This article focuses on the European Court of Justice's [ECJ] recent case law on the free movement of goods in order to show how the boundaries of the prohibition laid out under Articles 28 to 30 EC are once again coming under strain. Such a development, it will be argued, can be observed both in terms of the modification of the scope of the prohibitions set out by Articles 28 and 29 EC and of their application to purely internal situations.

This essay is a true working paper, a work-in-progress that raises a set of questions that I am not yet sure how to answer. The questions are not unknown; indeed, they lurk in the shadows of scholarly discourse on the three systems I will examine. They are, however, often ignored in research and commentary on the constitutional law, and they have never been the focus of comparative inquiry. I nonetheless will argue that the answers one gives to them will bear directly on how we should understand the nature, evolution, and political (i.e., normative) legitimacy of legal systems.

In this work I will try to analyse the latest trends of the European integration process in light of the notion of complexity, conceived as a bilaterally active relationship between diversities.

This notion of complexity comes from a comparison among the different meanings of this word as used in several disciplines (law, physics, mathematics, psychology, philosophy) and recovers the etymological sense of this concept (complexity from Latin complexus= interlaced). The effort to find a common linguistic core could cause ambiguity but I would like to take the risk because only a multidisciplinary approach can “catch” the hidden dimension of the European process I argue that the European Union legal order is a “complex” entity that shares some features with complex systems in natural sciences: non-reducibility, unpredictability, non-reversibility and non-determinability.

The territory of the European Union is made up of a rich and wide-ranging universe of languages. The European Union contains a wealth of languages. In its current form there are more than 60 autochthonous languages in the 27 Member States, with widely differing situations and legal statuses. The principal characteristic of the European linguistic diversity is the great heterogeneity of situations and internal legal statuses that the european languages display. Most of the languages of EU are spoken by very few people and few languages are enormously widespread. There are many languages in the EU, which, in spite of having an appreciable number of speakers, do not have official recognition. And there are languages that are co-official or have some sort of official recognition in some areas, but struggle to survive. Multilingualism is one of the defining characteristics of the EU, and it is worth examining how EU law deals with it.

The province of Kosovo – 2 million people in 11,000 square kilometres of territory nestled between Serbia to the North and Albania and Macedonia to the South – was thrust into the international limelight when Serbian actions to repress Kosovo Albanian calls for independence made it a subject of international concern at the end of the 1990s. While Kosovo is not unique in becoming well-known for suffering the repressive actions of a parent state, and while it has not even enjoyed the distinction of being the only territorial administration of its time, it appears to be unique in its (potential) impact on the doctrines of international law. On a number of levels, the international community's response to the situation created by Milosevic's actions and NATO's intervention threaten to call fundamental pillars of the post-World War II order into question. It is too early to speculate conclusively on whether the NATO action in Kosovo sans Security Council approval in some measure paved the way for an emerging doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” that, in turn, opened the door to the illegal invasion of Iraq. It seems not implausible to suggest that the apparent success of unauthorised military intervention in Kosovo in stopping mass human rights violations emboldened politicians on both sides of the Atlantic in opting for a moral path over the formally legal one. In any event, grounded as they are in that history, the final status talks on the future of Kosovo represent a serious challenge to the current framing of the international order. It is these issues that this symposium wished to raise and examine.

This contribution examines the possible contribution the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can make towards the achievement of transitional justice in countries or regions recovering from (civil) war or other serious conflict. It will first briefly epitomize the recent process culminating in the set-up of the PBC and then address the functions and tools of the Commission with particular focus on its transitional justice capabilities. Thereby, I will examine conceivable operative approaches the PBC might take in the first cases submitted to it, i.e., Burundi and Sierra Leone, and assess the Commission's potential and added value both in general terms but in particular with regard to transitional justice activities.

This contribution will contain an analysis of important European dynamics, particularly at this moment when it seems to be necessary to restart the process of a unified European identity, which was, in a way, compromised after the failure of the EU Constitution and the difficulty of giving effectiveness to democracy:

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has today become the rhetoric of every Business Enterprise, especially those engaged in Natural Resource Development. This is in recognition of its intrinsic value to the business bottom line and its ability to stave off social and reputation risks that may not only affect a project's rate of return, but also subject to questioning, its ‘social licence’ to operate. But the ‘free rider’, ‘green wash’ and ‘blue wash’ problems that result from self-regulation inherent in the practical implementation of CSR initiatives, has led to questions as to whether self regulation as exemplified in the ‘soft law’ approach to CSR and transparency, is really the answer to the problem of using CSR and Transparency initiatives, to ensure that Mineral Resource Development benefits all parties on the Mineral Development Triangle. Is government regulation a better option or should industry driven self-regulation be allowed to continue? This paper reviews the above issues using examples from a few countries to show the way forward.

Approximately ten to fifteen years ago the “danger of Europeanization” of the German law on churches and religion was hotly debated. The churches in Germany feared that the influence of the European Union would dramatically change their legal framework. But also academic writers worried about the influence of the common market law or European antidiscrimination law on the legal situation of the churches in the member states – sometimes in rather shrill tone. One almost got the impression that Brussels replaced the Marxist Ideologiekritik (critique of ideology) as the main enemy of Christianity in Europe.

On its website “The EU Single Market – Fewer barriers, more opportunities”, the European Commission lists the judgments by the European Court of Justice [ECJ] dealing with the free movement of capital under Art 56 EC Treaty (ex 73b). The latest update of this list is the Court's Volkswagen decision of 23 October 2007 (Case C-112/2005), which the Commission had launched against the Federal Republic of Germany on 4 March 2005. This suit, brought under Art. 226 EC Treaty, had been long coming. That the Volkswagen statute, which effectively gave the Federal government and the Land (federal state) of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) a veto against majority acquisition while only holding a fifth of all shares, would come into the Commission's purview, could hardly surprise, given the Commission's activity with regard to such ‘golden share’ provisions under Portuguese, French, Belgian and English company laws. The most recent decision of the ECJ in the case of Volkswagen is of interest in more than one respect. Not only does it constitute a continuation and further accentuation of a line of argument that the Court has been unfolding over past few years with regard to the Member State provisions in conflict with the EC's guarantee of the free movement of capital as laid down in Art. 56 EC.

As is well known, both the drafting and the anticipated ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty were surrounded by a lively debate. The communicative spectacle created by the “Convention on the Future of Europe” and its ambitious plan to draw up a European constitution served as the major attractors. The debate was conducted, of course, in different settings and at several levels. What interests me here, though, is that the public and the academic debate emphasised different aspects of the overall project.

On a global level, we are witnessing a revitalisation of religion, which also includes a re-politisation of religion, particularly within contemporary Islam. Religion has become, once again, a political topos. The secularised western world is thus facing a new challenge, for which it appears to be inadequately prepared. The idea of freedom of religion, guaranteed as a fundamental right, obliges western democratic states to respect the religious activities of their citizens and to secure their free development. Therefore, the state is principally neither allowed to favour nor to discriminate against certain professions of faith. This concept of equidistance is known as the principle of state neutrality: it commits the state to generally withdraw from religious issues, especially the political act of defining what can legitimately be classified as religion and religious behaviour. The leeway given to the self-conception of religious groups by the German Federal Constitutional Court and its wide understanding of what kind of behaviour has a direct relationship to faith and therefore deserves protection by the freedom of religion, is to be understood against the context of this general principle. However, with regard to the new challenges mentioned above, the neutrality principle increasingly serves yet another purpose. The courts use it as an exit-option in order to avoid addressing problems which appear to be too complex for the law relegating religion to sociological study. In this context, state neutrality merely functions as a chiffre for indifference. But this strategy of avoidance, though understandable in the light of the complexity of religious pluralism, undermines the law's function of conflict resolution. Furthermore, it neither corresponds to the historical development nor to the functional aspects of the idea of religious freedom.

The right of counsel in criminal proceedings is granted by section 137 (1) of the Strafprozessordnung (Criminal Procedure Code), which gives a person the right to obtain legal advice in criminal proceedings whenever he or she wishes, or as the law states: “in jeder Lage des Verfahrens“ (at any stage of the proceedings). There are different stages of criminal proceedings, which are to be distinguished under German Law, but section 137 governs the whole process and is not limited, for instance, to the pre-trial or the trial itself.

Many questions come to the mind if one starts thinking about morality and the law - questions about the epistemological or ontological status of morality, its content, motivating force or cognitive accessibility. They concern the content of norms, the enigma of justice and the demands of human solidarity. The universality, particularity or relativity of morality and material legal standards is as much an issue as the general relation of morality and the law.

The governmental role played by the United Nations in Kosovo since 1999 raises a host of questions for international lawyers. Chief among these is whether governmental acts of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) should be subject to review within Kosovo for compliance with applicable legal standards. In principle, such review would be helpful in ensuring UNMIK accountability and in sending the message that the governors—as well as the governed—in Kosovo are subject to the rule of law. However, for many, the prospect of actors in Kosovo second-guessing decisions taken by UNMIK is problematic, partly due to a fear that review could be used to derail the UNMIK-led peacebuilding process in the territory.

Which element of democracy is to prevail in the composition of parliament: an accurate reflection of minorities and their ideas, or a strong bond between citizens and their representatives? The answer, it seems, is to be determined to a large extent by the national political culture. The political history of the Netherlands makes strict proportionality the highest principle in this regard. Over the years, various attempts at fundamental electoral reform have been left stranded. It seems that the current system of proportional representation will remain intact in the Netherlands in spite of periodic attempts at change, as it probably best reflects the Dutch culture's longing for maximum inclusiveness.

In recent months a criminal law case has strained relations between Germany and Turkey. A 17 year-old German citizen, who had been vacationing in a Turkish seaside resort town of Antalya with his parents was arrested there in Spring 2007 for allegedly having sexually abused a 13 year- old girl, also a tourist on holiday in Turkey with her parents. Presently, court proceedings are still underway in Antalya. Although the suspect has admitted to having had a sexual encounter with the girl, tests indicated that the intercourse was consensual. Initially both politicians and parts of the media expressed their shock at the arrest and detention of the suspect rather than the alleged crime itself. At the present time of writing there is insufficient information to adequately assess the facts of the case and it is important to note that the young man has not yet been convicted of any crime. Yet, based on media reports concerning statements made by the suspect himself, the case presents a number of interesting questions from the perspective of German law. These questions require a closer look, particularly in the light of the criticism directed at Turkish authorities from German politicians and media and since the Staatsanwaltschaft (Office of the Prosecutor) in Lüneburg (the suspect's hometown) is now investigating as well. This article considers, as a revealing comparative exercise, how the alleged crime would be addressed under German law.

The constitutional structure of the EU comprises two different components, one supranational (the European Community - EC) and one intergovernmental (the European Union). The EC is referred to as the first pillar, while the European Union in turn consists of two parts referred to as the second and third pillars respectively: the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the second, and the Police & Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the so called “area of Freedom, Security and Justice” - PJCC). The role of the common European institutions was from the outset more limited not just when it - which is logical - comes to legislation, but also when it comes to consultation and preparation of legislation. However, the ECJ retained jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of so called framework decisions in order to create a basis for uniform implementation in national law of such decisions. This was particularly true in relation to the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Whereas the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was granted jurisdiction in PJCC, the other community institutions, notably the European Commission, were given roles to supervise the implementation of framework decisions - but their role in enforcing uniformity was limited compared to the role of the community institutions in EC-law.

“Margin of appreciation” refers to the power of a Contracting State in assessing the factual circumstances, and in applying the provisions envisaged in international human rights instruments. Margin of appreciation is based on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights and national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse moral convictions. In this regard, the doctrine is analogous to the concept of judicial discretion, where a judge, in line with certain constraints prescribed by legislation, precedent or custom, could decide a case within a range of possible solutions. The role of discretion is indispensable not only for bridging the gap between the law and changing realities of dynamic social organisms, but also for answering the particular questions of a given case in the absence of overall enacted or case law. In other words, judges are entitled to exercise discretion to make fair decisions in a specific case, without being locked into a formula that might not be applicable to every scenario.

I wanted to begin by thanking Dr. Voneky for her thoughtful contribution to this rapidly developing area of international law. One of the purposes of the ongoing dialogue with my European counterparts on the legal framework for the use of force and detention of combatants in an armed conflict with non-state actors is to spur dialogue to arrive at a common approach on these issues. I agree with many things in Dr. Voneky's article. I am pleased that, unlike many critics of the United States, she recognizes that it is possible to use force in self defense from armed attacks not directly linked to the actions of any state, and that the law of armed conflict would govern that use of force. I also appreciate that she notes that actions against terrorist groups outside a state's country are not necessarily simply transnational police actions. I wanted to take this brief opportunity to note three areas where there may be some misunderstandings regarding the views of the United States, and then discuss my thoughts on the way forward.