in the refugee/asylum context.

The paper offers the first comprehensive treatment of the applicability and regulation of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts. It introduces three approaches to the topic (‘extralegal’, ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches) which all enjoy some support among States and scholars. The paper shows that international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, IHL customs and other legal sources do not make it possible to decide between these approaches, as they are either silent on the topic or allow for several interpretations. It is the assessment of extralegal considerations and of the general framework of IHL which allows us to conclude that belligerent reprisals are inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (‘extralegal’ approach). Yet, there are signs indicating that a gradual shift toward the ‘restrictive’ approach could be under way. The paper cautions against a premature acceptance of this approach drawing attention to its limits.

Recent years have witnessed significant developments in international human rights law relating to domestic violence. No longer viewed as a matter ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State’, domestic violence now frequently commands the attention of international human rights bodies. The obligations imposed on States include positive obligations of due diligence to prevent, investigate and to punish domestic violence, whenever and wherever it occurs.1 Judicial dialogue across the borders of human rights and refugee law has also expanded access to asylum for women fleeing domestic violence, bringing with it a gradual recognition of the positive obligations that international law now imposes on States. However, as recent cases such as Jessica Gonzalez v the United States2 and Opuz v Turkey3 reveal, significant gaps remain between the rhetoric of human rights law and the reality of everyday enforcement and implementation on the ground. These gaps are most keenly felt by refugee women. While State practice suggests greater gender inclusivity and sensitivity in the practice of refugee law, women fleeing domestic violence continue to face obstacles in making their claims heard.

On 4 August 1995 the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, at its sixth session, adopted without a vote the text of the Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.1 The title is often shortened to “the Straddling Stocks Agreement”. To date, the Agreement has been signed by 29 States.2 It marks a significant clarification and development in the rules of international law relating to fishing on the high seas, within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

On 17 January 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.1 Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric once described as ‘Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe’, was convicted in absentia in Jordan for various terrorist offences.2 He alleges, however, that part of the evidence against him had been obtained under torture. In 1994 he was granted refugee status and permitted to remain in the United Kingdom (UK) temporarily. Qatada later applied for indefinite leave to stay. While his application was pending, he was arrested in October 2002 and detained without charge or trial under the now-repealed Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In March 2005 he was released from detention and put under a ‘control order’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A few months later, the UK government sought to deport Qatada to his native Jordan, having first concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Jordanian government that he would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The deportation order was challenged before English courts, but ultimately upheld by the House of Lords in RB (FC) and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department and OO v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2009.3 In contrast, the ECtHR ruled unanimously that the UK could not lawfully deport Qatada to Jordan. The decision was criticized by Home Secretary Theresa May as ‘unacceptable’ and predictably led to several Conservative backbenchers in the House of Commons calling on the government to withdraw from the ECHR.4

In November 1995 a draft resolution was presented to the 28th General Conference of UNESCO which, among other matters, dealt with the organisation's future activities in the field of the underwater cultural heritage.1 In conjunction with this resolution, the text of a draft Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage prepared by the International Law Association (ILA) was presented to the General Conference as the possible basis for a new international convention on the subject.2 Annexed to this draft Convention text was the Charter for the Protection and Management of the Underwater Cultural Heritage prepared by the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)3 to accompany the ILA draft Convention and serve as a set of criteria of good practice to be applied by States parties to the Convention. The General Conference adopted the draft resolution without any change and this therefore forms the basis for future deliberations within UNESCO over this issue, the question whether to draft an international convention on the basis of the ILA draft text having been a central part of the deliberations. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, meetings have been held between UNESCO and various bodies with an interest in the issue (such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Oceanographic Commission as well as the UN Law of the Sea office). Following these consultations, it was agreed to hold a joint meeting of representatives of these organisations with chosen experts in order to examine the ILA draft Convention along with any other material relevant to a new legal instrument for the protection of the underwater cultural heritage.

The law applicable to arbitration is not the law applicable in arbitration. The latter determines arbitrators' decisions. The former refers to the source of their authority: the legal order that governs arbitration. According to the territorialist thesis, an arbitration can have no foundation other than that of the legal order of the particular State in which the arbitration takes place. This outdated conception is disproved by the simple factual observation that a plurality of legal orders may give effect to arbitration. Some French scholars promote the notion of an autonomous arbitral order. Inasmuch as they ultimately seek to establish this order by positing its recognition by the very State orders from which they claim autonomy, their idea is circular and in effect no more than a dressed-up variant of ordinary horizontal pluralism. But the model of horizontal pluralism fails to account for important orderings of arbitral activity. Arbitration in modern society is accurately perceived as a complex, three-dimensional form of pluralism, in which legal orders (i) are not exclusively those of States and (ii) frequently overlap.