Governing in multilevel settings has become a prominent research field in comparative political science. This article asks if German state parties adopt similar ideological positions and coalition strategies to the parties on the federal stage. The results of a content analysis of state and federal election manifestos show that German political parties on the state level indeed adopt different programmatic positions to the federal parties'. Government formation on the state level, however, is not only influenced by the state parties' programmatic viewpoints, but also by the predominant patterns of coalition politics at the federal level.

After the 2006 elections, a bourgeois government came to power in Sweden. This article argues that the popularity of the ‘universal’ Swedish welfare state has led the dominant ‘neoliberal’ party (Moderaterna) to adapt its policies; the party has accepted that the modern welfare state is irreplaceable. In the short run the party can only hope to achieve incremental changes, but at the same time the party wants to change society (lower taxes) in the long run. The differences between the allegedly neoliberal 1980s and 2006 should not conceal that the mechanism of welfare popularity remains largely the same. The party's policy proposals tend to suggest only incremental changes in both periods.

The lack of effective political parties is one of the dominant characteristics of modern Arab polities. The role of opposition to the authoritarian regimes is therefore left to a number of civil society organizations. This study examines the interactions among such groups in the context of the traditional transition paradigm and it analyses specifically how religious and secular organizations operate and interact. The empirical evidence shows that such groups, far from attempting any serious coalition-building to make common demands for democracy on the regime, have a competitive relationship because of their ideological differences and conflicting policy preferences. This strengthens authoritarian rule even in the absence of popular legitimacy. The article focuses its attention on Algeria and Jordan.

This article contends that intra-party dynamics based on particularistic exchanges constitute a double-edged sword for a political system. On the one hand, they provide party leaders with strategic flexibility, which can be essential for their party stability and for the governability of the political system. On the other hand, in permitting office holders to switch policies whenever they consider fit, these dynamics render governments unpredictable and unaccountable in partisan terms, thus debasing the quality of democratic representation. The hypothesis is illustrated by recent Argentine political development.