This issue of the Quarterly marks 60 years of its publication, since 1958 under the auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. To mark the occasion the editorial board has taken the opportunity to reflect on the contribution the Quarterly has made in the key areas of legal scholarship represented in its pages (and accordingly in the composition of the editorial board), namely, public international law, private international law, comparative law, EU law and human rights law.

There are arguments indicating that Brussels I could be applicable to cross-border competition law proceedings before a National Competition Authority located in one Member State and private EU competition law proceedings before another Member State court. However, an analysis of the current private international law framework appears to indicate that Brussels I is not well suited to deal with the difficulties that could arise in this context. Given the fact that, in the new proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments there is no indication that special jurisdictional bases for competition law actions in the successor to Brussels I are on anyone's agenda, an option for a reform may be setting up a new and special regulation to be applicable with regard to EU competition law claims only.

Writing 62 years ago, Georg Schwarzenberger posited that international criminal law did not exist. As long as some States, those larger or more powerful, were held to a different standard, or, in fact, not held to account at all, it was premature to speak of such a thing. For Schwarzenberger, international criminal law was a misnomer without universal criminal justice. This article considers whether that same criticism can be made of international criminal law today. Indeed, it asks whether this is a realistic expectation in the first place. The recently concluded Review Conference of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda is seen as an ideal juncture at which to do so. This article analyses what is meant by the term international criminal law and then selects two models; the International Criminal Court and the exercise of universal jurisdiction, to gauge the success, or failure, of international criminal law in satisfying Schwarzenberger's criterion.

This article examines the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I. It focuses on a paradox in that these rules aim to protect employees jurisdictionally, but in fact fail to accord employees a more favourable treatment when they need it most, namely when they appear as claimants. The article argues that the current rules fail to achieve the objective of employee protection, examines the reasons for this, proposes certain amendments that would improve the existing rules, and thereby engages in the debate surrounding the forthcoming review of Brussels I.

This article addresses an important and complex subject relating to the link between international law and economic development. There is broad agreement that trade liberalization and participation in foreign markets play an important role in economic development. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have generally pursued a liberalization route over the past two decades, but their economic performance has been deeply disappointing. In this article, we look at seven countries in the Horn of Africa and examine, from legal and institutional perspectives, the central question of why these countries have failed to translate their comparative advantage, particularly in the livestock sector, into meaningful trade-led economic growth. In order to answer this question, we have reviewed the relevant legal and policy instruments and the literature, visited five of the seven countries, and interviewed different players in the livestock value chain. Analysis of the evidence reveals that the main impediments to trade relate to rising sanitary import requirements in foreign markets and weak institutional capacity within the Horn. The limited technical and financial resources available to these countries also reduce their capacity to meet these standards. Meaningful institutional change requires substantial involvement of local actors and it takes place incrementally and over the long term. International law can play a role in this process by promoting the rule of law and tackling corruption, facilitating capacity-building, and encouraging regional integration.

This article is part of a larger international investigation of the effects of a country's legal origins on the style of business regulation. We employ an innovative ‘leximetric’ methodology to numerically code the protective strength of Australian corporate law for both shareholder and creditor protection for the period 1970 to 2010. This leximetric methodology has been used in a prominent international debate concerning the development of legal rules and the effects of different styles of regulation on a range of economic outcomes—the legal origins debate. Drawing on similar data compiled by Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems in five other countries (France, Germany, India, the UK and the US) for the period 1970 to 2005, we compare changes in the level of protection afforded to Australian shareholders and creditors with developments in other countries. Our analysis finds that in Australia there was a sustained upward trend in shareholder protection, but not in the case of creditor protection. Compared to the five other countries, the level of protection afforded to shareholders under Australian law was relatively high, and this was the case for the level of protection afforded to creditors as well. We also examine the extent of convergence and divergence in shareholder and creditor protection among the countries in the study. We find persistent divergence in shareholder protection, with the extent of divergence in 2005 similar to that in 1970. For creditor protection, we find increasing divergence among the countries over the period of study. Our findings are not supportive of legal origins theory.

The title of this article1 is drawn from Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's famous monograph, published in 1933, entitled The Function of Law in the International Community.2 Writing in a decade when the shattering effects of the physical destruction wrought by World War I were giving way to the debilitating effects of the Great Depression, and when the invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia would sit side-by-side with the rise of Fascism in Germany and the great Stalinist terror in Russia, Lauterpacht was, not unnaturally, seeking a better way to a peaceful future under the Rule of Law. At that time, the recently established International Court in The Hague was dealing with acutely political cases, such as the question of the compatibility of the Austro-German Customs Union with the post-war peace settlement;3 and the cool rationality of debate in the Peace Palace seemed to offer a better way.

Prior to the rise of international investment treaties and institutionalization of investor–state arbitration, the protection of foreign investors from mistreatment in the host state courts was the preserve of customary international law, which prohibited a denial of justice and provided for diplomatic protection as a principal means of dispute settlement. In contrast, contemporary international investment law offers a whole array of legal standards that can be invoked in seeking redress for the acts of national courts before international arbitral tribunals. In addition to relying on the customary prohibition of denial of justice, investors can challenge judicial conduct under the treaty standards on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and, in some cases, the obligation to ensure effective means of asserting claims. Although the multiplicity of standards available to aggrieved investors can be regarded as an inalienable part of an effective regime for the protection of foreign investment, it also gives rise to a number of fundamental problems relating to the application of procedural mechanisms designed to control the review of the conduct of national judiciary by international courts and tribunals. Focusing on arbitral cases in which claims of a denial of justice were brought under the rubric of ‘a judicial expropriation’ and ‘a failure to provide effective means of asserting claims’, this article seeks to ascertain when investor claims relating to the administration of justice in the host state courts become amenable to arbitral scrutiny. It argues that, by providing a variety of standards under which the acts of judiciary can be challenged, investment treaty law allows investors to circumvent procedural barriers and thus muddles the boundaries demarcating the scope of international review of national judicial conduct.

In February 2011,2 an uprising began in Benghazi in eastern Libya against the long-established Gaddafi3 Government. After initial military success by the rebels in the east, the government responded forcefully. In the light of threats made by the government to the lives of people in Benghazi, the Security Council authorized ‘any necessary measures’ to protect civilian lives in Libya and to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya's air space.4 Acting on this authorization, NATO forces intervened to enforce the no-fly zone and to protect civilians. The resolution precluded the occupation of Libya, so the NATO action was confined to aerial and some naval bombardment of regime targets in Libya. The combined effects of operations by the irregular forces of the rebels and the bombing by NATO eventually led to the defeat of Government forces and the death of President Gaddafi on 20 October 2011. However, the overthrow of the regime was principally the work of groups in the west and south-west, not formally associated with the original insurrection in the east. This note is not concerned with matters of legality of the use of force or the way in which the campaign was conducted by any of the participants.5 It deals with the diplomatic aspects of the development of relations between the United Kingdom, the Gaddafi Government of Libya and the ‘National Transitional Council’ (NTC). It raises some speculation about the implications in domestic law of the way British policy was conducted.

On 3 January 2009 Israel deployed a naval blockade against Gaza in order to prevent materials entering or leaving Gaza that could be used by Hamas in its ongoing armed conflict with Israel.1 With the humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsening, on 31 May 2010 a flotilla of vessels carrying humanitarian aid expressed its intention to violate the naval blockade and deliver the aid to Gaza. Before violating the blockade and whilst still on the high seas, Israel sought to enforce its blockade and capture the vessels. This occurred largely without incident except in relation to the Mavi Marmara (a vessel sailing under the flag of the Comoros), which resisted capture by the Israeli special forces and continued to sail in the direction of Gaza. As Israel special forces boarded the Mavi violence ensued, with nine crew members of the Mavi being killed and dozens of others injured (principally Turkish nationals). Several members of Israel's special forces were also injured. Israel eventually assumed control of the ship and the crew members were detained and the vessel and its cargo confiscated.

On 25 July 2011, the governments of Australia and Malaysia announced that they had entered into an ‘Arrangement’ for the transfer of asylum seekers.1 Its stated aim was to deter asylum seekers from travelling by boat to Australia by providing that the next 800 asylum seekers to arrive unlawfully would be transferred to Malaysia in exchange for the resettlement of 4,000 UNHCR-approved refugees living there.2 The joint media release by the Australian Prime Minister and Minister for Immigration lauded it as a ‘groundbreaking arrangement’ that demonstrated ‘the resolve of Australia and Malaysia to break the people smugglers’ business model, stop them profiting from human misery, and stop people risking their lives at sea’.3 The success of the Arrangement relied on Malaysia being perceived as an inhospitable host country for asylum seekers, with the Australian Government emphasising that it provided ‘the best course of action to make sure that we sent the maximum message of deterrence’.4 The Government also made clear that those transferred to Malaysia would ‘go to the back of the [asylum] queue’.5

The long anticipated judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom1 provided a conclusion to years of academic debate regarding the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to United Kingdom military operations in Iraq.2 In question was the extent to which, if any, United Kingdom forces owed Convention obligations to Iraqi citizens when conducting security operations. For the Grand Chamber the case provided an opportunity to re-address the jurisdiction of the treaty under article 1.